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Abstract. In the wake of recent high-profile power failures, policymakers and politicians
have asserted that there is an inherent tension between the aims of clean energy and grid
reliability. But continuing to rely on fossil fuels to avoid system outages will only
exacerbate reliability challenges by contributing to increasingly extreme climate-related
weather events. These extremes will disrupt the power supply, with impacts rippling far
beyond the electricity sector.
This Article shows that much of the perceived tension between clean energy and
reliability is a failure of law and governance resulting from the United States’ siloed
approach to regulating the electric grid. Energy regulation is, we argue, siloed across three
dimensions: (1) across substantive responsibilities (clean energy versus reliability);
(2) across jurisdictions (federal, regional, state, and sometimes local); and (3) across a
public–private continuum of actors. This segmentation renders the full convergence of
clean-energy and reliability goals extremely difficult. Reliability-focused organizations
operating within their silos routinely counteract climate policies when making decisions
about how to keep the lights on. Similarly, legal silos often cause states and regional
organizations to neglect valuable opportunities for collaboration.
Despite the challenges posed by this disaggregated system, conceptualizing the sphere of
energy reliability as siloed across these dimensions unlocks new possibilities for reform.
We do not propose upending energy law silos or making energy institutions wholly
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public. Rather, we argue for calibrated reforms to U.S. energy law and governance that
shift authority within and among the silos to integrate the twin aims of reliability and
low-carbon energy. Across the key policy areas of electricity markets, transmission
planning and siting, reliability regulation, and regional grid governance, we assess changes
that would integrate climate and reliability imperatives; balance state, regional, and federal
jurisdiction; and reconcile public and private values. We believe this approach to energy
law reform offers a holistic and realistic formula for a cleaner, more reliable grid.
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Introduction
To avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate change, the United States
must rapidly decrease fossil fuel dependence while keeping the lights, heat, and
air conditioning on—an increasingly difficult task due to extreme weather
events intensified by climate change.1 Many have cast these dual imperatives as
dueling imperatives, arguing that there is an inherent tension between climate
policy and the regulations needed to keep the lights on. In 2011, for example,
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)—the U.S. agency
responsible for electric-grid reliability—claimed that “[e]nvironmental
regulations are shown to be the number one risk to reliability over the next
one to five years.”2 More recently, in 2021, the same agency expressed concern
that the shift to increased renewable energy resources had the potential to
threaten grid reliability.3
One high-profile example that has drawn attention to the perceived
conflict between a clean-energy transition and grid reliability took place in the
aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. In mid-February of 2021, an unusual yet
increasingly common type of storm pummeled the lower Midwest, causing a
prolonged cold snap in Texas and neighboring states. In Texas alone, millions
of people were without power and water for days.4 Texans huddled in freezing
homes, trying to stay warm and find backup power for essential medical
equipment—all while water pipes burst and city water-delivery systems
faltered.5 This loss of electricity to 69% of Texans had cascading effects.6 Many
areas experienced cell phone–service disruptions, which made it more difficult
1. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2019 STATE OF RELIABILITY, at viii (2019) (observing

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

that all of the worst grid failures in 2018 were caused by extreme weather events); see
also Miranda Willson, Cost of Climate Change to the Grid? $4B, POLITICO PRO:
ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 12, 2022, 7:09 AM EST), https://perma.cc/J2CE-57UN (to locate,
select “View the live page”) (discussing a report showing that extreme weather events
due to climate change may cost utilities over $4 billion each year).
Opinion, More Green Blackouts Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2021, 7:04 PM ET),
https://perma.cc/sR9MX-TNHK (to locate, select “View the live page”).
Robert Walton, NERC Sees Potential Summer Energy Shortfalls, Says Energy Transition
“Pace” May Threaten Reliability, UTIL. DIVE (May 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/7R86-2JNB.
UNIV. OF HOUS. HOBBY SCH. OF PUB. AFFS., THE WINTER STORM OF 2021, at 1 (2021),
https://perma.cc/K42N-3LSF.
See Reese Oxner & Juan Pablo Garnham, Over a Million Texans Are Still Without
Drinking Water. Smaller Communities and Apartments Are Facing the Biggest Challenges.,
TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2021, 6:00 PM CT), https://perma.cc/2T7C-95AV (describing how
“a peak of about 14.9 million Texans faced water disruptions”); Mike Hixenbaugh &
Perla Trevizo, Texans Recovering from COVID-19 Relied on Machines to Help Them Breathe.
Then the Power Went Out., TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2021, 6:00 AM CT), https://perma.cc/
5TWL-2MHJ (describing medical-equipment failures).
UNIV. OF HOUS. HOBBY SCH. OF PUB. AFFS., supra note 4, at 6, 12.
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for pipeline and power-plant workers to address rapidly developing
emergencies.7 The pumps and other electrical equipment needed to run natural
gas wells, pipelines, and power plants to support the skyrocketing demand for
home heating failed.8 Residents in neighboring states suffered as well: In
Jackson, Mississippi, the storm caused a power outage and damaged the city’s
drinking-water plant, causing a monthlong water crisis.9 Estimates place the
number of deaths from the storm and the electric grid and related
infrastructure failure at between 150 and 700, with damages totaling hundreds
of billions of dollars.10
State officials were quick to blame these outages on renewable energy,
pointing to wind turbines that froze during the storm.11 After the disaster, Sid
Miller, Texas’s Agriculture Commissioner, asserted that “[w]e should never
build another wind turbine in Texas.”12 Expert analyses, however, just as
quickly concluded that outages at fossil fuel plants, not wind farms, were the
central cause of the blackouts.13 But even with this information in hand, Texas
7. See id. at 12 (noting that approximately 47% of Texans lost cell phone service).
8. See UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INST., THE TIMELINE AND EVENTS OF THE

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

FEBRUARY 2021 TEXAS ELECTRIC GRID BLACKOUTS 9, 44-45 (2021), https://perma.cc/
4N7Y-TN3G (suggesting that electrical outages were a partial cause of natural gas
production declines and pipeline problems).
See Ellen Ann Fentress & Richard Fausset, “You Can’t Bathe. You Can’t Wash.” Water
Crisis Hobbles Jackson, Miss., for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/
S7PZ-E42E (noting that “[n]early one month” after Winter Storm Uri, “more than 70
percent of the city’s water customers remained under a notice to boil water”).
Peter Aldhous, Stephanie M. Lee & Zahra Hirji, The Texas Winter Storm and Power
Outages Killed Hundreds More People than the State Says, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 26, 2021,
6:09 PM ET), https://perma.cc/85LA-55RQ (reporting on an independent investigation
estimating that 702 people were killed during the week of Winter Storm Uri, as
compared to the state’s official tally of 151); PERRYMAN GRP., PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES
OF ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE FEBRUARY 2021 TEXAS WINTER STORM 1 (2021),
https://perma.cc/F75M-T7KE (estimating “projected long-term losses in gross product
over time” as “between $85.8 and $128.7 billion”).
Bryan Mena, Gov. Greg Abbott and Other Republicans Blamed Green Energy for Texas’
Power Woes. But the State Runs on Fossil Fuels., TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2021, 7:00 PM CT),
https://perma.cc/6GLM-HVJF; see Lessons Learned from the Texas Blackouts: Research
Needs for a Secure and Resilient Grid: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech.,
117th Cong. 4 (2021) (statement of Jesse D. Jenkins, Assistant Professor, Princeton
University) (stating that “2,000 MW of wind turbines were forced offline by the cold”).
Erin Douglas & Ross Ramsey, No, Frozen Wind Turbines Aren’t the Main Culprit for
Texas’ Power Outages, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/78SN-ERUP.
See, e.g., Bill Magness, Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event—
ERCOT Presentation 14 (2021), https://perma.cc/3C75-ZYCJ (showing that natural gas
in Texas experienced greater reduction in generation capacity than any other fuel
type); FERC ET AL., THE FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER OUTAGES IN TEXAS AND THE
SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES 15 (2021), https://perma.cc/KP33-Q56F (showing that
27% of wind-generating units and 58% of natural gas–fired units experience “outages,
derates, or failures to start”); see also Jacob Mays, Michael T. Craig, Lynne Kiesling,
footnote continued on next page

975

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

lawmakers responded with reforms that harden the existing, fossil fuel–centric
system, requiring stronger equipment at natural gas wells and pipelines and
natural gas–fired plants.14 These types of actions are important but nearsighted
responses to the root causes of recent reliability failures: They fail to fully
account for potential alternative investments in clean-energy resources that
could ensure reliability while avoiding the entrenchment of fossil fuels.15
The perceived tension between a clean-energy transition and a reliable
electric grid is not only a political talking point. For at least a century, the
American legal system has treated energy and the environment as distinct
policy concerns. In the 1930s, Congress charged the Federal Power
Commission, later renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), with regulating the country’s interstate natural gas and electricity
systems—several decades before President Nixon created the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the environment.16 This distribution of
authority endures, as the EPA is primarily responsible for regulating the
environment, including the reduction of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions
from energy use, and FERC is primarily responsible for regulating the energy
grid.
Today, energy and environmental goals have converged to some degree,
particularly through states adopting aggressive clean-energy laws to tackle
climate change.17 Nonetheless, the energy regulatory system is disaggregated in
ways that exacerbate the failure of energy policy to support both a reliable and

14.

15.
16.

17.

Joshua C. Macey, Blake Shaffer & Han Shu, Private Risk and Social Resilience in
Liberalized Electricity Markets, 6 JOULE 369, 370 (2022) (arguing that market
incompleteness contributed to the February 2021 blackouts in Texas).
See, e.g., H.R. 11, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (mandating that the Texas Public
Utility Commission require each utility to “prepare generation facilities to provide
adequate electric generation service during an extreme weather emergency”).
See infra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
Federal Power Act (FPA), ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 839-41 (1935) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 797-799); Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1971); Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See generally Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy–Environment
Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010) (advocating for legal reform that aligns the
energy and environmental law fields to address climate change, enhance electric-grid
reliability, and promote renewable energy); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the
Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 180 (2013)
(discussing how climate change has brought the two fields closer together); Jody
Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and Environmental Law, 41 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 339 (2017) (discussing continuing barriers to the integration of
environmental law and energy law).
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low-carbon electric grid.18 States control many decisions about the
construction and siting of electric generating plants and the location of
virtually all electric transmission lines—even those that extend across multiple
states.19 These transmission lines are critical to supporting the large amounts
of new renewable energy infrastructure that will be necessary to meaningfully
reduce U.S. carbon emissions.20 Meanwhile, the federal government oversees
wholesale electricity markets and regional planning and financing of electric
transmission lines.21 These markets, too, are essential to the expansion of
renewable energy resources because they determine which types of generation
win out in the competition for supplying electricity. And planning and paying
for new transmission lines is a necessary precondition for a clean grid.22
The governance of this disaggregated system is complex. In some parts of
the United States, regional institutions called regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) are responsible for implementing these policies under
the supervision of FERC. These RTOs sometimes work in concert with the
states in which they operate, and sometimes directly against the wishes of the
states.23 In other regions, utilities and states have opposed the formation of
RTOs and therefore rely on more balkanized approaches to wholesale energy
procurement and planning for and financing transmission lines.24 And
throughout the entire country, regional institutions called “regional entities”
manage the direct regulation of electric-grid reliability under federal
oversight.25
To further complicate matters, a curious mix of public and private
institutions governs the energy sector. Some institutions are wholly public,
such as FERC and the state utility commissions that govern electric generation
18. Earlier works explored disaggregation outside of the carbon context and painted it

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

primarily as a regulatory-commons problem. They focused on three jurisdictional
“dislocations”—several federal agencies operating in the energy space, sharing
jurisdiction with states, and operating within the shadow of judicial review. See, e.g.,
Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1002, 1003 (1987).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 836-37 (2016) (describing the
“[t]raditional [m]odel” that prevails in these states); Conor Harrison & Shelley Welton,
The States That Opted Out: Politics, Power, and Exceptionalism in the Quest for Electricity
Deregulation in the United States South, ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 2021, at 1, 7-9
(elucidating state opposition to RTOs).
See infra Part V.

977

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

choices and the approval (or “siting”) of transmission lines. But RTOs and
regional entities are private, nonprofit institutions, as is NERC, the
organization that oversees the reliability of the electric grid as a whole.26 The
energy sector’s substantial reliance on private governing institutions creates an
additional layer of challenges that at times compounds jurisdictional and
subject-matter divisions, even as these organizations’ technical expertise at
times provides a distinct benefit.27
We believe that this segmentation of energy policy—a phenomenon that
renders the true convergence of energy and environmental policy extremely
difficult—is an underdiagnosed cause of the perceived clash between clean
energy and grid reliability. The siloed approach to energy regulation creates
significant impediments to clean-energy policies, as reliability organizations
often counteract clean-energy policies—often inadvertently, but sometimes
more deliberately—when making decisions about how to keep the lights on.
Similarly, legal silos often cause states and regional organizations to neglect
valuable opportunities for collaboration. We view overcoming this structural
separation that prevents the establishment of a clean, reliable grid as a crucial
precondition to substantial progress on climate change mitigation in the
United States.
To be sure, a grid that runs on dramatically different sources of energy
will require different strategies to ensure its reliability. But the need to
reconceptualize and enhance reliability should not detract from the fact that the
only way to secure a reliable grid under conditions of climate change is to
rapidly engage in a clean-energy transition in the electricity sector.28 We need
an institutional framework for energy in the United States that embraces this
critical challenge.
Scholars often identify federalism as a central impediment to a clean,
reliable grid, leading to the politically fraught but diagnostically simple cure of
federalizing more energy policy.29 We argue that the diagnosis is more
26. See, e.g., About MISO, MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, https://perma.cc/8ESX-

5UTU (archived Mar. 24, 2022); About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
https://perma.cc/SXZ6-P7L5 (archived Mar. 24, 2022).
27. See infra Parts IV-V.
28. See infra Part I.A.
29. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 423, 428 (2017) (arguing for a greater federal role
in transmission-line siting); Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a
National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1341, 1343-44 (2010) (arguing for a federal
renewable energy requirement). But see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
835, 852 (2008) (arguing that states play an important role in climate-policy
innovation); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1628 (2015)
(arguing for a split national–state approach). For a defense of the FPA’s distribution of
footnote continued on next page
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complex than jurisdictional mismatch. In fact, the commonly proposed
antidote of federalizing energy policy would fail to harmonize reliability and
climate policy, since many of the most significant impediments to climate
action occur within entities subject to FERC jurisdiction that are charged with
maintaining grid reliability. We show that energy policy is better understood
as siloed along three separate planes: (1) across environmental and reliability
goals; (2) among jurisdictions (federal, regional, state, and sometimes local); and
(3) along a public–private continuum of actors. These silos are largely
responsible for the failure of energy policy to adequately harmonize climate
change and reliability concerns.
Conceptualizing the sphere of energy-reliability governance as siloed
across multiple planes unlocks new possibilities for governance reforms that
shift authority not only across jurisdictional scales but across the public–
private continuum. This Article highlights these silos within four core areas of
U.S. energy policy and governance: (1) decisionmaking about the type and
amount of electricity generation; (2) planning for, financing, and siting electric
transmission lines; (3) directly regulating electric-grid reliability; and
(4) regionally governing the grid. In each of these areas, we evaluate the
structure of governance and substance of policy that impedes a cleaner, more
reliable grid, and we assess how this policy and structure must change.
The changes that we propose are transformative, but they do not wholly
upend U.S. energy policy. For reasons of both theory and political economy, we
partially embrace the disaggregation of energy governance within these core
areas.30 We explore how to effectively navigate the current siloed system by
reconfiguring the balance of authority and rewriting or expanding the
substance of policies. To date, energy regulators have at times operated within
their silos without fully considering how their regulations interact with—and
often conflict with—approaches adopted by other regulators. Our proposed
solutions focus on how targeted shifts in energy governance and policy
responsibilities could encourage a systematic embrace of policies that are
simultaneously assigned to disparate regulators. Doing so, we argue, would
better reflect the spirit of the applicable federal laws governing the electric
grid, which create federal and state spheres of responsibility. It would also
eliminate tensions between policies designed to promote grid reliability and
those designed to reduce GHG emissions. And finally, we evaluate the extent to
which congressional action will be necessary—if at all—to enable this new
institutional balance.

jurisdiction, see Matthew R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal
Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365-67 (2021).
30. See infra Part II (explaining the potential virtues of silos).
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Several of the policy suggestions that we explore here are not new; a
growing literature on clean-energy governance has advocated for many of
these reforms.31 Our novel contributions are threefold. First, policymakers and
scholars have advocated for these changes nearly exclusively in the sphere of
clean energy. We view these necessary modifications through a new lens,
exploring how the proposed policies would enhance both clean energy and
reliability. Second, most proposals for modifying energy policy to support
clean energy are themselves disaggregated, usually resting within the
transmission or RTO sphere. We propose a comprehensive suite of policy and
institutional changes—modifications that will be necessary through all parts of
the energy system that intertwine with climate mandates. Third, we emphasize
how substantive policy changes will fall flat without substantial governance
modifications that allow siloed actors to effectively create and implement new
policies. For example, a truly interregional transmission-planning process—
essential to the nationally connected grid that must support expanded
renewables—likely requires a new FERC or Department of Energy (DOE)
office that does the planning or coordinates regional organizations to conduct
the planning.
The project of creating a clean, reliable grid is often treated as a technical
challenge, dependent predominantly on the emergence of technological
breakthroughs or engineering feats.32 We show that it is equally—or largely—a
challenge of law and governance. The siloed institutions and rules that dictate
the configuration of the electric grid—the generation plants, transmission
lines, and distribution lines that carry electricity to customers—substantially
impede the rapid grid transformations necessary to tackle climate change.
These impediments create not only substantial economic costs, but also
real human costs—and unequal ones at that. Black, brown, and low-income
communities shoulder the bulk of the burdens caused by fossil fuel energy in
the United States (and in many other countries). They inhale the air pollution
from fossil fuel–fired power plants and toil in the dangerous conditions of
fossil fuel–production industries.33 Low-income communities and
31. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C (discussing transmission-siting reforms).
32. See, e.g., ANALYSIS GRP., ELECTRICITY MARKETS, RELIABILITY AND THE EVOLVING U.S.

POWER SYSTEM 48-65 (2017); Semich Impram, Secil Varbak Nese & Bülent Oral,
Challenges of Renewable Energy Penetration on Power System Flexibility: A Survey, ENERGY
STRATEGY REVS., Sept. 2020, at 1, 3-10 (collecting technical sources). See generally NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY (2012) (focusing
on the technical aspects of a high-renewables grid).
33. See Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the
Energy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1, 4-6, 13, 15 (2019); Maninder P.S. Thind,
Christopher W. Tessum, Inês L. Azevedo & Julian D. Marshall, Fine Particulate Air
Pollution from Electricity Generation in the US: Health Impacts by Race, Income, and
Geography, 53 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 14,010, 14,013 (2019) (finding that Black Americans’
footnote continued on next page
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communities of color are disproportionately burdened by blackouts and other
reliability issues, and are also hit hardest by severe climate events, because they
lack many of the resources needed to weather these events.34 Although
infrequently discussed or justified on equity grounds, it is worth emphasizing
that the reforms we propose would make the grid cleaner and more reliable
and would reduce costly redundancies between climate and reliability policies,
thereby charting a course toward a safer and more equitable climate and
energy future.
Part I of this Article explores the critical nexus between the low-carbonenergy imperative and a reliable grid and analyzes the disaggregated structure
of U.S. energy policy and governance. This Part foreshadows how the policy
and governance system impedes the contribution of renewable energy—the
key zero-carbon energy source in the United States—to grid reliability and
frames our approach to policy solutions. In the Parts that follow, we assess
necessary reconfigurations of authority in four key areas of energy policy.
Part II explores how silos in governance—not just energy—can be both
exposure to PM2.5 emissions from power plants exceeds that of all other races); Ann E.
Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1036, 1046-47 (2018) (tracing how the Clean Air Act fails to regulate microclimates
of heavy pollution, which disproportionately occur in low-income communities of
color); Rachel Morello-Frosch, Miriam Zuk, Michael Jerrett, Bhavna Shamasunder &
Amy D. Kyle, Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities in Environmental
Health: Implications for Policy, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 879, 881 & nn.24-26 (2011); Christopher
W. Tessum et al., Inequity in Consumption of Goods and Services Adds to Racial–Ethnic
Disparities in Air Pollution Exposure, 116 PNAS 6001, 6001-03 (2019) (finding that Black
and Hispanic populations bear a pollution burden far exceeding the amount of
pollution that their consumption actually causes).
34. See James Dobbins & Hiroko Tabuchi, Texas Blackouts Hit Minority Neighborhoods
Especially Hard, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/79E7-JUL2;
Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 23, 25, 42 (2012) (describing how the United States has created a
“disaster underclass” by neglecting certain places and peoples); Jonathan P. Hooks &
Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those Most in
Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 23-25 (2006) (focusing on the class and race dimensions of
disaster recovery after Hurricane Katrina); Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction:
Navigating the Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783,
1810 (discussing how environmental disasters highlight not only unequal exposure to
risks, but also differential abilities to cope with such risks); Michel Masozera, Melissa
Bailey & Charles Kerchner, Distribution of Impacts of Natural Disasters Across Income
Groups: A Case Study of New Orleans, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 299, 304 (2007) (examining
why “lower income groups were more vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina during the
response and recovery phases”); Ian P. Davies, Ryan D. Haugo, James C. Robertson &
Phillip S. Levin, The Unequal Vulnerability of Communities of Color to Wildfire, 13 PLOS
ONE, No. 11, Nov. 2018, at 1, 6; Wil Lieberman-Cribbin, Christina Gillezeau, Rebecca
M. Schwartz & Emanuela Taioli, Unequal Social Vulnerability to Hurricane Sandy Flood
Exposure, 31 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENV’T EPIDEMIOLOGY 804, 804-05, 807 (2020) (finding
disparate impacts by class and race related to flooding after Hurricane Sandy).
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beneficial and problematic. The Parts that follow then consider how energy
governance silos can be leveraged, partially knocked down, or integrated to
create a cleaner, more reliable U.S. electric grid. Part III proposes changes to the
regulated state and regional markets that dictate the electricity generation mix.
Part IV explores policies for expanding long-distance, high-voltage electric
transmission lines and more localized, distributed resources that will be
essential for the creation of a low-carbon energy economy. Part V then
analyzes the multilevel, direct regulation of grid reliability in the generation
and transmission sectors as well as its recent failures, proposing policy and
governance changes needed to enhance reliability while incorporating large
amounts of renewable generation. Part VI highlights the modifications needed
to allow regional institutions—particularly RTOs—to strike an essential
balance between state, federal, public, and private silos in grid policy and
governance. Finally, Part VII summarizes our policy and governance
proposals.
I.

Climate Change, Grid Reliability, and Energy Policy

U.S. energy policy is a poster child of complex systems. It is the product of
more than a century of incremental institutional additions and changes.
Utilities originally controlled the system, then states intervened,35 and later,
the federal government began to “intrude” in areas once dominated by the
states, in part due to Supreme Court directives.36 The result is a menagerie of
institutional actors often fighting for authority within a given policy space. A
slew of recent high-profile Supreme Court cases highlights the ongoing
tensions among state, regional, and federal actors in energy-governance
spheres.37

35. Richard J. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate

(Re)regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 45-48 (2005).
36. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927)

(holding that states could not assert jurisdiction over wholesale electricity sold in
interstate commerce), abrogated by Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 375 (1983); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1973)
(finding that federal antitrust principles applied to utility activity that blocked
competition).
37. See, e.g., PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2257 (2021) (holding that
private utilities exercising FERC-granted eminent domain authority may condemn
state-owned lands); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016)
(finding that a state program designed to incentivize new generation capacity was
preempted under the FPA); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 276-77
(2016) (finding that FERC had the authority to regulate demand-response resources—
which also operate in the state-regulated retail space—within federally regulated
wholesale markets).

982

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

This system poses challenges to the development of a clean, reliable grid.
Yet it is within this system that these challenges must be overcome. This Part
explains why the pursuit of grid reliability and clean energy are
complementary, mutually reinforcing goals for energy governance—thereby
counteracting the chorus of skeptics asserting their incompatibility. It
highlights the existing U.S. energy policies and governance structures that
impede the important contribution that renewable energy–generation sources
can make to reliability, and it introduces our comprehensive approach to
energy-policy transformation to overcome these hurdles.
A. Why a Decarbonized Grid Is a More Reliable Grid
The U.S. electric grid transmits electricity to homes, businesses, and
industries over an enormous, interconnected network of power plants and
other generation facilities; long-distance, high-voltage transmission lines; and
low-voltage distribution lines.38 These generation facilities are predominantly
powered by fossil fuels, but that is rapidly changing—and must change even
more quickly—to address the climate crisis. It is this endeavor that worries
skeptics, who increasingly argue that we cannot transition to a clean energy
grid while maintaining reliability.39
Grid reliability has three distinct elements. First, reliability refers to the
process of ensuring that there is enough generation at all points on the grid to
meet electricity demand at all times of day.40 A failure to exactly match
electricity supply and demand (or “load”) on an instantaneous basis can lead to
over- or under-voltages in the wires and, ultimately, a blackout—the complete
loss of power to customers.41 However, short-term planning can only go so far.
Ensuring reliability requires both very short-term and long-term planning and
decisionmaking, from instantaneously dispatching additional energygeneration reserves to address unexpectedly high demand to building
additional transmission lines that reduce congestion in existing wires.42

38. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND

RELIABILITY 1 (2017).
39. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
40. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., DEFINITION OF “ADEQUATE LEVEL OF RELIABILITY” 5

(2007), https://perma.cc/W6PA-QKKM.
41. Electricity Explained: How Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.

(Nov. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/7LZW-WFGB.
42. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 40, at 5 (defining reliability to cover both

“adequacy,” which is the “ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric
power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times,” and
“operating reliability,” which is “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden
disturbances”).
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Resource adequacy—an important second element of reliability—involves
long-term planning for new generation infrastructure to ensure that demand
for electricity will be covered in the future.43 In the United States, regulators
define an acceptable degree of resource adequacy as allowing only a day’s loss of
power every ten years.44 Finally, for the purposes of this Article, we also
intend for grid reliability to encompass the third related concept of “resilience,”
or the ability of the grid to bounce back after power disruptions caused by
weather or other emergencies, and to prevent blackouts during these
emergencies.45
It is important to acknowledge up front that a grid fueled by clean
energy—and in particular, by substantial quantities of renewable energy—
poses different reliability challenges than fossil fuel generation.46 Whereas
fossil fuel generators can often increase and decrease production (or “ramp,” in
industry terminology) on command,47 wind and solar generation are available
only when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. Many politicians and
incumbent fossil fuel generators equate this intermittency with unreliability.48
43. See, e.g., Cal. ISO, Resource Adequacy: The Need for Sufficient Energy Supplies 1 (2021),

44.

45.

46.

47.
48.

https://perma.cc/484N-R96B (“Resource adequacy ensures that there is enough
capacity and reserves for the California Independent System Operator . . . to maintain a
balanced supply and demand across the grid.”).
See, e.g., ReliabilityFirst, Planning Resource Adequacy Analysis 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/9Z4Z-EB9T (noting the “ ‘one day in ten year’ loss of load expectation
principles” (capitalization altered)).
There has been increased discussion of grid resilience in recent years, but it remains
unclear whether the concept of resiliency is best treated as a separate end for the
electricity system or should be encompassed within the concept of reliability. We
follow the lead of former FERC chair Cheryl LaFleur in considering the grid’s ability
to recover from disasters quickly as an element of reliability. See Grid Reliability &
Resilience Pricing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, at para. 1 (Jan. 8, 2018) (LaFleur, Comm’r,
concurring) (“[R]esilience—the ability to withstand or recover from disruptive events
and keep serving customers—is unquestionably an element of reliability.”); cf. Andy
Ott, Reliability and Resilience: Different Concepts, Common Goals, PJM: INSIDE LINES
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/H248-AHB3 (“Resilience is directly linked to the
concept of reliability; you cannot be resilient if you are not first reliable. Resilience
encompasses additional concepts—preparing for, operating through and recovering
from significant disruptions, no matter what the cause.”).
We use the term “clean energy” to refer to all zero-carbon energy sources, including
nuclear power. It is worth noting, though, that because of its low costs, renewable
energy is projected to play a particularly large role in most future low-carbon energy
scenarios. See ERIC LARSON ET AL., NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS 88 (2021), https://perma.cc/W7W7-HZVG (stating
that “[w]ind and solar power have dominant roles in all pathways”). We therefore focus
on renewable energy resources in this Article.
Contingent on, of course, fuel supply and adequate weatherization. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 11-14; Mena, supra note 11.
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But that is misleading. No resource runs all of the time. In fact, in the past few
years, gas generation and, to a lesser degree, coal generation have played
prominent roles in weather-related system failures.49
At the same time, numerous studies have confirmed that we already have
the technology necessary to maintain grid reliability under conditions of
substantial renewable energy penetration.50 What renewable resources require
to ensure reliability are complementary resources that balance out over time
and can rapidly offer flexible back-up power. These can include energy
storage; other forms of renewable energy; and renewable energy in different
geographic locales, with different weather conditions, connected by longdistance transmission lines.51 Moreover, clean-energy resources often offer
superior performance when it comes to the provision of certain traditional
reliability services.52 For these reasons, the clean-energy transition may
ultimately prove cost saving, although expensive in the interim: A 2020 study
by the University of California Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public Policy
projects that wholesale electricity costs will be 10% lower than they are today
under a 90% clean-energy scenario in 2035.53
It is time, then, to dispense with the myth that a cleaner grid—one that
relies on substantially larger percentages of renewable generation—is not
possible from a reliability standpoint. As we argue below, it is not only possible
but advisable to do so, for three reasons. First, although atmospheric change
will be slow, a clean energy grid will, over time, reduce climate impacts that
49. See Sonal Patel, Polar Vortex Tests Resiliency of U.S. Power System, POWER MAG. (Jan. 31,

50.

51.
52.
53.

2019), https://perma.cc/73AA-QJBD (describing how nuclear energy underperformed
during a New England polar vortex); Mike O’Boyle & Silvio Marcacci, As Extreme
Weather Forces Coal to Falter, Where Will Resilience Come From?, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/29WP-Y8B3 (discussing coal’s underperformance in
the polar vortex); UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INST., supra note 8, at 8, 34
(describing and illustrating the scope of these resources’ failures after Winter Storm
Uri).
LARSON ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (outlining “five distinct technological pathways, each
of which achieves the 2050 goal” and accelerates “deployment at scale of technologies
and solutions that are mature and affordable today . . . .”). GOLDMAN SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y,
UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, 2035 REPORT 4 (2020); NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, supra
note 32, at iii (“[R]enewable electricity generation from technologies that are
commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible electric system, is
more than adequate to supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050 while
meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every region of the United States.”).
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, supra note 32, at viii-xi.
See infra Part I.A.3.
GOLDMAN SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, supra note 50, at 4; Dan Shreve, Deep Decarbonisation: The
Multi-trillion-Dollar Question, WOOD MACKENZIE (June 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/
4W7K-DKPQ (“We estimate the cost of full decarbonisation of the US power grid at
US$4.5 trillion, given the current state of technology. That’s nearly as much as what
the country has spent, since 2001, on the war on terror.”).
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currently stress the grid and human systems more generally. Second, a cleanenergy transition will induce the construction of both a nationally
interconnected transmission grid and numerous localized, self-sufficient
microgrids that will operate when the larger grid inevitably experiences
problems. Finally, renewable energy sources offer enhanced technical grid
benefits compared to fossil fuel–fired power—benefits that will make the grid
more reliable.
1.

Mitigating climate impacts on the U.S. energy system

The effects of climate change pose increasingly serious threats to the U.S.
energy system, including hurricanes, wildfires, extreme heat, and extreme
cold. These weather-related threats are expected to become more frequent,
which in turn will require a significant increase in electric-grid resilience and
reliability.54
The strategy for mitigating these harms can be summarized in six words:
electrify everything and decarbonize the grid. In 2019, electricity ranked as the
second largest sectoral source of carbon pollution in the United States (25%),
just below transportation (29%) and trailed by industry (23%), commercial and
residential (13%), and agriculture (10%).55 But electricity’s role in addressing
climate change is outsized: It has been described as the “linchpin” of
decarbonization because the central strategy for decarbonizing most other
sectors is to transition them to run on electricity.56 Of course, electrification
only works as a decarbonization strategy if the grid also cleans up as it grows
in size. Thus, to facilitate U.S. decarbonization on pace with planetary
imperatives, the U.S. electricity system will need to approximately triple in
size by 2050 at the latest, while reducing its emissions by 95-100%.57
As electricity becomes central to powering our economy, grid reliability
will assume even greater importance. Fortunately, though, a decarbonized grid
will ultimately prove stabilizing in this regard: A transition away from fossil
54. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON GRID RESILIENCE, GRID RESILIENCE: PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT

ADMINISTRATION 5 (2020).
55. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://perma.cc/AM64-UWKC (archived

Mar. 25, 2022).
56. See Jesse D. Jenkins, Max Luke & Samuel Thernstrom, Getting to Zero Carbon Emissions

in the Electric Power Sector, 2 JOULE 2498, 2498 (2018) (identifying electric power as the
“linchpin of efforts” to limit greenhouse-gas emissions).
57. See Joeri Rogelj et al., Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5 °C in the Context of
Sustainable Development, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 93, 95 (2019) (establishing 2050
as the latest date around which net-zero emissions should be achieved to limit warming
to 1.5 degrees Celsius); STEPHEN NAIMOLI & SARAH LADISLAW, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES, DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/ZKC8LHQA; see also Jenkins et al., supra note 56, at 2506.
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fuels will be essential to slowing the rise of extreme weather events that
increasingly disrupt the grid—not to mention the impact on human well-being
as a whole. To be sure, unilateral decarbonization by the United States would
not itself avert increases in global average temperatures and extreme weather
events. But the United States, as the world’s largest historical emitter, is widely
understood to play a key geopolitical role within international climate
negotiations, such that leadership on domestic decarbonization is critical for
spurring global ambition.58 Conversely, if the United States does not pursue
rapid decarbonization, it is unlikely to be achieved on a global scale, and we
will miss a critical window for stemming the rising frequency and degree of
extreme weather events that are significant causes of blackouts.59 Or, to frame
this in reverse, if we do not transition to clean energy, we can expect a
devastating, spiraling positive feedback loop: We will spend more money to
shore up less reliable fossil fuel generation, which leads to CO2 emissions that
exacerbate reliability events, which in turn require even more investment into
adaptive reliability measures for an ultimately untenable technology.
2.

Enhancing grid stability and energy equity through national
interconnection and localized networks

In addition to mitigating some of the effects of climate change,
decarbonization can also immediately improve grid reliability and resilience.
At the local level, microgrids already have been a key component of reliability
and resilience. Microgrids are energy systems that power a neighborhood,
university campus, or similarly small area and that can be islanded
(disconnected) from the larger grid.60 For instance, during and after Hurricane
Sandy in New York in 2012, several university campuses and other microgrids
kept the lights on while the rest of the city remained in the dark.61 Although
microgrids are not all zero carbon, they can be designed to run on a
combination of small-scale renewables, energy storage, or green hydrogen

58. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Justin Sink, Bloomberg, “A Very Weak Hand”: Biden Set to

Head to COP26 Summit Without Congressional Support for His Climate Pledges, FORTUNE
(Oct. 14, 2021, 4:13 AM PST), https://perma.cc/FN49-JMHS (describing why robust
U.S. domestic action on climate change is critical to the success of international climate
negotiations).
59. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2019 ERO RELIABILITY RISK PRIORITIES REPORT 18
(2019).
60. Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 549-50
(2010).
61. James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Superstorm Sandy: Climate Change
Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation, N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 92, 96-97
(2015).
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made with renewable energy.62 An expansion of green microgrids would
substantially improve reliability and reduce carbon emissions.63
At the opposite end of the spectrum, deep decarbonization will require a
massive build-out of utility-scale wind and solar farms.64 This, in turn, will
necessitate the construction of a large, nationally connected system of
transmission lines to deliver electricity from remote, rural areas to “load
centers”—high-population areas that consume a greater amount of electricity.65
A national transmission system has inherent reliability benefits because it
allows utilities to draw from a broader, more diverse pool of power.66 Indeed,
many argue that one central cause of Texas’s 2021 blackout during Winter
Storm Uri was the state’s decision decades earlier to refuse to interconnect with
out-of-state transmission networks.67
Enhanced interconnections and expanded microgrids could, if designed
properly, also substantially enhance the equity of the grid. A nationally
interconnected grid will bring cheaper, cleaner renewable energy to more
people, helping to alleviate the crushing burden of energy poverty that plagues
nearly one-third of U.S. households.68 Furthermore, clean microgrid
development targeted toward low-income, marginalized communities—which
have the fewest resources to fall back on during grid emergencies—will
enhance reliability in communities disproportionately burdened by outages.

62. See Microgrids, CTR. FOR ENERGY & CLIMATE SOLS., https://perma.cc/8BBU-UTSE

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.

68.

(archived Mar. 25, 2022) (“Historically, microgrids generated power using fossil fuel–
fired combined heat and power . . . and reciprocating engine generators. Today,
however, projects are increasingly leveraging more sustainable resources like solar
power and energy storage. Microgrids can run on renewables, natural gas–fueled
combustion turbines, or emerging sources such as fuel cells or even small modular
nuclear reactors, when they become commercially available.”).
The Role of Microgrids in Helping to Advance the Nation’s Energy System, U.S. DEP’T
ENERGY OFF. ELEC., https://perma.cc/8KFA-EGYQ (archived Mar. 25, 2022).
All of the reports describing pathways to a zero-carbon grid assume such a build-out.
See LARSON ET AL., supra note 46, at 27, 88.
See, e.g., Gregory Brinkman, Joshua Novacheck, Aaron Bloom & James McCalley, Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab’y, Interconnections Seam Study 33 (2020) (describing the
importance of this type of interconnection).
See Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 774 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting the need for
fewer reserve margins due to a transmission-line expansion).
See, e.g., After Texas, A New Spotlight on Long-Distance Transmission in MISO,
SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT (Mar. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/7QHZ-9Z4U (noting the
currently unfilled need to import electricity to Texas during grid emergencies).
See Sasha Ingber, 31 Percent of U.S. Households Have Trouble Paying Energy Bills, NPR
(Sept. 19, 2018, 8:12 PM ET), https://perma.cc/S2ND-A4MM.
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3.

Diversifying fuel supply

Beyond inducing the construction of a nationally interconnected grid, it is
important to highlight another characteristic of renewable energy in the wake
of Winter Storm Uri in 2021: its natural availability at the point of generation.
Natural gas–plant outages were the primary cause of the crisis precipitated by
Uri, in part because natural gas generates so much power in the state, and these
outages arose largely from fuel-supply issues caused by frozen parts on gas
wells and pipelines.69 Many natural gas plants—like some wind turbines in
Texas—also simply froze because they had not been properly weatherized.70
Certainly, fossil fuel infrastructure can be weatherized, and many power
plants in the northern United States regularly operate in conditions that are
far colder than those experienced in Texas.71 Even then, however, this
infrastructure remains vulnerable to geopolitical and physical supply shocks.72
Moreover, spending billions of dollars to weatherize natural gas wells,
pipelines, and power plants might not be the most efficient or practical
approach to reliability, given the links between this infrastructure and climate
change. Allocating some of these funds toward geographically diverse
renewables, which simply need to access wind or sunlight and do not require
wells, pumps, compressors, and pipelines, could be a more efficient path
toward reliability.
Wind turbines and solar panels also can be, and often are, weatherized to
avoid freezing.73 And although renewable generation sources lack a constant
69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
70. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Update to April 6, 2021 Preliminary Report on Causes

of Generator Outages and Derates During the February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather
Event 9, 18 (2021), https://perma.cc/5MBJ-F6EF (showing weather-related issues,
including the freezing of intake lines and other problems associated with a lack of
winterization, as the leading cause of natural gas–plant outages in Texas during
Winter Storm Uri); UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INST., supra note 8, at 30-31
(describing the weather-related issues at the 167 generation units that stopped
generating as a result of freezing equipment rather than fuel-supply issues or other
outage causes).
71. See, e.g., Chris Hubbuch, Built for Cold, Wisconsin Grid Hums Along in Temperatures that
Crippled Texas, MADISON.COM (Feb. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/T5TR-PYB5 (discussing
how power plants and related energy-producing equipment in northern U.S. states are
designed for “frigid” temperatures as cold as “40 degrees below zero”).
72. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Clifford Krauss & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattack Forces a
Shutdown of a Top U.S. Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (updated May 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/
6V6T-ZR5X (describing a cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline that caused significant gas
shortages throughout the eastern United States).
73. See, e.g., XCEL ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY 8 (2020), https://perma.cc/JN7J-7PX7 (“All
the wind turbines that Xcel Energy owns across its three regions are outfitted with
cold weather turbine packages that support operations down to -22 F (-30 C).”); Sonal
Patel, Prepare Your Renewable Plant for Cold Weather Operations, POWER MAG. (Oct. 1,
2014), https://perma.cc/E4FX-A7DG.
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fuel supply—since the strength and frequency of wind and sunlight varies—
intermittencies can be smoothed out when wind turbines and solar panels are
geographically diversified, adequately interconnected through transmission
lines, and supported by storage.
B. How Siloed Grid Policy and Governance Impede a Clean, Reliable Grid
Thus far, we have made the case that integrating renewable energy is
central to a reliable electric grid. In this Subpart, we turn to the legal and
institutional context in which a clean, reliable grid must be achieved, focusing
on the ways in which the system is currently disaggregated across
jurisdictional scales and the public–private continuum.
The history of electricity explains much of energy law’s disaggregation.
When the grid was first constructed, power generation was highly localized,
with cities like Chicago authorizing around forty-five companies to build
power plants.74 Gradually, ambitious companies took over and consolidated
this generation, reducing the number of power plants and vertically
integrating their operation.75 These investor-owned utilities (IOUs) began to
build, own, and operate generation, the transmission lines that connected
generation to load centers, and the distribution lines that carried electricity to
retail customers.76 IOUs successfully lobbied states to regulate electric utilities
so that utilities could act as monopolies within established service territories.77
As a consequence of states providing IOUs with exclusive service territories,
state legislatures granted public-utility commissions (PUCs) the power to set
the rates utilities charged their customers.78 But as IOUs increasingly
transacted across state lines, states began to compete for regulatory control
over these interstate enterprises. These efforts by state regulators to set rates
for interstate electricity sales led to a Supreme Court case prohibiting this state
competition and, ultimately, to the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA).79

74. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in THE

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY 43, 73 n.4 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
See id. at 46-47; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2002) (discussing the growth
of public utilities).
See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 24, at 820-22, 824; New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5-6.
Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 35, at 49; see, e.g., Bradley, supra note 74, at 46-48.
Some states utilize the term PUC; other states use the analogous title public-service
commission (PSC) and, occasionally, corporation commission.
Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927), abrogated by
Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
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The FPA draws a dividing line between federal and state jurisdiction over
electricity.80 This law authorizes FERC to regulate the selling of electricity at
wholesale in interstate commerce; the transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce (the rates charged for transmission, and the service that must be
offered); and the reliability of the U.S. electric grid.81 The FPA left intact state
authority over electricity generation, retail sales, and other electricity-related
matters not expressly regulated by FERC, including the siting of transmission
lines within states’ jurisdictions.82
Today, some states continue to rely upon PUCs to regulate all aspects of
the electricity system not subject to FERC jurisdiction.83 They allow IOUs to
act as regulated monopolies, with the PUC approving how much and what
type of generation the IOUs may build and determining the rates that IOUs
may charge retail customers.84 Other states have restructured by separating the
enterprise of generating electricity from the enterprise of delivering electricity
to customers.85 In these states, independent generators sell electricity at
wholesale either directly to IOUs or through competitive energy markets.86 In
states like Texas—the most restructured state—even the retail side of the
business is competitive. In most parts of the state, businesses called retail
electric providers (REPs) compete to offer customers different packages of
electricity at different rates.87 But even in Texas, the transmission and
distribution aspects of electricity remain a state-regulated monopoly, with

80. See Christiansen & Macey, supra note 29, at 1367. The relevant authority of FERC

81.

82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

under the FPA was supplemented by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005). See
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594, 941-46 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824o); see also infra Part III.
16 U.S.C. § 824 (establishing federal regulatory authority over interstate transmission
and wholesale electricity sales in interstate commerce); EPAct 2005 § 1211, 119 Stat. at
941-46 (authorizing FERC to issue reliability standards in some circumstances).
The federal government regulates the safety of nuclear power plants and licenses
hydroelectric dams, but states can still block these projects by refusing ratepayer
funding.
James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L.
REV. 659, 696-97, 700 (2019).
See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
765, 769-72 (2008) (describing the traditional regulation of utilities).
See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 24, at 837.
See Spence, supra note 84, at 772-74; Boyd & Carlson, supra note 24, at 837-39 (describing
the regulatory models in which independent generators operate).
REP—Retail Electric Providers Certification and Reporting, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N TEX.,
https://perma.cc/UK2Z-X43F (archived Mar. 26, 2022).

991

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

regulators determining which projects utilities can build and the rates to be
charged for use of the wires.88
States affect the carbon intensity and reliability of the electric grid in
several ways. In states that have restructured, competition has increased the
amount of renewable generation on the grid because wind and solar (and
hydroelectric) generation are now often cheaper than most fossil-fired
resources.89 Across restructured and non-restructured states, many PUCs and
PSCs operate under legislative directives to increase renewable generation.90
Other states have blocked utility proposals to build this generation.91
Furthermore, through siting decisions, states have at times enabled or, in many
cases, blocked the construction of transmission lines required for renewable
energy integration.92 And states have approved massive utility build-out of
fossil-fired power plants, citing reliability concerns.93
Many states rely not only on IOUs but also on rural electric cooperatives
and publicly owned municipal utilities to supply power to a portion of
consumers.94 Rural electric cooperatives, which are nonprofit, member-owned
organizations, are prevalent in areas of the country that IOUs chose not to
serve in the early twentieth century because their low density creates higher

88. See Transmission/Distribution Service Providers, ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL TEX.,

89.
90.

91.
92.

93.

94.

https://perma.cc/NVW8-BQAS (archived Mar. 26, 2022) (explaining that transmission
and distribution service providers continue to be regulated by Texas’s PUC).
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COSTS OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2021, at 4 (2021).
See GLEN ANDERSON, KRISTY HARTMAN, DANIEL SHEA & LAURA SHIELDS, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND GOALS 7-9 (2021),
https://perma.cc/977N-WNAS.
See infra Part III.B.
JULIE COHN & OLIVERA JANKOVSKA, CTR. FOR ENERGY STUD. AT THE BAKER INST. FOR
PUB. POL’Y, RICE UNIV., TEXAS CREZ LINES: HOW STAKEHOLDERS SHAPE MAJOR ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 3-4 (2020); LIZA REED, NISKANEN CTR., TRANSMISSION
STALLED: SITING CHALLENGES FOR INTERREGIONAL TRANSMISSION 4-5 (2021) (discussing
state siting hurdles for transmission).
See, e.g., Building Capacity for a Clean Energy Future, MCLEAN ENERGY, https://perma.cc/
Z54C-MKM7 (archived Mar. 26, 2022) (describing California’s resource-adequacy
requirements and noting that “[t]raditionally, reserve capacity requirements have been
met by gas plants”).
See Alexandra B. Klass & Gabriel Chan, Cooperative Clean Energy, 100 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4,
10-30 (2021) (discussing the history of rural electric cooperatives and the customers
they currently serve); Alexandra B. Klass & Rebecca Wilton, Local Power, 75 VAND. L.
REV. 93, 100-01, 112-14, 123-25 (2022) (describing role of municipal utilities in
providing electricity in the United States); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 290 (2017); Investor-Owned Utilities Served 72% of U.S. Electricity Customers in
2017, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/MNK7-AWQY (“Co-ops are located
in 47 states but are most prevalent in the Midwest and Southeast.”).
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interconnection costs.95 Today, cooperatives and municipal utilities
collectively continue to serve over 27% of the U.S. population,96 and
cooperatives own and manage approximately 40% of electricity distribution
lines.97 Because cooperatives and municipalities are often exempt from state
and federal regulation, we do not focus on them here.98 Nevertheless, one could
conceptualize their continued prevalence and relative insulation from
regulation as another form of “siloization” in energy law—one that requires a
different set of strategies for transitioning to a clean, reliable system.99
Federal and regional authorities also make decisions that affect the carbon
intensity and reliability of the electric grid. Two years after the electric-grid
failure that led to a large 2003 Northeast blackout, Congress required FERC to
certify a national electric reliability organization (ERO) to govern electric
reliability and directed FERC to oversee this organization.100 Until 2005, the
United States had relied wholly on a private organization with no enforcement
authority—the North American Electric Reliability Council, now called the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)—to ensure the
reliability of the nation’s grid.101 FERC approved NERC as the nation’s ERO in
2006.102 Today, NERC sets national and regional reliability standards for the
electric grid that are subject to FERC oversight and approval.103 Many of these

95. Klass & Chan, supra note 94, at 8, 11-14.
96. PUB. POWER ASS’N, 2021 STATISTICAL REPORT 10 (2021), https://perma.cc/YWT2-V3L4

97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

(archived Mar. 26, 2022) (reporting that cooperatives cover 13.2% of customers and
publicly owned utilities cover 14.5%).
Klass & Chan, supra note 94, at 6.
Id. at 8.
For analysis focusing on cooperatives and municipal utilities, see generally Gabriel
Pacyniak, Greening the Old New Deal: Strengthening Rural Electric Cooperative Supports and
Oversight to Combat Climate Change, 85 MO. L. REV. 409 (2020) (considering ways to
support a clean-energy transition in electric cooperatives); Klass & Chan, supra note 94
(discussing how cooperative principles might empower cooperatives to transition to
clean energy); Klass & Wilton, supra note 94 (considering how localities’ proprietary
control over energy can act as an antidote to preemption challenges); Welton, supra
note 94 (arguing that the challenges posed by climate change make public control over
the electricity grid more appealing); and HEATHER PAYNE, JONAS MONAST, HANNAH
WISEMAN & NICOLAS EASON, CTR. FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY, ENV’T & ECON., UNIV. OF N.C.,
TRANSITIONING TO A LOWER-CARBON ENERGY FUTURE: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (2019) (setting
forth three case studies considering how municipalities and electric cooperatives are
confronting the energy transition).
EPAct 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594, 941-46 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o).
See N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,062, at 7-8 (July 20, 2006).
Id. at 4.
About NERC, supra note 26; FERC, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022, at 13 (2018).

993

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

standards are drafted and ultimately implemented by regional subunits of
NERC called “regional entities.”104
Reliability standards centrally affect the carbon intensity of the grid in
addition to reliability. For example, one key reliability standard for “resource
adequacy” requires all utilities within the geographic footprint of a regional
entity to plan for adequate generation capacity: building up electricitygeneration infrastructure and other resources (such as demand reductions) to
ensure that there will be enough electricity to avoid blackouts.105 As
introduced in Part I.A above, utilities within regional entities are supposed to
operate at a resource adequacy level that only allows one blackout every ten
years.106 As discussed below, this standard can affect—and might even
determine—the type and amount of generation that utilities build or procure
from other sources.
NERC’s regional entities often work closely with and in some cases have
territories that are identical to the territories of RTOs and independent system
operators (ISOs).107 RTOs are nonprofit entities under FERC oversight that
manage and operate the electric transmission system, run regional energy
markets, and plan and finance transmission within their regional footprint.108
These organizations serve about two-thirds of the country as measured by
population, but are notably absent in the Pacific Northwest and the South.109
In areas of the country without RTOs, private organizations or electric
utilities themselves serve as “balancing authorities” responsible for ensuring
adequate electricity supplies and grid reliability for customers within their
jurisdictions pursuant to FERC, NERC, and state regulatory commission
oversight.110 Outside of RTOs, balancing authorities typically obtain capacity,
energy, and ancillary services (such as the last-minute balancing of electricity
supply and demand and the managing of other conditions that could cause
104. See infra Part V.
105. See infra Part III. NERC does not, however, establish the specific amount of capacity

that must be in reserve. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., ReliabilityFirst, supra note 44, at 1 (establishing “common criteria, based on

107.
108.
109.
110.

‘one day in ten year’ loss of load expectation principles, for . . . resource adequacy for
load” in one NERC region (capitalization altered)).
We refer to RTOs and ISOs simply as RTOs in this paper because they are virtually
identical.
Coleman & Klass, supra note 83, at 695-96; see also infra Parts III.A (markets); infra
Part IV.B.1 (transmission); infra Part VI.A (RTO structure).
Coleman & Klass, supra note 83, at 695-96; see The IRC: Shaping Our Energy Future,
ISO/RTO COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/24YH-RYVS (archived Mar. 27, 2022).
See P. DENHOLM & J. COCHRAN, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, BALANCING AREA
COORDINATION: EFFICIENTLY INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ENERGY INTO THE GRID 5
(2015); Sarah Hoff, U.S. Electric System Is Made Up of Interconnections and Balancing
Authorities, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/3C7P-KD3Y.
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blackouts) through contracts with utilities or with other balancing authorities.
However, some balancing authorities operate limited markets for a few of
these services.111 As discussed in more detail in Part IV below, some balancing
authorities have begun to coordinate planning for new cross-state
transmission lines needed to carry renewable energy to load centers. Such
enhanced interconnections reduce utilities’ need to maintain their own
generation reserves for reliability, since utilities can call upon a more diverse
pool of generation. Some balancing authorities outside of RTOs have also
developed creative mechanisms for coordinating the services and rates charged
for electricity crossing transmission lines operated by numerous utilities, thus
easing the transport of renewable energy to customers.112 Other non-RTO
areas remain heavily balkanized, however, thus making it more difficult for
renewable generators to transport energy. Despite these impediments, areas
without RTOs, such as the Western Electricity Coordinating Council region,
have some of the highest percentages of renewable energy generation.113
A final fragmentation that underscores the divides in clean energy,
reliability, jurisdiction, and public–private governance is time. State utility
commissions, RTOs, FERC, and NERC all have considerable interest in the
day-to-day project of keeping the lights on, which involves rerouting
electricity in congested wires, dispatching dirty “peaker” plants to meet
unusually high demand, and making other rapid decisions needed to maintain
voltage in the grid.114 Yet this short-term imperative also demands long-term
planning to site, finance, and construct new energy generation or generation
alternatives, as well as the transmission and distribution infrastructure
necessary to support them. To further complicate matters, a rapid transition to
clean energy on the scale necessary to abate potentially cataclysmic climate
impacts will likely require the abandonment of many otherwise economically
viable generation resources.115 These time-scale mismatches create a further
compelling reason to break down energy governance silos where possible, to
facilitate the integration of short-term and long-term grid management.

111. DENHOLM & COCHRAN, supra note 110, at 3.
112. See id. at 2-3 (explaining reserve-sharing and coordinated-scheduling practices among

some balancing authorities).
113. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2018

RENEWABLE ENERGY GRID INTEGRATION HANDBOOK 4 (2018).
114. See, e.g., Ancillary Services Market, PJM, https://perma.cc/R4RP-E3UY (archived
Mar. 27, 2022) (describing some of these functions).
115. See Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L.
REV. 645, 646-47 (2017).
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Figure 1
Siloed Actors in Energy Policy
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II. The Promise and Peril of Silos
We do not propose a wholesale modification of energy policy silos because
within a given policy area—in our case, regulating the electric grid to be both
clean and reliable—the siloing of regulation can present both benefits and
obstacles. “Siloing,” as we use it here, involves the division of authority over a
policy area among different federal agencies, different levels of government, or
private and public agencies. In some cases, the division of authority involves
different agencies addressing the same policy issue. Take the example of the
direct regulation of the reliability of the grid. As discussed in more detail in
Part V, both NERC and FERC have the task of developing the substance of
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reliability standards and enforcing these standards, with FERC reviewing all
proposed standards and every enforcement action taken by NERC or a NERC
agent.
In other cases, the siloing of a policy issue assigns different aspects of a
policy area to different entities. For example, under the FPA, states regulate the
construction and operation of power plants (aside from nuclear plants), the sale
of retail electricity, and the siting of electric transmission lines, and FERC
regulates wholesale power sales and the operation of electric transmission
lines.116 For both power generation and transmission lines, the “sub-areas”
assigned to states and the federal government influence each other
substantially. Decisions about retail power inevitably affect wholesale power
provision, and vice versa—decisions about the wholesale markets also affect
retail power.117 Thus, if a state requires its retailers to purchase a certain kind
of generation—say, renewable energy generation—and FERC-regulated
wholesale markets impede the participation of that generation in markets, the
result is interference with state policy, as we discuss in Part III below.
Additionally, as discussed in Part IV, whether or not a transmission line can be
sited and built clearly affects the operation of that line, giving states and
utilities considerable influence over federal transmission policy.
In the Subparts that follow, we contend that regulatory silos provide a
critical unifying foundation to our analysis for four reasons. First, and most
importantly, they substantially affect regulatory outcomes. Congress’s
selection of a combination of agencies (sometimes at different jurisdictional
levels, and sometimes involving both public and private entities) to implement
a particular command has a powerful effect on the substantive focus of the
resulting regulations. Second, siloing influences the accountability of agencies
to various stakeholders. Third, siloing shapes the efficiency of regulatory
processes and thus the speed at which regulatory action occurs. Finally, siloing
impacts the political economy of new laws and regulations—in our case, a
particularly important consideration in light of the short window of time for
averting potentially cataclysmic climate impacts.
A. Substantive Outcomes
To highlight the importance of siloing to the content of regulation, take
the case of the enormous task of ensuring the reliability of the electric grid.
Reliability requires the provision of a constant supply of electricity regardless
of the level of demand, and it increasingly also demands consideration of
116. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
117. For a discussion of the interrelationship of the wholesale and retail systems, see

FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 776-77 (2016).
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resilience, which involves bringing the grid back online quickly after
disruptions.118 If the EPA and Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) were primarily tasked with this order, reliability standards would
likely look quite different than the actual standards produced by FERC and
NERC. Those standards might place more emphasis on reliability resources
with lower air pollution emissions and on generation resources that would be
more resistant to flooding and extreme weather, for example. And in some
cases, the EPA and FEMA would likely clash, with FEMA potentially arguing
for more highly durable yet environmentally impactful infrastructure and the
EPA taking an opposite stance. The result could be inaction, or compromise
policies with relatively weak assurances of reliability. Alternatively, the result
could be a better one. Theories of the separation of powers among agencies posit
that friction among agencies can improve decisionmaking, as agencies with
“differing missions and objectives” have to “convince each other of why their
view is right.”119 Overlap can thus at times promote innovation by
encouraging deliberation and enhancing expertise.120
Overlap can also induce cooperation, causing siloed agencies to take joint
action on certain issues. Such cooperation occurred, for example, when the
EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration jointly wrote fuelefficiency standards for vehicles to address greenhouse gases.121 Joint action by
separate agencies can ensure that rules are more technically accurate and best
address the substantive policy issue at hand. Indeed, NERC and FERC
sometimes jointly act on reliability issues, as they did after the winter storm of
2021 revealed the inadequacies of weatherization standards.122 On the flip side,
a toxic combination of agencies—all with some responsibility in a particular
policy area—can result in conflict, gridlock, and subpar policies. To take a
recent example, the Trump Administration’s Department of Energy (DOE)
blocked release of a National Renewable Energy Laboratory study of the
importance of building out a national transmission grid, allegedly because it
conflicted with the DOE’s agenda to promote fossil fuels.123
Assigning several agencies to one policy issue can also address lapses by
individual agencies—refusals to act, or inadequate action, for example. As Sarah
118. See supra note 45.
119. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous

Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006).
120. Id. at 2325; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,

125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012).
121. Daphna Ranan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 227-28 (2015).
122. See infra Part V.
123. See Peter Behr, DOE Study Details “Supergrid” for High Levels of Renewables, E&E NEWS:

ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 25, 2021, 7:11 AM EST), https://perma.cc/2MHW-YJBH.
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Light notes, splitting up policy authority among multiple agencies can have
the effect of creating Harry Potter–esque horcruxes: Even if one agency refuses
to regulate, a policy goal can remain alive when another agency with
regulatory responsibility takes up the task.124
There is also merit in the cross-pollination of policy ideas among state and
regional silos. For example, in the area of electric-grid-reliability regulation,
utilities within some states and regions have weatherized their assets either
voluntarily or in response to state mandates—avoiding some of the problems
experienced during Winter Storm Uri.125 These approaches help color the
debate regarding the advisability of nationally uniform weatherization
standards under conditions of climate change, which is inducing more rapid
swings in temperature and more severe storms across regions.126 The interplay
of federal, regional, and state authorities may well improve policy outcomes,
especially in the uncharted terrain of rapid and massive electrification and grid
decarbonization.127
Despite the substantive benefits of siloing, assigning different entities
responsibility over different aspects of a policy issue, or assigning the same
issue to multiple entities, can also result in a regulatory anticommons. A
regulatory anticommons arises when too many entities have at least partial say
over the property rights or regulatory permits necessary to see a project to
fruition.128 The result is an inefficiently low level of activity,129 as illustrated
by the transmission line development conundrum we discuss in Part IV below.
Alternatively, overlapping responsibilities can result in free-rider problems
within the regulatory common space: individual entities may wait for others to
act first, thus externalizing the costs of action but gaining some of the benefits
124. Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647, 1655-72 (2018); see also Katyal,

125.
126.

127.

128.
129.

supra note 119, at 2324 (“Redundancy has practical benefits as well because reliance on
just one agency is risky. . . . ‘When one bulb blows, everything goes.’ ” (quoting Martin
Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 346, 354 (1969))).
See supra note 70; Hubbuch, supra note 71.
U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14
(2014), https://perma.cc/APK2-YNJD. See generally DONALD J. WUEBBLES ET AL., U.S.
GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 185-222 (2017),
https://perma.cc/DGH7-G728 (charting the major consequences of climate change).
Sarah E. Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 327, 330-31 (2017)
(exploring the benefits of maintaining fluid jurisdictional authority in nascent
regulatory areas).
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
Id. at 637-40, 684-87 (illustrating anticommons in Moscow storefronts, fractional
property rights owned by Native Americans, and the division of real estate in Japan,
among other examples).
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none may be motivated to act.130 Take again the example of the direct
regulation of grid reliability, discussed in detail in Part V. Agents of NERC,
called regional entities, are largely responsible for proposing reliability
standards and implementing them—with NERC and FERC reviewing their
actions. As explored in Part V, FERC and NERC have been slow to mandate
national weatherization requirements, incorrectly assuming that regions were
appropriately tailoring standards to evolving regional needs. Extensive
weatherization is not necessarily the most efficient approach to addressing
growing weather extremes, given that it further entrenches fossil fuels and
potentially uses up funds better spent on microgrids and other, cleaner
reliability measures. But given more common weather extremes—and the fact
that weatherization can prevent outages at both renewable and fossil fuel–fired
plants—weatherization should have at least been more seriously considered at
an earlier date, as discussed in more detail in Part V. More coordination among
silos is essential to address these types of anticommons and regulatorycommons problems.
B. Agency Accountability
The siloing of regulatory responsibility for a clean, reliable grid does not
only affect the content of energy regulations: It also has profound effects on the
extent to which regulatory processes account for stakeholder concerns. As we
explore below, these effects are again sometimes beneficial and sometimes
problematic.
In the context of siloing among federal agencies, certain agencies may be
more adept than others at soliciting input from diverse stakeholders.131 For
example, in the reliability context, FERC has been working hard to expand the
quality of its stakeholder outreach in ways that could potentially offset the
relatively closed, industry-led reliability process within NERC.132 NERC, too,
is working to expand stakeholder engagement, but is largely focused on

130. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,

89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 9 (2003) (noting the problems of partial jurisdiction in the context
of aquaculture); id. at 28 (noting that an individual regulator within a regulatory
commons “cannot stop others from free riding on the regulator’s investment in
investigating the social ill and designing a regulatory response”).
131. Cf. Katyal, supra note 119, at 2325 (observing that “to the extent that particular agencies
are captured by interest groups, overlapping jurisdiction can mitigate the harm”).
132. In particular, Congress has instructed FERC to create a new Office of Public
Participation, and the agency has embraced this task with a focus on including longmarginalized voices in its proceedings. See FERC, THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
4, 10 (2021), https://perma.cc/X8QP-V9VW.
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expanding industry stakeholder participation on NERC committees.133 In an
ideal scenario, different federal agencies might even compete to offer a
superior participatory process. Indeed, there is some evidence of this occurring
among regional actors in the reliability space, with the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP) and California ISO (CAISO) competing to attract utilities to participate in
specially designed markets offered by these RTOs. These RTOs appear to be
competing specifically on accountability grounds: They have each emphasized
the extent and type of stakeholder input in governance that will be available to
utilities that join their markets.134
Siloing policies for clean and reliable energy between states and the federal
government poses potential accountability benefits and challenges, too. The
federalism literature tends to identify states as more accountable to individual
residents than to the federal government, as they are “closer to the people.”135
Compelling accounts have challenged this assumption, yet it remains relatively
fixed within the literature.136 Our discussion of transmission policy in Part V
below embodies these dueling accounts: On the one hand, states’ authority over
transmission line siting allows them to respond to residents’ aesthetic and
environmental concerns.137 On the other hand, this accountability may
133. See,

134.

135.

136.

137.

e.g., Stakeholder-Engagement-Team, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
https://perma.cc/9YFQ-GJJ3 (archived Mar. 28, 2022) (noting that a stakeholderengagement team formed with the goal of “optimizing the value of industry
stakeholder participation,” among other values, which resulted in a “comprehensive
review” of how existing technical committees could be restructured).
CAL. ISO, EIM GOVERNANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q4EF59G7 (noting that the energy imbalance market (EIM) governing body and CAISO’s
board asked an advisory committee “to lead a public stakeholder process on EIM
governance that will culminate in a proposal” for the board’s consideration); Western
Energy Imbalance Service Market, SW. POWER POOL, https://perma.cc/K9M3-YHB4
(archived Mar. 28, 2022) (asserting that “[f]or more than 75 years, SPP has distinguished
itself as a stakeholder-driven organization that achieves its business objectives through
consensus-building,” and describing the ways in which stakeholders can participate in
the development of the energy imbalance market).
For a summary of the literature and cases asserting the common assumption that states
are “closer to the people,” see Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State
Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 146 (2018).
See id. (noting overall agreement on the assumption in scholarship); Dave Owen,
Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 63-64 (2016) (observing that the
federal government, through regional subunits, can and does act at a very local level);
Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1119, 1123-24 (2018) (exploring federal agencies’ highly local policy experiments).
But cf., e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 191-94
(2001) (disagreeing with the “closer to the people” assumption).
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1107-08
(2013) (noting that state courts have denied eminent domain authority for proposed
transmission lines that would run through the state but would only benefit out-ofstate customers); id. at 1084 (noting the “environmental and aesthetic objections that
footnote continued on next page
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represent a response to a relatively small group of voters—those who can see
the transmission lines from their property, for example—while ignoring the
growing demand of other voters for clean energy, which would require
thousands of miles of new transmission lines.138 Shifting more authority to the
federal level in the area of transmission siting might better respond to these
broader voices. Indeed, as we discuss in Part V, there could be federal
transmission-siting processes with meaningful state input. The power of state
transmission-siting silos will likely need to diminish substantially, however,
for large-scale renewable energy to expand to the extent necessary to address
climate change.
Conversely, as we explore in Parts III and V below, jurisdictional and
public–private siloing within energy market structure has led to a somewhat
opposite dynamic, in which federal and regional entities sometimes
overshadow state preferences for renewable energy policy. The regional
processes resulting in these outcomes diverge considerably in terms of
stakeholder and state participation, and the literature has demonstrated that
these different voting schemes affect regulatory outcomes.139
When substantial regulatory authority in a policy area resides within
private institutions, there is also a threat that the powerful voice of a limited
set of industry stakeholders will be further amplified due to siloing. This
potentially occurs within RTOs and NERC, as we explore in more detail in
form the basis of regular opposition” to transmission lines). For a discussion of the
importance of maintaining a balance between state and federal control in the land-use
context, see, for example, Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (2007)
(arguing that “some regulatory targets are better understood within a separate,
interjurisdictional sphere that legitimately implicates both local and national
responsibility”).
138. The extent to which voters prefer renewable energy depends on how one poses the
survey question. Indeed, when residents were asked whether they would support
renewable energy if it were located in their backyard, the positive responses declined
substantially. See, e.g., SAMANTHA GROSS, RENEWABLES, LAND USE, AND LOCAL
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2020), https://perma.cc/NCC4-P9GU
(“Nationally, 82% of Americans would support tax rebates for energy-efficient vehicles
or solar panels. However, public perception can turn negative, even among those
generally in favor of renewable energy, when people believe that a renewable
development will cause them economic or health problems or when they dislike the
aesthetics of the project.”). Still, it is fair to say that a large number of U.S. voters
indicate support for renewable energy. See, e.g., ALEC TYSON & BRIAN KENNEDY, PEW
RSCH. CTR., TWO-THIRDS OF AMERICANS THINK GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE ON
CLIMATE 5 (2020), https://perma.cc/7CH5-4EH2 (“To shift consumption patterns
toward renewables, a majority of the public (58%) says government regulations will be
necessary to encourage businesses and individuals to rely more on renewable
energy . . . .”).
139. Seth Blumsack & Kyungjin Yoo, RTO Governance Structures Can Affect Capacity Market
Outcomes, 53 PROC. HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCIS. 3087, 3087-88 (2020).
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Parts V and VI. It is remarkable to think that until 2005, the United States
relied solely on a private organization of utilities (that is, NERC) to prevent a
cascading grid blackout.140 And it is equally remarkable that two-thirds of the
U.S. population currently lives in areas where private regional entities (that is,
RTOs) are responsible for how much and what type of electricity flow through
the grid at any given time.141 FERC reviews both NERC’s and RTOs’ decisions,
thus infusing an element of “publicness” into grid governance, but its authority
to shape or contradict these decisions is in some cases surprisingly limited.142
Again, the key point is that silos matter when it comes to participatory
possibilities within government.
C. Efficiency
In addition to affecting both agency substance and agency accountability,
silos can also either enhance or impede the efficiency of governance. With
effective coordination, different government agencies with partial jurisdiction
over a given policy area can divide and conquer, efficiently splitting up tasks,
leveraging the expertise of individual agencies, and creating better end
products more quickly than if one agency took on the same task. This may be
the case, for example, with environmental impact statements under the
National Environmental Policy Act, where an agency lead collaborates with
other agencies with related expertise to complete the necessary evaluations.143
On the other hand, multiple government actors or private agencies with
policy-type authority acting within the same policy space can create
duplication and delay.144
D. Political Economy
A final undercurrent running through this Part’s evaluation of silos is the
consideration of political economy—that is, the ways in which the distribution
140. DAVID NEVIUS, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN

141.
142.
143.
144.

ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION 3-5 (2020), https://perma.cc/XR7Z-ZXPG
(describing how, in the wake of several blackouts in the 1960s, industry executives
lobbied key lawmakers to maintain private control over reliability); id. at 85
(describing the passage of EPAct 2005, which was the first piece of legislation to require
formal government oversight of NERC).
See The IRC: Shaping Our Energy Future, supra note 109.
Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109 CALIF. L.
REV. 209, 221-22, 222 n.66 (2021).
See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2022) (describing agency-lead obligations).
See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Regional Cooperative Federalism and the U.S. Electric Grid, 90
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 147, 203-04 (2022) (discussing the potential for duplication and
overlap); Welton, supra note 142, at 241-46 (discussing RTO “heel dragging” in response
to FERC orders to amend market rules).
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of legal authority among relevant actors influences politics and power
dynamics within a field.145 Consideration of how silos inform political power
is particularly important when it comes to reliable decarbonization, given the
transformative nature of the project for the grid.
Here, again, there is some value to jurisdictional silos. States have been at
the forefront of U.S. climate policy, while the federal government has been
inconsistent and largely ineffectual, with a few notable exceptions.146 Thus,
aggrandizing federal power in this sphere may not lead to a “rationalization” of
energy policy, due to the complex politics of climate action at the federal
level.147 In many cases, states have been able to overcome the myriad political
hurdles to action on climate change much better than regional or national
entities have.148 But while states have paved the way in some respects, some
broad-based initiatives are clearly better situated at the federal level, as
discussed in Part IV below with respect to the parochialism plaguing
transmission siting.
Similarly, the power dynamics within private silos—and their relationship
to public-oversight agencies—shape their potential as agents of reform. In the
energy sphere, some utilities jealously guard their transmission territories,
opposing any efforts for needed interstate transmission lines that would
enhance access to renewable generation.149 Many also oppose new-entrant
technologies, fearing they will dangerously cut their customer base.150 At the
145. See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel

146.

147.

148.
149.
150.

Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1791-92 (2020).
See Shannon Osaka, Is the U.S. Uniquely Bad at Tackling Climate Change?, YALE CLIMATE
CONNECTIONS (Jan. 12, 2022), https://perma.cc/T8WA-9CZK (discussing the
disappointments and challenges of federal climate action); Adelman & Engel, supra
note 29, at 837-39 (noting the distinct benefits of state and local climate action); Garrick
B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 879-82 (2010)
(describing the important role of local governments in the clean-energy transition). But
see, e.g., MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT IN BRIEF 1 (rev. 2020), https://perma.cc/D4DE-4JMN (noting
the importance of the federal production tax credit to wind-energy development).
On hurdles, see Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009)
(defining a “wicked problem” as one “that defies resolution because of the enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated
by any effort to develop a solution” and including climate change in that category
(quoting Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160 (1973))).
On state action, see State Climate Policy Maps, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
https://perma.cc/T6F4-VKZR (archived Mar. 29, 2022).
Ari Peskoe, Is the Utility Transmission Syndicate Forever?, 42 ENERGY L.J. 1, 58 (2021).
See, e.g., Mary Ellen Klas, Insider Reveals Deceptive Strategy Behind Florida’s Solar
Amendment, MIA. HERALD (updated Oct. 19, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://perma.cc/5V88footnote continued on next page
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same time, some utilities have been leaders on the renewable energy and
reliability fronts—meaningfully changing their practices in response to
consumer demand or state policies.151 Thus, a nuanced approach to public–
private silos is also advisable. Attempts to force institutions such as NERC and
RTOs to be wholly public would face major political hurdles and might
eliminate some of the nimbleness that often accompanies privatized, less
bureaucratic forms of decisionmaking. But respect for institutional expertise
should not foreclose inquiry into the ways in which their current allocation of
authority might impede a rapid, reliable clean-energy transition.
E. An Overview of Our Reforms to Silos in Energy Governance
In this Part, we have sketched the ways in which silos as a governance
concept offer both opportunities and challenges. Our goal in the Parts that
follow is to reimagine the siloed regulatory system that has evolved over the
past century in energy governance to make its multiplicity work for, rather
than against, a transition to a clean and reliable power grid. Because we see
political and practical value in preserving elements of these silos, our reform
proposals are nuanced and issue specific. In the Parts below, we discuss how
best to recalibrate silos and accelerate a reliable transition to clean energy
across four key issue areas: electricity market structure (Part III), transmission
(Part IV), reliability regulation (Part V), and regional governance (Part VI). To
assist readers in tracking and synthesizing these proposals, we provide here an
overview chart of key reforms within each sector.

ZXJA (describing utility support for an initiative that would have constitutionally
enshrined Florida’s judicial ban on third-party-financed rooftop solar).
151. Scott Carpenter, U.S. Utility Companies Rush to Declare Net-Zero Targets, FORBES (Oct. 15,
2020, 6:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/25J5-GCSU; Klass & Chan, supra note 94, at 3840 (discussing investor-owned utilities’ clean-energy commitments and the associated
financial benefits); Harman K. Trabish, As 100% Renewables Goals Proliferate, What Role
for Utilities?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/XAV6-M7T2 (discussing large
and small electric retail customer demand for renewable energy and response of
utilities).
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Table 1
Policy and Governance Reforms for a Clean, Reliable Grid
Energy Policy
Area

Broad Reform

Specific Reforms
Competitively solicit “reliability must run”
resources—those critical to preventing blackouts.

Leverage
competitive
markets

Limit the state-regulated generation selfscheduling and “reliability must run” market
avoidance.
Reduce constraints on generators’ bids into
markets (for example, MOPR).

Market
structure

Recognize the value of short-term energy
resources, such as batteries.
Properly value
reliability

Accommodate
state and federal
policies

Create a national
transmissionplanning process

Require contracting parties to honor
commitments (for example, promises to pay for
reliability).
Implement fixed-resource requirements; procure
clean-energy resources, then run capacity
auction or forward clean-energy capacity
markets; run one auction for clean and reliable
capacity and a second traditional capacity
auction.
Empower FERC to initiate a top-down, national
process or form a planning authority to lead
RTOs in multiregional planning.
Form interregional planning boards.
Prohibit local exemptions from interregional
planning.

Transmission
planning,
siting, and
financing

Rely more on federal power-marketing
administrations to build transmission;
streamline the process.
Enhance federal
siting authority

Provide DOE grants to federal power-marketing
administrations to identify needed transmission
projects.
Congressional reforms (for example, give FERC
or RTOs siting authority, constrain states’ ability
to delay and deny transmission lines).
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Energy Policy
Area

Reliability
regulation

Broad Reform

Specific Reforms

Identify gaps and
weak reliability
standards

Focus on standards addressing extreme weather
events and intermittent generation.

Broaden
reliability
standards
Enhance public
input into
reliability
standards

Form a NERC reliability and clean-energy
technical committee.
Incorporate the reliability benefits of clean
energy into standards.
Require at least two members of regional entity
or NERC boards of directors/trustees to
represent the public at large.
Increase transparency: Allow public
representatives to attend all RTO meetings.

RTO
governance

Enhance public
voice in RTO
decisionmaking

Give states larger role in RTO internal
governance and/or oversight.
Issue a FERC Notice of Inquiry revisiting the
adequacy of RTO independence and
responsiveness.
Congressional reforms: Override court decisions
mandating FERC deference to RTO decisions;
possibly reconsider voluntary nature of RTOs.

III. Market Structure
One of the most difficult challenges energy regulators face is ensuring that
enough resources enter and remain in the market to meet demand—a challenge
referred to within the field as “resource adequacy.” This Part describes how
siloed energy governance impedes a thoughtful, integrated approach to
resource adequacy and suggests ways that the goals of clean and adequate
resources can be co-realized through more calibrated market signals. We focus
primarily on regions of the country with RTOs, including California, Texas,
the Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast. These regions have the most
sophisticated energy markets, which even utilities outside of historic RTO
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regions now seem increasingly inclined to join.152 It bears noting, however,
that the lack of organized wholesale markets for energy in non-RTO areas—
particularly those that have not joined RTO energy markets—creates perhaps
even greater impediments to renewable energy development and reliability.
The lack of a market makes it more difficult for utilities to acquire backup
capacity and last-minute generation support, as well as renewable generation,
from other sources.153
A. Resource Adequacy
Resource adequacy is the project of ensuring that there will be enough
electricity generated to cover the amount of electricity demanded by
customers. Ensuring adequate resources involves resource management over
multiple time horizons—from second-to-second balancing of voltage
vacillations to distinct long-term decisions about what energy supply is
necessary to meet future projected demand.154 In the analysis below, we discuss
how current approaches to resource adequacy impede the transition to a clean,
reliable grid. Here, too, resource adequacy is treated as its own silo. That, in
turn, prevents regulators from harmonizing resource adequacy and climate
goals. We focus on resource adequacy in RTOs because this policy area has
shown both the most promise (and, perhaps, peril) with respect to achieving a
cleaner, more reliable grid.155
In market-driven RTO regions, one central resource adequacy challenge is
ensuring that resources necessary to meet future demand earn enough revenue
to incentivize their continued participation in the bulk electric system. One
152. See W. ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL, TECHNICAL SESSION POWER MARKET EXPANSION
IN THE WEST 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/AN89-B6AR (noting that entities in the
western United States “continue to join” RTO EIMs).
153. Cf. id. at 14 (noting that participation by areas of the western United States in the
Western EIM “appears to have contributed to enhanced grid reliability, decreased
energy costs, and improved integration of renewable energy”). For additional
discussion, see Part V.B below.
154. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; Wholesale Electricity Markets, PROTOGEN
(Jan. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/4SJU-BW4K (illustrating the varying time scales of
energy markets).
155. Outside of RTOs, as well as in many traditionally regulated states within RTOs,
resource adequacy is predominantly ensured through a state-mandated integrated
resource planning (IRP) process, where state regulators work with their utilities to
determine what resources should be built. See RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD,
SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLANNING 3-6 (2013), https://perma.cc/JTJ2-JP73. Although state IRP
practices differ considerably, with some states integrating the goals of clean and
reliable energy more successfully than others, we set these issues aside because they do
not involve the siloization of reliability from clean-energy goals—the central theme of
our analysis.
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way these resources earn money is through participating in energy markets, in
which they sell electricity either one day ahead or in real time.156 In these
markets, grid operators receive bids from suppliers that are willing and able to
sell electricity in a given time period.157 Some customers also bid energy nonuse—a promise to reduce demand and thus displace the need for generation—
into these markets.158 This is called “demand response.”159 RTOs determine
how much energy is required to meet total demand on the system and clear—or
dispatch—the resources needed at that moment.160 In determining which
resources to clear, RTOs start with the cheapest bid and move up in a process
called merit-order dispatch.161 All resources that clear receive the price bid by
the highest-priced resource that clears the market.162 This process centrally
affects the carbon intensity of the grid because it dictates the type of generation
infrastructure built and dispatched. If not designed properly, it can also
support the construction of too much generation infrastructure—including
fossil fuel–fired infrastructure.
Merit-order dispatch incentivizes generators to bid at their marginal
costs.163 Imagine it costs a generator $20 per megawatt-hour (MWh) to operate.
If it bids more than $20, it risks losing out to a competitor and not clearing,
even though it would be profitable for the generator to operate at that
moment. And if it bids less than $20 per MWh, it risks being forced to sell
electricity even when the generator’s cost of producing that amount of energy
is higher than the revenue it receives from the wholesale market. Merit-order
156. See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC, https://perma.cc/8AUB-DR65 (last

updated July 20, 2021).
157. See FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK FOR ENERGY MARKET BASICS 36, 39, 55-56

(2020), https://perma.cc/Y5MH-9GNZ.
158. See Demand Response Comp. in Organized Wholesale Energy Mkts., 134 FERC

¶ 61,187, at 2 n.2 (Mar. 15, 2011).
159. Id.; see Demand Response, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY OFF. ELEC., https://perma.cc/X9LQ-A65P

160.
161.

162.
163.

(archived Mar. 29, 2022) (“Demand response provides an opportunity for consumers to
play a significant role in the operation of the electric grid by reducing or shifting their
electricity usage during peak periods in response to time-based rates or other forms of
financial incentives.”).
See DIV. OF ENERGY MKT. OVERSIGHT OFF. OF ENF’T, FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A
HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 95 (2015), https://perma.cc/WN6R-3A5Q.
See id. at 95-96. For example, if four generators bid into a market and one bids $10 per
megawatt-hour (MWh), another bids $20 per MWh, another bids $30 per MWh, and
another bids $40 per MWh, then all four generators receive $40 when all four clear.
When demand declines and only three generators are needed to meet demand, then the
first three generators all receive $30 and the fourth does not clear and does not sell
electricity during that time period. See id. at 95.
See id. at 95.
See Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1181,
1186 (2020).
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dispatch is thus excellent at disciplining generators to bid their true costs, but it
presents an attendant resource-adequacy challenge: How does a grid operator
ensure that occasionally needed but high-cost generators remain in the market,
especially if they will only be dispatched a few times a year—likely during
severe weather events such as winter storms or heat waves?164
At least three solutions are possible to solve this problem: energy-only
markets, resource-adequacy requirements, and centralized capacity markets.
The first approach, an energy-only market, has been adopted in Texas. This
involves letting energy prices reach extremely high levels at times of peak
demand, thus effectively privatizing the resource-adequacy decision by leaving
it in the hands of potential generation developers.165 While most generators
will bid their marginal prices, “peaker plants,” or generators that are only
dispatched during peak demand, are able to submit extremely high bids that
earn them a profit even if they operate only a few times a year.166
The second approach, used in California, is to create a resource adequacy
requirement and mandate that all customer-serving utilities—often referred to
as load-serving entities (LSEs)—procure sufficient reserves to meet projected
demand.167 The regulator requires that LSEs procure enough reserves to meet
peak demand but gives LSEs discretion to procure those reserves for
themselves.168
The third approach, used by the East Coast grid operators, is centralized
capacity markets.169 Capacity markets compensate generators for making
164. Bethel Afework, Jordan Hanania, Kailyn Stenhouse & Jason Donev, Peaking Power,

165.

166.

167.
168.
169.

ENERGY EDUC., https://perma.cc/D38U-8NAF (last updated Sept. 3, 2018); Electric
Generators’ Roles Vary Due to Daily and Seasonal Variation in Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (June 8, 2011), https://perma.cc/AF84-25XG (“Peaking capacity runs a few
times a year for short periods to help electricity systems meet peak demand.”).
See Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which Model Can Best Handle the
Energy Transition?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/PTR3-DDU5 (“In
Texas, regulators ensure reliability through . . . scarcity pricing, which allows real-time
electricity prices to reach as high as $9000/MWh . . . . Instead of guaranteeing
generation revenue through a capacity market, the promise of high prices is supposed
to incentivize generators to build new plants and keep them ready to operate.”). The
cap is now $5,000 per MWh. See Robert Walton, Texas Power Plants “Ready for Winter”
Following Weatherization Assessment, ERCOT Says, UTIL. DIVE (updated Jan. 5, 2021),
https://perma.cc/X5DS-D3FJ.
See Bade, supra note 165; Paul L. Joskow, Challenges for Wholesale Electricity Markets with
Intermittent Renewable Generation at Scale: The U.S. Experience, 35 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 291, 302-03 (2019) (describing conditions in which scarcity pricing supports
resource adequacy).
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 380(c) (West 2022).
See id. § 380(d).
THOMAS JENKIN, PHILIPP BEITER & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y,
CAPACITY PAYMENTS IN RESTRUCTURED MARKETS UNDER LOW AND HIGH PENETRATION
LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/8KGC-GC7L.
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themselves available to sell electricity—not for actually selling it.170
Generators that do not make enough money in energy markets (those
involving the sale of electricity on a real-time or similarly short-term basis)
rely on capacity markets to make up the revenue shortfall. Capacity markets
also contain a resource adequacy requirement, since the grid operator requires
that LSEs procure from this market sufficient resources to meet peak
demand.171 The difference is that in central capacity markets, the regulator
oversees the auction that determines which generators meet the region’s
capacity needs, whereas in markets like California that rely on resource
adequacy requirements, the LSE is free to determine how to comply with the
requirement (in collaboration with state regulators).172
Among these three approaches, central capacity markets are the most
prescriptive approach to resource adequacy. A regulator both determines the
level of reserves needed to meet peak demand and creates an administrative
process to determine which resources will provide those reserves and how to
value those resources’ reliability benefit. Energy-only markets used in Texas
are the least prescriptive because, while the regulator sets prices designed to
procure sufficient reserves, it does not determine which resources are needed.
Resource-adequacy requirements like those in California occupy a middle
position—regulators determine the level of reserves necessary (similar to the
integrated resource planning process used in traditionally regulated states) but
permit LSEs to procure those reserves in whatever manner they think is
best.173
B. Principles for a Reliable, Clean Grid
A reliable and clean energy grid requires that reliability regulators
harmonize—not counteract—other policy goals, such as state clean-energy
standards, when designing resource procurement markets. We contend that
170. See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM: LEARNING CTR., https://perma.cc/6XGX-2V5J

(archived Mar. 29, 2022).
171. See, e.g., 2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM:

DETAILED ANALYSIS 49 (2019), https://perma.cc/V29D-EZ7Y (“Energy market revenues
alone were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario, which demonstrates the
critical role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.”); id. at 29 (“The PJM
Capacity Market is explicitly designed to provide revenue adequacy and the resultant
reliability.”).
172. See PUB. UTIL. § 380(c).
173. See supra note 155 (discussing integrated resource planning); Kathleen Spees, Samuel A.
Newell & Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, Capacity Markets—Lessons Learned from the First
Decade, ECON. ENERGY & ENV’T POL’Y, Mar. 2013, at 1, 4 (describing the common use of
integrated resource planning in traditionally regulated—that is, noncompetitive—
electricity markets to ensure adequate generation capacity).

1011

Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy
74 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2022)

best practices in this regard include (1) eliminating barriers to entry such that
market participants—not regulatory fiat—determine the particular resources
that provide the needed level of reserves; (2) correctly pricing reliability so that
market participants actually bear the costs imposed by those price signals; and
(3) accommodating state and federal clean-energy policies.
All three of these approaches are necessary to bridge silos between
resource adequacy requirements (such as those drafted by RTOs and approved
by FERC) and policies at other jurisdictional levels, such as federal tax
incentives and state mandates for renewables. These three principles should
guide market design regardless of the resource adequacy approach the
regulator adopts. The challenges of adhering to these principles, however,
differ depending on the approach to resource adequacy. All approaches create
some hurdles to clean energy. We explore these hurdles here and propose ways
of overcoming them.
1.

Eliminating barriers to entry

Failure to adhere to the first principle and erecting barriers to entry in
resource adequacy markets has been a problem for RTOs across the country
and has exacerbated tensions between federal and regional resource adequacy
policy and state clean-energy standards. The use of competitive markets or
performance standards to select future generation capacity has a natural
smoothing function that is essential to integrating the many policy silos that
drive generation capacity.174 Bidders come to the table with a variety of factors
influencing the price that they offer, including, for example, state and federal
subsidization of certain types of generation.175 By ignoring these many
background factors and simply accepting bids on their face (within careful
market-design limits),176 competitive markets for generation resources
174. A performance standard requires regulated entities to meet specific outcomes but does

not specify how entities should comply. See Cary Coglianese, Opinion, On the Pitfalls of
Performance Standards, REGUL. REV. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/G3N6-2J6Z. A
design standard, by contrast, involves a regulatory decision about how to achieve
compliance. See Laura Montgomery, Patrick McLaughlin, Tyler Richards & Mark
Febrizio, Performance Standards vs. Design Standards: Facilitating a Shift Toward Best
Practices 6 (June 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/BQ3D-KNK5.
175. See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey & Robert Ward, MOPR Madness, 42 ENERGY L.J. 67, 72-73
(2021) (discussing bidder incentives).
176. The bids within “competitive” capacity markets are carefully regulated and are thus
not wholly representative of free markets. RTOs design capacity markets following a
variety of FERC-approved parameters that affect the market, including, for example,
the amount of capacity that generators are required to acquire within the auction. See,
e.g., Spees et al., supra note 173, at 9-12 (describing the complex formation of
administrative demand curves, including price caps and other features that depart
from a purely competitive model, in some capacity auctions).
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naturally accommodate the many silos that shape generators’ bids. Those
bidders that have not benefited from these silos—such as coal-fired power
plants or natural gas currently disfavored by state clean-energy policies or
federal tax incentives—argue that competitive resource adequacy markets do
the opposite of “smoothing” and create an unlevel playing field.177 Yet efforts
to place these disfavored entities on equal footing simply place different
thumbs on the scales, and often in a way that artificially elevates certain policy
silos over others.178
When administrators become more prescriptive about how to comply
with regulatory policies by selecting certain resources, they can directly
contradict the policies emanating from certain silos. One such practice is the
“reliability-must-run” (RMR) agreement. Faced with a pressing reliability need,
grid operators will guarantee generators a certain amount of revenue
regardless of the wholesale price of electricity.179 RMR agreements are often
responses to genuine reliability concerns.180 For example, transmission
constraints sometimes mean that certain generators play a critical role in
keeping the lights on.181 When such generators threaten to retire, regulators
are understandably willing to pay a premium to keep them in the market.
Our concern with RMR agreements is not that they pay an above-market
price to essential facilities, but rather the process by which grid operators
177. See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, at 5-6 (Dec. 19, 2019) (stating that an

178.

179.
180.
181.

administratively-set minimum bid amount for state-subsidized resources “is necessary”
to protect “the competitiveness of the PJM capacity market,” and that state cleanenergy policies are “disruptive to competitive wholesale market outcomes”); Calpine
Corp., 171 FERC ¶ 61,035, at 48 (Apr. 16, 2020) (asserting that administrative
interventions “protect the integrity of federally-regulated markets against state
policies”).
The classic example of this is the minimum-offer-price rule (MOPR) of the
Pennsylvania–Jersey–Maryland (PJM) RTO, which we discuss in further detail below.
This much-maligned rule attempts to place natural gas and other fossil generators on
more equal footing with subsidized renewable energy and nuclear resources by
requiring state-subsidized resources to bid in at a minimum price, thus preventing
them from creating what FERC previously viewed as artificially low prices. But the
MOPR does not account for federal subsidies, such as federal tax credits for wind
energy, and thus favors federally subsidized resources while disfavoring statesubsidized resources. Indeed, FERC Commissioner Glick—dissenting from the FERC
order approving the MOPR—criticized the Commission’s claim that it could not
nullify federal subsidies (and thus could not include them within the MOPR) while the
MOPR somehow avoided nullifying state subsidies. Framed in our terms, the MOPR
validates federal silos while knocking down state silos. Calpine Corp., 171 FERC
¶ 61,035, at 20 (Apr. 16, 2020) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
See ERCOT, Reliability-Must-Run Procedures 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/C4UB-SBJZ.
See N.Y. Ind. Sys. Operator, 150 FERC ¶ 61,116, at 1-3 (Feb. 19, 2015) (directing the New
York ISO to develop RMR agreements).
See id. at 4.
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determine that the generator is needed and the system of compensating such
generators. The first problem is that grid operators and FERC rarely consider
competitive solicitations before determining that the generator is in fact
needed for system reliability. For example, Exelon’s Mystic Generating
Station, a large natural gas facility in Massachusetts, received a highly lucrative
contract to keep it in the market from 2018 to 2022.182 In approving this
contract, FERC and ISO-New England (ISO-NE) ignored objections from
Connecticut that these reliability needs could be met at lower cost.183 Since
ISO-NE did not solicit bids to determine whether alternative solutions were
available, it is difficult to assess whether Mystic was in fact an essential facility.
California, by contrast, has relied on competitive solicitations before
entering into RMR agreements.184 While in some situations, the state has
approved cost-of-service treatment for facilities that threaten to retire, in
other cases, it has found cheaper and less carbon-intensive solutions.185 One
structural element that allows California’s RTO to incorporate California’s
aggressive clean-energy policy is the fact that the RTO covers California only.
The silos in this case are relatively simple: a state legislature and energy
commission that push aggressively for renewable energy, and a “regional”
transmission organization that operates the grid supporting this energy, the
boundaries of which only cover California. This has allowed some cities to
replace gas-fired power plants with solar-plus storage facilities, which in turn
has helped California navigate the thorny process of achieving both federal
and state mandates in generation capacity decisions.186
In contrast with California, central capacity markets, too, have become
increasingly prescriptive in determining which resources are eligible to
provide reliability services. For example, the three RTOs that rely on central
capacity markets—Pennsylvania–Jersey–Maryland (PJM, the mid-Atlantic
182. See Gavin Bade, FERC Approves Cost Recovery for Exelon’s Mystic Gas Plant, UTIL. DIVE
183.

184.

185.
186.

(Dec. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/88UP-LGGK.
See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267, at 11-12 (Dec. 20, 2018)
(describing Connecticut’s objection that Mystic would receive the cost-of-service rate,
not a market rate).
See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 168 FERC ¶ 61,199, at 24 (Sept. 27, 2019) (approving
a CAISO tariff-policy revision that requires RMRs to “submit market bids at specified,
marginal cost-based prices”).
See Robert Walton, CAISO: Changes to RMR Procurement Could Keep Generators from
Gaming the System, UTIL. DIVE (updated Mar. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/E87R-WDHA.
See Cecilia Keating, “Breakthrough” California Solar-Plus-Storage Project Bought by Capital
Dynamics, ENERGY STORAGE NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/VVT8-WE9G;
Andy Colthorpe, Local Capacity Contract for 600MWh of California Battery Storage Signed
by Recurrent Energy, PG&E, ENERGY STORAGE NEWS (Aug. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/
7KXK-NSHY (describing how solar-plus-storage resources are being used to satisfy
California resource-adequacy requirements and support state climate policies).
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RTO), ISO-NE, and New York ISO (NYISO)—have expanded the scope of
regulatory tools called minimum-offer-price rules (MOPRs)187 to determine
the terms and conditions on which generators are permitted to offer to sell
capacity. MOPRs set a minimum price at which generators are eligible to bid
into capacity markets. Utility-scale solar that would be willing to offer to sell
capacity at a low price—say $5 per MW—will be unable to do so if it is subject
to a MOPR. If the minimum price the array company is allowed to bid is $40
per MW, and if the market clears at $20 per MW, then the firm will not clear
the capacity market and will not receive capacity revenues even though it
supports resource adequacy.
Though developed in the mid-2000s as limited devices designed to curb
market power abuses, MOPRs have expanded significantly since then.188
Though PJM recently narrowed the scope of its MOPR rule, and a split
Commission allowed PJM’s focused MOPR to go into effect by operation of
law, MOPRs have threatened to prevent some renewable resources that receive
a state subsidy in the eastern states from participating in capacity markets.189
Because capacity markets can account for 30% of generator revenues in these
regions,190 the expansion of these mitigation rules means that regulations that
are ostensibly designed to maintain a sufficient level of reserves also prevent
the inclusion of some renewables in the RTO’s procurement of resources
needed to support the region’s reliability needs.191 Thus, the siloed approach to
187. While PJM calls the tools MOPRs, NYISO calls them “buyer-side mitigation” and ISO-

188.

189.

190.

191.

NE uses the phrase “alternative price rule.” See Macey & Ward, supra note 175, at 72-83,
90, 97. In response to political pushback, PJM has indicated that it will scale back its
MOPR. See Catherine Morehouse, PJM Proposes to End FERC MOPR Policy that Raised
Prices for State-Subsidized Resources, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/4C8F79E8.
See Macey & Ward, supra note 175, at 73-101 (providing a history of buyer-side
mitigation rules in PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE). PJM recently narrowed the scope of its
MOPR. See Joint Statement of Chairman Glick and Commissioner Clements Regarding the
Fair Rates Act on PJM MOPR, FERC, https://perma.cc/7TCU-V5N2 (last updated
Oct. 19, 2021).
See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, at 2 (D ec. 19, 2019); Kathryne Cleary, What the
Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Means for Clean Energy in PJM, RESOURCES (Jan. 21,
2020), https://perma.cc/9PCN-PQNJ (“[T]he MOPR . . . will likely significantly restrict
the participation of new renewables in the capacity market.”).
MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, supra note 171, at 16, 286 (stating that capacity markets
accounted for $10.3 billion of generator revenues in 2018, while total generator
revenues amounted to $49.29 billion); INTERNAL MKT. MONITOR, ISO NEW ENG. INC.,
2018 ANNUAL MARKETS REPORT 4-5 (2019) (showing that 30% of revenues come from
capacity markets in ISO-NE).
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at 4 (Dec. 22, 2006) (“[PJM’s capacitymarket ruleset] is expected to provide greater incentives for new generation,
transmission, and demand response, while also providing sufficient revenues to retain
existing resources that are needed.”); see Macey & Ward, supra note 175, at 110-11.
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reliability adopted in PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO means that the markets those
regions have developed to maintain resource adequacy also make it harder for
state-subsidized renewables to be compensated even if they provide significant
reliability benefits. As introduced above, such rules cause resource adequacy
markets to counteract rather than knock down silos associated with cleanenergy goals. The result is that resource adequacy silos prevent generation
resources from coming to the table with their own price—a price influenced by
a variety of background policy factors.
A separate problem of policy segregation pervades RTOs where there has
been less structural separation of generation and transmission assets—most
notably, the Midwest ISO (MISO) and SPP. Substantial numbers of rateregulated utilities participate in these markets. RTOs allow these generators to
“self-schedule,” or provide generation “out of merit” with least-cost dispatch
practices.192 When a generator self-schedules, it determines the hours that it
will run instead of leaving such decisions to the RTO and its dispatch
algorithms.193 In practice, self-scheduling tends to benefit rate-regulated coal
resources, which recover the costs of operating from ratepayers even when the
energy market would not select them as a least-cost resource. A recent study by
the Union of Concerned Scientists has found that this practice costs ratepayers
billions of dollars a year.194
Self-scheduling provides another example of how the siloed nature of
federal and state resource-adequacy decisions can impede the transition to a
low-carbon grid.195 No matter what state and federal regulators do to
encourage renewables to enter the grid, such policies will not reduce output
from a coal-fired power plant if that plant is guaranteed a profit from its
captive ratepayers. The disaggregation here is particularly warped: A historic
utility-driven, state-commission-sanctioned resource-procurement decision to
allow the construction of a fossil fuel–fired plant prevents RTO wholesale
markets from accommodating low-carbon resources prioritized by many state
legislatures in the region.
When energy regulators presumptively favor fossil fuel resources to meet
reliability requirements—whether that be through misguided MOPRs or RMR
192. JEREMY FISHER, AL ARMENDARIZ, MATTHEW MILLER, BRENDAN PIERPONT, CASEY

ROBERTS, JOSH SMITH & GREG WANNIER, SIERRA CLUB, PLAYING WITH OTHER PEOPLE’S
MONEY: HOW NON-ECONOMIC COAL OPERATIONS DISTORT ENERGY MARKETS 8 (2019),
https://perma.cc/56V2-UY5V.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 4.
195. See id. at 22 (“The decoupled responsibility of utility regulators and RTOs has had the
consequence of allowing non-economic dispatch by regulated utilities to go relatively
unchecked, at the expense of captive ratepayers and competitive independent
generators.”).
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agreements—they make it impossible to determine whether those resources are
in fact critical. They also prevent renewable generators from being
compensated for supporting reliability when they are capable of doing so—
thereby potentially slowing the clean-energy transition and impeding
reliability at the same time.
2.

Correctly pricing and parameterizing reliability services

Even when federal and regional energy regulators rely on competition, the
inability to correctly identify and value reliability further impedes attempts—
many of them state led—to shift to a clean and reliable grid. This challenge is
endemic to all three approaches to resource adequacy.
One issue is that regulators misvalue resources that provide reliability
benefits. For example, for years, the RTO PJM, which operates in much of the
Mid-Atlantic region, required that resources be able to operate for a minimum
of ten hours in order to be dispatched in energy markets and participate in
capacity markets.196 This rule was justified on the ground that duration
requirements supported the reliability of the bulk power system.197
The problem with this justification is that resources that operate for much
shorter periods of time have substantial reliability benefits. Many batteries, for
example, can store energy for only four hours.198 Peak demand, however, is
usually four hours, and so battery storage has significant benefits at this
time.199 Yet PJM’s duration requirements kept batteries from participating in
markets even though they could provide the precise service needed to support
reliability.
PJM’s performance-duration requirements are only one example of how
RTOs’ overly prescriptive reliability rules prevent clean-energy resources
from contributing to a reliable grid. FERC recently found that similar rules
also “limit customer participation in demand response programs.”200 Properly
pricing and parameterizing the reliability benefits of energy resources is
essential to overcoming these mismatched incentives. If renewables and
storage resources support a region’s reliability needs, they should be
compensated for doing so. But when regulators charged with ensuring

196. See Jeff St. John, Taking Aim at PJM’s 10-Hour Performance Duration Capacity Rule for

Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/MR2R-LKJA.
197. See id.
198. See THOMAS BOWEN, ILYA CHERNYAKHOVSKIY & PAUL DENHOLM, NAT’L RENEWABLE

ENERGY LAB’Y, GRID-SCALE BATTERY STORAGE 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/3AUX-932D.
199. See id. at 4.
200. FERC, 2020 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 46 (2020),

https://perma.cc/S7Q2-LSHL.
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resource-adequacy design rules do not accommodate such resources, they
create an unlevel playing field that favors fossil resources.
3.

Accommodating state and federal clean-energy policies

Central to the two challenges discussed thus far—eliminating barriers to
entry to ensure low-carbon, economic resource adequacy and properly valuing
reliability—is the premise that a clean and reliable grid requires wholesale
energy markets to accommodate, not counteract, state and federal clean-energy
policies. In this case, the federal and state silos would be quite difficult to knock
down—and likely should not be erased. Congress’s decision to give FERC
authority over wholesale power transactions and states authority over retail
sales served to avoid conflicting state rate regulation of interstate transactions
while still allowing states to respond to the values of their constituents. The
challenge, though, is that wholesale policies centrally affect retail ones, and
vice versa, because retail utilities build their own generation and purchase
wholesale electricity to supply retail customers. A great deal of accommodation
of state policies by federal agencies, and vice versa, is accordingly necessary.
This challenge is perhaps best highlighted by comparing federal and regional
policies with the zero-carbon energy mandates of state policies.
Certain approaches to resource adequacy work relatively well to
accommodate state policy goals. For example, California’s approach to resource
adequacy, which imposes resource-adequacy requirements on LSEs, organically
incorporates state policy goals. The LSE can simply balance its federal
resource-adequacy goals with state clean-energy goals when procuring
resources. Thus, if offshore wind supports both reliability and climate policy,
the LSE can count offshore wind resources toward both its clean energy and
resource obligations.
Energy-only markets are also relatively well suited to accommodating
state policy goals. An LSE that needs to procure a certain percentage of supply
from renewables can enter into bilateral contracts to do so. The grid operator
simply needs to accommodate carbon prices and other renewable policies by
letting the price signals generated by such policies pass through to energy
markets.
But here, too, regulators ignore how other policy priorities impede the
transition to a low-carbon grid. States that participate in RTOs need the RTO’s
blessing to pass an effective carbon tax.201 If the RTO does not develop rules
201. In August 2020, FERC organized a panel to “explore general legal issues that may arise

under the Federal Power Act when the Commission is presented with a proposal to
integrate a carbon price set by a state (or group of states) into an RTO/ISO market
design.” Supplemental Notice of Technical Conference at 1, 3, Carbon Pricing in
Organized Wholesale Elec. Mkts., Docket No. AD20-14-000 (FERC Aug. 28, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ET88-L37M. RTOs have successfully incorporated emissions fees in
footnote continued on next page
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for incorporating the state carbon tax into energy markets, then the state
cannot tax all electricity-related emissions. The state could still tax in-state
generators, but that has little effect on out-of-state generators that participate
in the RTO’s energy market. Generators in neighboring states will be
unaffected, and carbon-intensive generators built in those states will still be
able to sell energy into the RTOs’ energy market. This issue is known as
leakage.202 An effective carbon tax therefore requires either that states
coordinate with each other or that the RTO develop rules to address leakage
concerns.203
Accommodating such policies is not particularly difficult, as RTOs have
frequently incorporated federal and state rules that incorporate the costs of
complying with environmental regulations.204 But RTOs are still trying to
figure out whether—and how—they should incorporate potential future
carbon taxes.205 As a result, a state cannot unilaterally impose an effective
carbon tax—or, more specifically, a carbon tax that addresses leakage
concerns—but must instead hope that its RTO develops a mechanism for
integrating the carbon tax into wholesale markets.
Yet perhaps the most difficult tensions between resource adequacy and
state policies occur in regions that rely on capacity markets. Capacity markets
procure resources needed to meet expected load.206 As discussed, the problem is
that some resources will enter the energy market even if they don’t clear the

202.
203.
204.

205.
206.

energy markets. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 FERC ¶ 61,418, at 35 (June 19, 2001)
(noting that “mitigation fees associated with [nitrous oxide] emissions are a legitimate
cost of producing energy” and instructing CAISO to “to submit tariff modifications
incorporating an emission allowance administrative charge”); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator
Corp., 153 FERC ¶ 61,087, at 26 (Oct. 26, 2015) (approving proposed “greenhouse gas bid
adder enhancements” to the energy imbalance market that “allow[] a resource to
recover its greenhouse gas compliance costs” imposed by California’s CO2 cap-andtrade program).
See Carbon Pricing Senior Task Force, PJM, PJM Study of Carbon Pricing & Potential
Leakage Mitigation Mechanisms 13 (2020), https://perma.cc/82QC-U59M.
See id. at 8, 27-32.
See, e.g., Policy Statement and Interim Rule Regarding Ratemaking Treatment of the
Cost of Emissions Allowances in Coordination Rates, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,930, 65,935
(Dec. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 35) (allowing “the recovery of
incremental costs of emission allowances in coordination rates” under defined
circumstances); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 FERC ¶ 61,418, at 35 (instructing CAISO “to
submit tariff modifications incorporating an emission allowance administrative
charge”); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 153 FERC ¶ 61,087, at 26 (approving proposed
“greenhouse gas bid adder enhancements” that “allow[] a resource to recover its
greenhouse gas compliance costs”).
See PJM, FERC Technical Conference on Carbon Pricing in Organized Wholesale
Electricity Markets 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/3X85-R8QP.
See Capacity Market (RPM), supra note 170.
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capacity market.207 Some will enter because they are needed to satisfy a state
renewable policy.208 In other circumstances, a resource will enter the market
because the underlying economics have changed and it operates at a profit even
if it receives all of its revenues from energy markets and none from capacity
markets.209 The dramatic decline in the costs of lithium-ion batteries, for
example, have made storage cost effective even if it does not clear the capacity
auction.210 Because capacity markets do not count these resources that are
nevertheless participating in the energy market, they procure more capacity
than is needed.
But grid operators can structure capacity markets to account for the
capacity benefits of such resources—an elegant way of redesigning market
policy to accommodate state silos without needing to fundamentally change
the structure of governance. One market-design option is to permit LSEs to
procure the resources needed to comply with state clean-energy policies and
then run the capacity market after the LSE has done so. This proposal has been
dubbed the “fixed resource requirement.”211 Doing so would ensure that
renewables that enter the market as a result of state clean-energy policies
count toward a particular region’s needed reserves.
Another solution is to run capacity auctions such that they align with
clean-energy policies. One option is to develop a forward clean-energy market
or an integrated clean-capacity market.212 A forward clean-energy market
would allow states that have developed clean-energy standards to procure a
certain percentage of their capacity obligations from resources that also
support their clean-energy policies. They could fulfill the rest of their capacity
obligation in the ordinary capacity market, as could states that do not have

207. See, e.g., ISO New Eng. Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,138, at 5 (Feb. 3, 2017) (Bay, Comm’r,

208.

209.
210.
211.

212.

concurring) (“Instead, the MOPR not only frustrates state policy initiatives, but also
likely requires load to pay twice—once through the cost of enacting the state policy
itself and then through the capacity market.”).
See ROB GRAMLICH & MICHAEL GOGGIN, GRID STRATEGIES, TOO MUCH OF THE WRONG
THING: THE NEED FOR CAPACITY MARKET REPLACEMENT OR REFORM 10-11 (2019);
Macey & Ward, supra note 175, at 104.
See Macey & Ward, supra note 175, at 104-09.
See John Fitzgerald Weaver, Solar Price Declines Slowing, Energy Storage in the Money, PV
MAG. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/E374-9Y7Y.
See Catherine Morehouse, States Ask FERC To Eliminate MOPR, Grant More Flexibility in
Pursuing Alternatives to PJM Capacity Market, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/7ZVC-HG7H.
This concept seems to have been developed by economists working for the Brattle
Group, an energy consulting organization. See KATHLEEN SPEES, SAMUEL A. NEWELL,
WALTER GRAF & EMILY SHORIN, BRATTLE GRP., HOW STATES, CITIES, AND CUSTOMERS
CAN HARNESS COMPETITIVE MARKETS TO MEET AMBITIOUS CARBON GOALS, at ii (2019).
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clean-energy policies.213 An integrated clean-capacity market would operate
similarly.214 The auction would simultaneously procure capacity and cleanenergy attributes such that participants can purchase clean attributes such as
renewable energy credits (RECs).215 The price paid for those clean-energy
attributes would help determine which resources clear the capacity market.216
This, too, would allow regions that rely on capacity markets to avoid
procuring excess capacity.
None of these options would require congressional action. The FPA
(Federal Power Act) clearly grants FERC jurisdiction over wholesale
transactions in interstate commerce and states jurisdiction over retail
decisions.217 The Supreme Court has explicitly noted that FERC has authority
to police these tensions.218 FERC may do this policing under its explicit FPA
authority to regulate practices “affecting” wholesale rates.219
In fact, the reforms we suggest here would be consistent with the spirit of
the FPA—even if they are not required by it. The Supreme Court has long held
that the FPA was “drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of
state power.”220 Reconstructing resource-adequacy markets in a manner that
accommodates state policies would prevent reliability goals from operating at
cross-purposes with clean-energy goals. That, in turn, would preserve for
states the matters that the FPA left to their control.

213. The Supreme Court has said that states may not directly regulate wholesale markets.

214.

215.
216.
217.
218.

219.
220.

See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016). But so long as
states act within the policy designed by FERC and RTOs, rather than against it, they
should be free and clear to act.
This concept was described in detail in a New Jersey Board of Public Utilities report
investigating alternatives to PJM’s capacity market. See ABRAHAM SILVERMAN, KIRA
LAWRENCE & JOSEPH DELOSA, N.J. BD. OF PUB. UTILS., ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE
ADEQUACY STRUCTURES FOR NEW JERSEY 36-39 (2021), https://perma.cc/H6WSGXMP.
See id.
See id.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b).
See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016) (“The Act makes federal
and state powers ‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that ‘there [will] be no “gaps”
for private interests to subvert the public welfare.’ Or said otherwise, the statute
prevents the creation of any regulatory ‘no man’s land.’ Some entity must have
jurisdiction to regulate each and every practice that takes place in the electricity
markets, demand response no less than any other.” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (first quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631
(1972); and then quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S.
1, 19 (1961))).
See id. at 767.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1947).
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IV. Transmission Planning, Financing, and Siting
Beyond energy markets, new electric transmission lines are essential to
enabling a clean, more reliable grid. This will involve planning for a new,
nationally interconnected network of transmission lines across existing
“seams” that divide the U.S. transmission network, deciding how to allocate
costs among utilities for these new lines, and determining where these lines
should be sited. As we explain below, this project will require the most
federalization of institutional authority, given the inherently national scope of
the project. But this is not to say that all authority should shift from the state
and regional to the federal level. Rather, we explore here how federal, topdown authority must grow, while still leaving room for the expertise of state
and regional actors.
A. The Need for a Nationally Interconnected Transmission Grid
An expanded, nationally interconnected transmission grid, or “macrogrid,”
is a prerequisite to a decarbonized, more reliable U.S. energy system. As stated
in a 2021 National Academies report entitled The Future of Electric Power in the
United States, a successful clean-energy transition will require “expand[ing] the
system’s ability to generate and move power so as to make abundant electricity
available to support the deep decarbonization of all parts of the economy.”221
Proponents of a macrogrid build-out argue that to increase grid reliability
through a decarbonized electricity sector, we must pursue a massive
investment in our existing long-distance electric transmission system.222 This
strategy will involve both reinvesting in existing transmission capacity and
expanding the transmission system itself. Necessary expansions include a new
network of long-distance, high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission
lines and more long-distance alternating current (AC) lines.
The map below from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s
Interconnected Seams Study illustrates one scenario for accomplishing this.223
This map explains how large amounts of wind and solar energy can move
between the RTOs and interconnections to accommodate demand at different
221. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER IN THE UNITED

STATES 14 (2021).
222. ROB GRAMLICH & JAY CASPARY, AMS. FOR A CLEAN ENERGY GRID, PLANNING FOR THE

FUTURE: FERC’S OPPORTUNITY TO SPUR MORE COST-EFFECTIVE TRANSMISSION
INFRASTRUCTURE app. A at 89-95 (2021) (citing and describing numerous studies).
223. Aaron Bloom et al., The Value of Increased HVDC Capacity Between Eastern and Western
U.S. Grids: The Interconnections Seam Study, 37 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 1760,
1764-68 (2022) (describing how the construction of seven HVDC facilities between the
Western and Eastern Interconnections could increase the efficiency and resilience of
the entire energy system).
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times of day through new HVDC lines (shown in red) that connect with
existing AC lines.
Figure 2
Proposed “Macrogrid” (Design 3)

Source: Brinkman et al., supra note 65, at 22.
The source describes Design 3 as follows: “Macrogrid (a nationwide HVDC
transmission network) is built and additional AC transmission and generation are
co-optimized to minimize system costs.” Id.

An expanded transmission grid along the red lines will not only facilitate
greater penetration of renewable energy across the country, but will also make
the grid more reliable and resilient, all while providing significantly lower
electricity costs for consumers.224 If it sounds too good to be true, there is a
224. See, e.g., id. at 30, 33; Alexandra B. Klass, Transmission, Distribution and Storage: Grid

Integration, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 527,
529-31 (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds., 2019) (detailing expert studies
showing the need for expanded transmission infrastructure and the benefits of such
expansion); GRAMLICH & CASPARY, supra note 222, app. A at 89-95 (summarizing
numerous studies showing the need for “large regional and interregional
transmission”). But see Steve Huntoon, Counterflow: Big Transmission—Still Not the Right
Stuff, RTO INSIDER (May 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/2W35-W33C (to locate, select
“View the live page”); (contending that proposed long-distance HVDC lines have little
chance of being built and are not cost-effective investments, while supporting more
modest regional transmission projects).
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catch: The current siloization of legal authority around transmission makes it
exceedingly hard to accomplish this necessary expansion, as we explain below.
B. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
Historically, vertically integrated utilities built most of the transmission
lines in the United States. These lines connect generators to utilities and
utilities to each other to enable wholesale trades. Utilities built transmission to
meet their obligations to provide electricity to the communities they served.
This was a local process designed to serve local needs. But over the decades, the
transmission grid has become gradually ever more interconnected. As this has
occurred, FERC has recognized that transmission has significant benefits
outside of the communities in which the line is built, and it has tried to reform
transmission planning and cost allocation rules to reflect those benefits.
Yet despite FERC’s efforts, transmission planning continues to be done
primarily at the local level, and cost allocation does not reflect the full benefits
of HVDC lines. The result is that we are not investing enough in transmission,
and the transmission built primarily serves local reliability needs. This
parochial approach to transmission planning and cost allocation also impedes
the construction and siting of the many interstate transmission lines that will
be needed to support a large amount of new renewable generation. This
Subpart explains why the process FERC has developed for transmission
planning and cost allocation fails to realize FERC’s goal of building a reliable,
robust national power grid capable of facilitating the country’s changing
resource mix.
1.

Current transmission planning and cost-allocation policy

FERC’s early transmission reforms were part of the Commission’s
campaign to support competitive wholesale energy markets—reforms that
continue today and that have been an essential component of renewable
energy growth. In landmark orders issued between 1996 and 2000, FERC
sought to accomplish two goals. First, it wanted to ensure that independent
merchant generators were able to access electricity markets so that they could
compete with vertically integrated, investor-owned utilities that controlled
and operated generation, transmission, and distribution lines.225 Second, it

225. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385); see also Open Access Same-Time Information System
(Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,737, 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).
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wanted to encourage utilities to join RTOs and delegate the operation of their
lines to these organizations.226
The early reforms related to open grid access and a more regionalized
electric grid had a significant effect on the operation and control of the
transmission system. But FERC’s primary goal in these early orders was to
make sure that the sale of electric energy was subject to competitive forces.
Transmission was at most a secondary goal.
FERC’s emphasis shifted more directly to transmission over the next
decade. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Congress instructed the
Commission to incentivize the further development of transmission to reduce
costs and improve reliability. As a result, FERC issued the putatively landmark
Order No. 1000 in 2011, which attempted to create a more regional focus for
grid development.227 In Order No. 1000, FERC acknowledged that the benefits
of transmission were not concentrated in the locale where the transmission
line was being built.228 Yet utilities outside these locales—and their state
regulators, at times—had every incentive to resist helping to pay for
transmission benefits they reaped.229 In effect, this infighting caused regionally
beneficial transmission lines to fail to advance through planning processes—
yet another example of the energy law silo at work. Recognizing that
transmission creates reliability, cost, and climate benefits in a broad geographic
area, FERC, in Order No. 1000, attempted to make transmission planning and
cost allocation reflect those nonlocal benefits.230
To remediate these deficiencies, Order No. 1000 made four reforms to
transmission planning and cost allocation: It (1) required RTOs to develop
regional transmission plans; (2) instructed RTOs to develop systems of
coordinating with each other to develop interregional plans, which were more
efficient than region-by-region plans; (3) directed utilities to adopt a
“beneficiary pays” approach to cost allocation to require that the costs of
building new transmission be spread out among the entities that benefit from
the new infrastructure and not be concentrated in the region where the
transmission line is built; and (4) mandated that merchant transmission
operators be given an opportunity to participate in the regional planning

226. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified
227.
228.
229.
230.

at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
See id. at 49,845.
See id. at 49,846 (describing the free-rider problem in transmission planning).
See id. at 49,845.
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process to allow transmission-line development to be subject to competitive
forces.231
These reforms were intended to wrest control over transmission out of the
hands of vertically integrated utilities and make sure that transmission
development reflected its geographically broad benefits.232 Regional planning,
for example, recognized that transmission lines often generate substantial
nonlocal benefits. A transmission line near Philadelphia may support
reliability or lower electricity costs in Cleveland by allowing Cleveland to
import electricity from generators located in a wider array of areas. If
generators located near Philadelphia shut down, perhaps as a result of a polar
vortex, the transmission line may prevent Philadelphia from losing power
since it can now import electricity from Ohio. That is why Order No. 1000
instructed RTOs “to create a regional transmission plan that identifies
transmission facilities needed to meet reliability, economic and Public Policy
Requirements.”233
Similarly, utility-scale solar will provide only moderate benefits if the
electricity it generates is cabined by state borders. For example, demand for
electricity in Arizona is relatively moderate compared to some of the state’s
more populous neighbors.234 But if Arizona can export solar to California and

231. See id. at 49,845-46.
232. See Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed.

Reg. 12,266, 12,268 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37) (“In the first few
decades after enactment of the [FPA] in 1935, the industry was characterized mostly by
self-sufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities, in which generation,
transmission, and distribution facilities were owned by a single entity and sold as part
of a bundled service to wholesale and retail customers.”).
233. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,851.
234. Paul L. Joskow, Facilitating Transmission Expansion to Support Efficient Decarbonization of
the Electricity Sector, ECON. ENERGY & ENV’T POL’Y, Sept. 2021, at 57, 58 (“[T]he best
sources of wind and solar resources are typically located in areas that are different
from the locations of the legacy stock of thermal generating plants. They are also often
more remote from demand centers.”); Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy Bumps into Power
Grid’s Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2008), https://perma.cc/BY5J-4AMA (“The dirty
secret of clean energy is that while generating it is getting easier, moving it to market
is not. . . . Achieving [the possibility of getting 20% of U.S. electricity from wind
turbines] would require moving large amounts of power over long distances, from the
windy, lightly populated plains in the middle of the country to the coasts where many
people live. . . . The grid’s limitations are putting a damper on such projects already.”);
see also Arizona State Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/3BPT3CDE (last updated Apr. 21, 2022) (providing details on Arizona’s energy generation
and consumption and stating that “Arizona power plants typically generate more
electricity than the state consumes, and, in 2019, more than one-fourth of the
electricity generated in-state was sent to consumers outside of Arizona”).
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Texas, then solar energy produced in Arizona will be able to provide electric
power to populations that consume massive amounts of energy.235
The interregional planning requirement reflected the same concerns. The
idea behind interregional planning was that the benefits of transmission do not
stop at an RTO’s borders and that bigger is better: Joining utilities and
connection regions is both more cost-effective and more reliable. Interregional
benefits were apparent during Winter Storm Uri. As it did for the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the storm put MISO and SPP under
extreme strain.236 However, these regions experienced far lower rates of
blackouts, in large part because those RTOs were able to import a large amount
of energy from PJM in the east.237
Additional interconnections would have provided even more significant
reliability benefits during Winter Storm Uri. More transmission connecting
MISO and PJM (as well as more transmission connecting northern and
southern MISO) would have allowed additional electricity to be exported to
resource-constrained areas, further reducing the number of blackouts in those
regions.238 FERC foresaw these kinds of benefits in its interregional
requirements—even if, as we describe below, its efforts in this regard have not
proven successful.
In sum, Order No. 1000 recognized that a region can meet its transmission
needs more cost effectively through regional projects than through individual
utilities developing their own transmission plan in isolation. In this way,
transmission creates benefits outside the location of any single transmission
line, and FERC took ambitious steps to make sure that planning and cost
allocation reflects those benefits.

235. See Arizona State Energy Profile, supra note 234 (discussing efforts by Arizona to export

carbon-free energy resources to neighboring states and noting that “[i]nterstate
transmission lines have become congested in peak demand periods, and Arizona
continues to work with other states and stakeholders to improve transmission
capacity”).
236. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER GRID OPERATIONS:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8-9 (2021), https://perma.cc/P7E2DZ62.
237. See, e.g., id. at 10 (noting that during Winter Storm Uri, “MISO’s and SPP’s ability to
transfer power through their many transmission ties with adjacent Balancing
Authorities in the Eastern Interconnection helped to alleviate their generation
shortfalls,” unlike ERCOT in Texas, which “did not have the ability to import many
thousands of MW from the Eastern Interconnection”). There are limits, however, to
relying on geographic diversity for reliability. See, e.g., id. (“Had ERCOT been able to
import more power, it would have decreased the amount that MISO and SPP would
have been able to import.”).
238. See id.
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2.

Problems with transmission planning and cost allocation: silos,
exit, and coordination challenges

Order No. 1000 remains FERC’s most aggressive, well-intended effort to
break down energy silos in transmission planning and cost allocation. But at
least four deficiencies remain. Some of these shortcomings are a direct result of
the strategy adopted in the Order. Others have arisen because of how RTOs
perform regional planning and because of “beneficiary pays” cost allocation.
First, because RTOs and utilities allow a bottom-up approach to planning,
RTOs or individual transmission owners often undertake haphazard, localized
transmission upgrades rather than more cost-effective regional and
interregional solutions.239 Second, RTOs use different methodologies to
calculate the benefits of transmission, which makes interregional planning
extremely difficult.240 Third, RTOs generally define the benefits of
transmission narrowly and discount (or ignore entirely) many environmental
and reliability benefits, which can be difficult to quantify.241 Fourth, utilities
may be able to escape cost allocation by leaving (or threatening to leave) the
market.242 As a result, planning and cost allocation remain parochial processes
that continue to be dominated by incumbent utilities.
a.

Bottom-up planning

The bottom-up approach to planning adopted in response to Order
No. 1000 has impeded the development of regional and interregional
transmission infrastructure. In practice, local transmission development often
precedes regional planning and Order No. 1000 incentivized utilities to
embrace local planning.243 While Order No. 1000 required IOUs to compete
with merchant transmission developers when they are participating in the
239. See Johannes Pfeifenberger, Brattle Grp., Transmission Planning and Benefit-Cost

240.
241.
242.

243.

Analyses 3 (2021), https://perma.cc/999Y-ZHMN (“Most projects are build [sic] solely
to address reliability and local needs; the substantial recent investments in these types
of projects now make it more difficult to justify valuable new transmission that could
more cost-effectively address economic and public policy needs.”).
SW. POWER POOL ENG’G, 2020 INTEGRATED TRANSMISSION PLANNING: ASSESSMENT
REPORT 80 (2020), https://perma.cc/MUH2-7MSC.
See Pfeifenberger, supra note 239, at 3 (“Planners and policy makers do not consider the
full range of benefits that transmission investments can provide.”).
For example, state regulators and utilities in Louisiana have threatened to leave MISO
to avoid paying for costs of regional transmission build-out, since Louisiana utility
customers receive less benefit than utility customers in the northern part of MISO. See
Mark Ballard, Louisiana to Stay in MISO After State Regulators Put Off Vote to Leave
Transmission Authority, ADVOCATE (Nov. 17, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://perma.cc/2RRC49KP.
See Pfeifenberger, supra note 239, at 3.
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regional planning process, Order No. 1000 did nothing to upset the traditional
monopoly that IOUs held on transmission built to serve local reliability
needs—instead encouraging local projects rather than regional projects.244
For example, since 2008, PJM has developed separate processes for
evaluating regional and local transmission projects. Regional projects must
participate in competitive solicitations, are subject to beneficiary pays cost
allocation, and must be approved by the PJM board.245 Local plans, by contrast,
need not meet all of these requirements.246 For example, “end-of-life” projects,
which are those needed to “maintain, repair, or replace transmission facilities,”
are generally exempt from the requirements of the regional planning
process.247 Similarly, projects that need to be built within three years to
support reliability goals, known as “Immediate-need Reliability Projects,” need
not be part of the regional plan.248
The predictable result of these exceptions, as Ari Peskoe has shown in
detail, is that local transmission developments are now responsible for most of
the new transmission built in RTOs.249 These local projects have rendered
regional planning little more than gap-filling. Local spending in PJM has
tripled since Order No. 1000 went into effect and is approximately two times
greater than regional spending.250 This suggests that PJM is allowing
244. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating

245.
246.

247.

248.
249.

250.

Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,887 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(“[O]ur actions today are not intended to diminish the significance of an incumbent
transmission provider’s reliability needs or service obligations.”).
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 123 FERC ¶ 61,163, at 35 (May 15, 2008).
See Building Through the Future for Electric Regional Transmission Planning and
Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection, 87 Fed. Reg. 26,504, 26,570-76 (May 4,
2022) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Letter from Kenneth G. Jaffe, Couns., Alston & Bird LLP & Donald A. Kaplan, Couns.,
K&L Gates LLP, to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, FERC 3 (June 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/
5QG6-VHG8.
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 142 FERC ¶ 61,214, at 107-11 (Mar. 22, 2013).
See Peskoe, supra note 149, at 50; JOHANNES P. PFEIFENBERGER, JUDY CHANG, AKARSH
SHEILENDRANATH, J. MICHAEL HAGERTY, SIMON LEVIN & WREN JIANG, BRATTLE GRP.,
COST SAVINGS OFFERED BY COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION: EXPERIENCE TO
DATE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ADDITIONAL CUSTOMER VALUE 6-7 (2019),
https://perma.cc/BLJ7-8XUN (noting that between 2013 and 2017, “about one-half of
the approximately $70 billion of aggregate transmission investments by FERCjurisdictional transmission owners in ISO/RTO regions are approved outside the
regional planning processes or with limited ISO/RTO and stakeholder engagement”).
Transmission Expansion Advisory Comm., PJM, 2019 Project Statistics 3 (2020),
https://perma.cc/NR77-9HVY. Annual spending on supplemental projects ballooned
in the aftermath of Order No. 1000. Between 2005 and 2013, spending on supplemental
projects was $1.25 billion a year. That number increased to $3.73 billion a year from
2014 to 2019. At the same time, spending on regional projects declined from $2.76
billion to $1.86 billion per year. Id.
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transmission needs to be addressed in a haphazard process without requiring
serious consideration of whether those needs could be dealt with more costeffectively through a regional process.251
PJM is not unique. The other RTOs have also seen local exceptions eat into
regional transmission planning. MISO, for example, exempts “Baseline
Reliability Projects,” which are network upgrades required to maintain
compliance with applicable national electric reliability standards,252 from
many of the obligations Order No. 1000 places on projects that go through the
regional planning process.253 MISO, PJM, ISO-NE, and SPP also exempt
immediate-need reliability projects from these obligations.254 Competitive
solicitations in ISO-NE and NYISO have been stymied by such exemptions.255
A similar problem plagues the interregional planning process. Just as local
development reduces the need for regional planning, so too does regional
planning reduce the need for interregional planning. Order No. 1000 required
RTOs to coordinate and share the results of their regional transmission plans
and identify interregional facilities that would more efficiently and costeffectively address regional transmission needs.256 The regional process can
thus render interregional planning redundant. Regions identify their
reliability needs.257 Only then do the RTOs determine if those needs can be

251. GRAMLICH & CASPARY, supra note 222, at 25-26 (explaining that “the majority of

252.
253.
254.

255.
256.
257.

[transmission] investment has been in local transmission and low-voltage projects,
planned without a full regional assessment that examines their cost-effectiveness
relative to regional alternatives, or in regional infrastructure that is planned to meet
reliability needs without assessing how to maximize other types of benefits, or that
simply rebuilds or replaces existing infrastructure”).
MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FERC ELECTRIC TARIFF, module A at 1.B (2013).
MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FERC ELECTRIC TARIFF, attach. FF ¶¶ A.c-.d.
(2021).
See Tom Marshall & Elizabeth McCormick, FERC Rejects MISO Tariff Revisions
Regarding Cost Allocation for Regional and Local Economic Transmission Projects,
TROUTMAN PEPPER: WASH. ENERGY REP. (July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/8ZNP-FJVT;
Tom Marshall & Miles Kiger, FERC Finds PJM Not in Compliance with Order No. 1000
Immediate Need Reliability Project Exemption, TROUTMAN PEPPER: WASH. ENERGY REP.
(June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/V68V-FAVQ; see also Troutman Pepper, Tom
Marshall & Elizabeth McCormick, FERC Sustains PJM and ISO-NE Immediate Need
Reliability Project Exemption Orders, JD SUPRA (Oct. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/YC7KJF98.
See ISO NEW ENG., NEW YORK ISO & PJM, 2019 NORTHEASTERN COORDINATED SYSTEM
PLAN 3 (2020), https://perma.cc/A3JQ-EKUG; Peskoe, supra note 149, at 44-46.
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
See Pfeifenberger, supra note 239, at 35 (describing a MISO study that “[did] not address
any interregional opportunities” and explaining that the regional solution is “likely far
from optimal for the broader grid”).
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better resolved through interregional seams.258 As a result, an RTO that moves
forward with a regional plan may resolve its regional needs before
determining whether the need could be better addressed through a coordinated
transmission plan.259 In addition, interregional transmission planning has to
successfully navigate the regional transmission–planning processes of all of the
transmission-planning region in which the new facility will be built. Thus, if
one RTO disagrees about how the interregional need can be addressed, or about
how to calculate the regional benefits of the interregional project, it can veto
an interregional transmission plan.260
The result is that virtually no interregional planning occurs today. This is
in part because IOUs have financial incentives to pursue those bottom-up, local
transmission lines that they know they do not have to compete for. As Ari
Peskoe has explained, “In general, IOUs build all transmission projects located
in their retail service territories, including segments of projects that span
across more than one IOU territory.”261
Entities’ varied incentives also create a timing challenge. Even though
regions are in theory supposed to use interregional plans when doing so is
more cost-effective than regional planning,262 the reality is that local and
regional planning often occurs before an interregional plan can be evaluated.
That, in turn, obviates the need for interregional planning, which makes it
more difficult to install the HVDC lines needed to bring electricity generated
from renewable-rich regions to population centers that consume a large
amount of electricity.
258. Id. at 34 (“Regional planning will tend to pre-empt more valuable and cost effective

interregional solutions.”).
259. See id.
260. See Ben Stearney, PJM, Joint and Common Market: Interregional Planning Update 2

(2020), https://perma.cc/6XPY-W4XA; Building Through the Future for Electric
Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection,
87 Fed. Reg. 26,504, 26,576 (May 4, 2022) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (“The
Commission clarified that the developer of an interregional transmission facility must
first propose its transmission facility in the regional transmission planning processes
of each of the neighboring transmission planning regions in which the transmission
facility is proposed to be located. The submission of the interregional transmission
facility in each regional transmission planning process triggers the procedure under
which the public utility transmission providers, acting through their regional
transmission planning process, jointly evaluate the proposed transmission project.”).
261. Peskoe, supra note 149, at 40.
262. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,907 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35) (noting that the order’s requirements “obligate public utility transmission
providers to identify and jointly evaluate interregional transmission facilities that may
more efficiently or cost-effectively address the individual needs identified in their
respective local and regional transmission planning processes”).
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b. Methodological differences
Methodological differences compound the difficulties of interregional
planning. Each RTO uses its own internal models when valuing transmission.
Because these models differ, RTOs often disagree about whether transmission
is needed, how much transmission is needed, and where it is needed.263 Even if
the RTOs agree to build transmission, modeling can raise further challenges
when it leads to disagreements about who will pay for the new transmission.
These methodological differences are partly responsible for situations in
which renewable energy is stranded in a region. For example, wind capacity in
SPP is often greater than load, and a significant amount of additional wind is
currently sitting in SPP’s interconnection queue.264 However, transmission
operators in SPP refuse to build—and pay for—transmission that will be used to
export energy to other regions.265 To fully take advantage of this energy, the
RTOs need to coordinate with each other to develop transmission. To do so,
however, they must figure out a way to allocate the costs of building
transmission so that regions that benefit from transmission pay. Modeling
disputes have made it difficult for RTOs to accomplish this.266
The RTOs are aware of the need for better coordination, yet they remain
unable to reconcile these modeling differences. For example, in 2020, MISO
and SPP agreed to jointly evaluate transmission upgrades, in recognition that
congestion between the north and south of the two regions was leading to
higher energy prices.267 They failed, however, to move forward on any
projects. The RTOs explained that, “[d]ue to differing methodologies between
MISO and SPP when calculating benefits and project costs, the two RTOs
decided not to pursue any projects in this area as part of the 2020 [Integrated
Transmission Plan].”268
c.

Calculating the benefits of transmission

A third problem is that RTOs “calculate the benefits of transmission
narrowly and often consider distinct needs in separate processes. Regional
263. Pfeifenberger, supra note 239, at 37-39 (describing barriers to transmission planning

created by “divergent criteria”).
264. See GI Active Requests, SW. POWER POOL, https://perma.cc/YZB9-4ZQQ (last updated

265.

266.
267.
268.

Mar. 31, 2022) (showing projects in SPP’s interconnection queue to be dominated by
wind).
JULIE LIEBERMAN, CONCENTRIC ENERGY ADVISORS, HOW TRANSMISSION PLANNING &
COST ALLOCATION PROCESSES ARE INHIBITING WIND & SOLAR DEVELOPMENT IN SPP,
MISO, & PJM 6 (2021), https://perma.cc/N9AC-L8PL.
SW. POWER POOL ENG’G, supra note 240, at 3, 79-80.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
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planning typically begins by running a model to determine whether the region
has violated any NERC reliability requirements.”269 The RTOs apply NERC
transmission system planning performance requirements. Under these
requirements, transmission planners must evaluate the region’s long-term
reliability issues.270 RTOs often compartmentalize—or silo—a region’s
reliability needs from the region’s economic and policy needs.271 In doing so,
RTOs consider future scenarios that are supposed to analyze how electric
demand and the mix of resources could change going forward.
Although reliability projects are usually selected based on cost,272
economic and policy projects are selected based on the benefit-to-cost ratio.273
“Those projects that create the most sizable benefits compared to their costs are
chosen, and regulators often require a benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.25—meaning
that the benefits of a new transmission line should be 25% greater than the
costs of building it.”274
But many RTOs narrowly calculate the benefits of transmission. Most
RTOs calculate the benefits using a metric called the adjusted production cost
(APC).275 APC “compares the costs of operating a generation fleet with and
without the proposed transmission upgrade.”276 APC further “allows the RTO
to identify the monetary savings of operating under normal conditions.”277
Doing so, however, excludes substantial reliability and climate benefits. A
resource mix that is geographically diffuse and diversified can (1) improve
resilience against extreme weather events; (2) allow grid operators to better
respond to transmission outages; and (3) support integration of renewable
269. Pub. Int. Orgs., Comment Letter on Building for the Future Through Electric Regional

270.
271.
272.
273.

274.
275.
276.
277.

Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection 119
(Oct. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Public Interest Comment Letter], https://perma.cc/6RM4VMWK; see infra Part V.
STAFF OF THE FERC, REPORT ON BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGH VOLTAGE
TRANSMISSION 25 (2020), https://perma.cc/JH55-6U23.
Pfeifenberger, supra note 239, at 37-39; see also id. at 39 (describing how interregional
planning compartmentalizes the benefits of new transmission).
See id. at 7-11.
See Johannes Pfeifenberger, Brattle Grp., Improving Transmission Planning: Benefits,
Risks, and Cost Allocation 38 (2019), https://perma.cc/A3CG-YKEE. To calculate the
benefit-to-cost ratio, RTOs quantify the expected benefits of a proposed project and
compare those benefits to the costs of building the transmission line.
Public Interest Comment Letter, supra note 269, at 119; see Pfeifenberger, supra
note 273, at 47.
See, e.g., Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, MISO Adjusted Production Cost Calculator
White Paper (2021), https://perma.cc/8U5D-6ZSV.
Public Interest Comment Letter, supra note 269, at 120; see Midcontinent Indep. Sys.
Operator, supra note 275.
Public Interest Comment Letter, supra note 269, at 120.
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energy which provides climate benefits. “These are all quantifiable benefits, but
in many cases, RTOs do not count them when calculating the benefits of
proposed transmission upgrades.”278
Again, the siloed approach to energy regulation makes it difficult to build
the type of transmission needed to allow renewables to support grid reliability.
Here, RTOs’ refusal to consider the benefits of such resources causes grid
operators to develop transmission plans that do not accommodate an
interregional, reliable macrogrid.279
d. Utility exit and cost allocation
Finally, the ability of utilities to exit RTOs discourages RTOs from
imposing costs that the utilities do not want to bear.280 This became apparent
in the immediate aftermath of Order No. 1000, when MISO tried to adopt a
series of ambitious transmission upgrades.281 Consumers in the eastern part of
MISO were expected to experience substantial benefits from these new lines.282
As a result, MISO planned to impose some of the costs on Duke Power and
FirstEnergy.283
But before those costs could be allocated to Duke and FirstEnergy, the two
utilities decided to leave MISO and join PJM.284 In doing so, they were able to
escape the requirement that they pay for many of the transmission upgrades
MISO had proposed.285
Utilities have all sorts of reasons to oppose new transmission lines. In some
cases, utilities may be concerned that a more integrated grid will create
278. Public Interest Comment Letter, supra note 269, at 120; see GRAMLICH & CASPARY, supra
279.
280.
281.
282.

283.
284.

285.

note 222, at 8-9.
For one heartening counterexample, see the text accompanying notes 415-17 below.
As noted in Part I above, RTOs are voluntary regional organizations. Part VI below
discusses the possibility of making RTO membership mandatory.
See Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 135 FERC ¶ 61,204, at 3-4
(May 31, 2011).
MISO allocated costs of new transmission across the entire service territory in part
based on the benefits of the new line. See MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 860
F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he [MISO] Tariff allocates twenty percent of the total
‘Project Cost’ ‘on a system-wide basis to all Transmission Customers and recovered
through a system-wide rate.’ . . . It allocates the remaining eighty percent of the costs to
designated pricing zones and sub-regions, with utilities in those zones paying annual
charges calculated under a formula set forth in the Tariff.”).
See id.
See MISO Transmission Owners, 860 F.3d at 841. This may not have been the only reason
for their departure. See Rich Heidorn Jr., MISO Defectors Deny Moves to PJM Are Evidence
of Barriers, RTO INSIDER (July 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/6NJ7-UK6E (to locate, select
“View the live page”).
See MISO Transmission Owners, 860 F.3d at 841.
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economic challenges for their generation assets as cheaper or cleaner options
are now able to compete with their extant generation facilities.286 In other
situations, the utility may want to build transmission itself and not pay a
utility located in a different service territory.287 Utilities’ decisions to embrace
local projects likely reflect an attempt by those utilities to ensure that they—
not a utility located in another part of the RTO—build the transmission
infrastructure that supports reliability in that utility’s service territory.
Regardless of Duke and FirstEnergy’s motivations, the threat of exit makes
it difficult for RTOs to impose costs on utilities that do not want to pay for the
transmission upgrade or to pursue transmission projects that their IOU
members don’t want because they facilitate competition against them.
* * *
Virtually no interregional projects have been constructed in the decade
since Order No. 1000 went into effect. A more ambitious transformation of
transmission planning and financing will be necessary to achieve the
macrogrid necessary for a cleaner, more reliable energy system. And in this
case, the state, regional, and federal silos must actually be broken down, not
accommodated. A national grid requires a federalized planning process that
includes local and state stakeholders but does not allow them full veto
authority.
3.

Toward national planning and cost allocation

FERC, RTOs, and states must make further reforms to realize Order
No. 1000’s laudable goals of interregional transmission planning and cost
allocation. While Order No. 1000 did not lead to regional transmission
planning marked by competitive solicitations, FERC should continue to
pursue those goals.288 Transmission planning and cost allocation should be
national and mandatory. Utilities should not be able to avoid regional and
interregional planning by relying on the local process. Nor should they be able
to escape cost allocation by leaving RTOs to avoid costs they do not want to
286. Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act;

Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595, 68,610 (Dec. 30, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 2)
(“Limitations on available transmission capability that prevent competitors from
participating in a market can give substantial market power to incumbents in the
market.”); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2002) (“The utilities’ control of
transmission facilities gives them the power either to refuse to deliver energy
produced by competitors or to deliver competitors’ power on terms and conditions less
favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions.”).
287. See Peskoe, supra note 149, at 29-34.
288. In our view, though, regional planning and cost allocation should be prioritized over
competition.
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bear. There are a variety of ways to accomplish these goals of breaking down
jurisdictional and parochial silos in transmission policy, all of which would
appear to be well within FERC’s jurisdictional authority, thus requiring little
congressional action.
Since 2011, courts have routinely upheld transmission planning that
adopts a broad understanding of the benefits of transmission and FERC’s
authority to promote it. The most important in the line of FERC transmission
cases is South Carolina Public Service Administration v. FERC, in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2014 broadly upheld the Commission’s
authority in Order No. 1000 to regulate transmission planning and mandate
beneficiary pays cost allocation.289 Also significant are two Seventh Circuit
cases on cost allocation, both called Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC (ICC II
and ICC III, respectively).290 In ICC II, the court upheld MISO’s approach to cost
allocation.291 Judge Posner wrote that FERC and the RTOs did not have to
precisely quantify all of the benefits and costs of transmission; they just had to
make a good faith effort to allocate the costs based on the benefits created by
transmission.292 In ICC III, Judge Posner invalidated a PJM transmission plan
on the ground that PJM ignored evidence that the east would benefit
disproportionately.293 Read together, these two cases suggest that courts will
defer to RTO and FERC determinations of how to allocate costs but will
overturn transmission plans that ignore evidence about the costs and benefits
of a transmission plan.
These decisions plausibly suggest that FERC and the RTOs are now legally
compelled to reform transmission planning and cost allocation to better reflect
transmission’s scale economies. There is immense evidence that national
transmission corridors would improve reliability and reduce electricity
costs.294 Under the logic of these decisions, a just and reasonable transmissionplanning process would require that FERC and RTOs develop transmission
plans that consider those benefits.
Perhaps the most direct route to developing the necessary macrogrid
would be for FERC to create a national transmission-planning authority that
289. 762 F.3d 41, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
290. Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC (ICC II ), 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013); Ill. Com. Comm’n v.

FERC (ICC III ), 756 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2014).
291. ICC II, 721 F.3d at 780.
292. See id. at 775 (quoting Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC (ICC I ), 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir.

2009)).
293. See ICC III, 756 F.3d at 564-65.
294. Patrick R. Brown & Audun Botterud, The Value of Inter-regional Coordination and
Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System, 5 JOULE 115, 130 (2021); LARSON
ET AL., supra note 46, at 103, 108.
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coordinates transmission and allocates the costs of building it.295 It is unclear,
however, whether FERC has jurisdiction to do this. Under the FPA, only
utilities can file tariffs with FERC,296 and transmission utilities are defined as
firms that own or operate transmission infrastructure.297 If utilities do not
voluntarily give filing rights to the national planning authority, it is possible
that the planning authority would not be able to allocate the costs of new
transmission to developers.
This legal interpretation is far from certain. It is also possible that, simply
by virtue of participating in one of the interconnections, utilities have engaged
in the type of coordination needed to satisfy the FPA’s definition of “public
utility.”298 If that is the case, then the planning authority would have filing
rights. Alternatively, FERC may be able to force all utilities to join RTOs and
mandate robust interregional planning.299 But because FERC’s jurisdiction
here is speculative, pursuing this route could lead to a protracted legal fight
that would itself delay transmission developments.
Alternatively, FERC could work with the RTOs to make sure that they
engage in multiregional transmission planning and cost allocation. To do this,
we recommend that FERC create a national transmission-planning authority
to develop transmission plans. This authority would not need to have filing
rights. FERC could therefore develop this planning authority internally or do
it through RTOs or NERC. If it relies on RTOs, the Commission should
require that the planning authority be independent, as it did in Order

295. See BOB ZAVADIL & ALISON SILVERSTEIN, BLUEPRINT FOR A NATIONAL ELECTRIC

TRANSMISSION AUTHORITY 1-2 (2021), https://perma.cc/AFV8-YZVG.
296. 16 U.S.C. § 824d. Tariffs are “compilation[s] of all effective rate schedules of a particular

company or utility.” Glossary, FERC, https://perma.cc/LC7B-FW39 (archived Apr. 4,
2022).
297. 16 U.S.C. § 824(e).
298. There is considerable uncertainty about when a firm “operates” a transmission facility
such that it receives filing rights under the FPA. See FPA, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(e), 49
Stat. 803, 848 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824). The D.C. Circuit has
clarified that FERC can exercise its section 205 authority to order RTOs that have
filing rights to participate in regional planning. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762
F.3d 41, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2014). FERC cannot, however, order utilities to give up their filing
rights. See Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9-11 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To our
knowledge, no court has clarified what, precisely, constitutes the operation of a
transmission facility. See FPA sec. 213, § 201(e), 49 Stat. at 848; cf. Atl. City Elec. Co., 295
F.3d at 9-11 (concluding that section 205 bars FERC from ordering utilities to give up
their filing rights without addressing the threshold question of whether FERC has
jurisdiction under section 201(e)).
299. See infra Part VI.
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No. 2000.300 The studies the planning authority conducts would provide a
baseline from which to assess the plans submitted by the RTOs.
In addition to the planning authority, FERC should require robust
interregional and multiregional planning. Specifically, the Commission should
prohibit local exemptions that have undermined regional and interregional
planning and mandate that RTOs begin with the multiregional plan. Because
FERC and RTOs are required to consider the full costs and benefits of their
transmission plan under ICC II and ICC III, FERC has legal authority to declare
the current approach to be unjust and unreasonable on the ground that they
fail to consider the full benefits of transmission.
The formation of new interregional planning boards is one way to
accomplish this goal.301 These boards would not have authority to make
section 205 filings to FERC, but they would not have to since the RTOs would
file the plans the boards developed. Of course, RTOs could try to file
alternative plans, but given the massive benefits of multiregional transmission
developments, any RTO plan that did not consider those benefits would be
unjust and unreasonable—and thus would be rejected by FERC. Thus, while
this approach would go through the RTOs (and the RTOs would retain filing
rights), it would result in much more interregional and multiregional
transmission planning.
This approach would resolve the problems that currently plague
transmission planning and cost allocation. A multiregional process would not
have inconsistent modeling assumptions, since FERC would require that
participants agree on the same methodologies. Moreover, utilities would be
unable to escape cost allocation by exiting an RTO, since all of the RTOs would
be subject to the planning process. Finally, it is worth mentioning that FERC
should require that the plans developed by RTOs and planning boards account
for the full benefits of transmission and consider whether a transmission plan
will support state policy goals. This way, FERC could avoid completely
restructuring today’s siloed transmission-planning process while making sure
that these silos do not undermine grid reliability or impede the transition to a
low-carbon economy.
C. Transmission Siting
To build the interconnected, national macrogrid that will be required to
enhance reliability everywhere—not just in pockets of the country—and to
300. For additional discussion on governance, see Part VI below. See also Regional

Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) (listing independence as a required RTO characteristic).
301. See GRAMLICH & CASPARY, supra note 222, at 14 (suggesting such boards); LIEBERMAN,
supra note 265, at 8.
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support a decarbonized grid, policy reforms in transmission planning and
financing will not be enough. The states, which exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the siting of intrastate and interstate transmission lines, have been one of
the primarily obstacles to a clean, reliable grid. As with planning, enhanced
federal authority in this policy area will be required. The literature has
extensively analyzed the issue of siloed transmission-siting authority and
potential solutions to it.302 Here, we build from this foundation to briefly
explore a variety of options for supporting a clean, reliable grid through
existing or enhanced federal authority.
1.

Working within existing law to site interstate lines

As explained in Part I above, FERC has jurisdiction over the transmission
of electricity in interstate commerce and the wholesale sale of electricity in
interstate commerce. Unlike with interstate natural gas pipelines, there is
(with limited exceptions) no general federal authority over interstate electric
transmission lines. Thus, electric utilities and other actors who wish to build
transmission lines, including interstate lines spanning several states, must
obtain a siting certificate from each state’s PUC and navigate the vagaries of
divergent state laws—many of which actively impede reliability and cleanenergy goals.303
In the mid-2000s, Congress attempted to shift some regulatory authority
over the approval of interstate electric transmission lines from the states to the
federal government to address these concerns, but it was largely
unsuccessful.304 EPAct 2005 created an enhanced role for DOE and FERC in
transmission line siting to provide a more national scope of review for
transmission lines needed for grid reliability.305 First, under section 1221 of
EPAct 2005, Congress granted DOE authority to designate national interest
electric transmission corridors (NIETCs) for regions of the country with
documented transmission congestion.306 It then authorized FERC to use
“backstop siting authority” to approve the siting of transmission lines in
302. See infra Part IV.C.2.
303. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN RE APPLICATION OF CLEAN ENERGY

PARTNERS LLC PURSUANT TO SECTION 1222 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 5-6
(2016), https://perma.cc/V7SL-NKZU (describing an example of state impediments to
merchant transmission); Klass, supra note 137, at 1144-47 (describing state-based
barriers to interstate transmission); Klass & Rossi, supra note 29, at 424-25 (same); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 23-3-205 (2021) (expressly prohibiting merchant transmission lines from
obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity to foreclose efforts by the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line project to obtain one).
304. Klass & Rossi, supra note 29, at 452-55.
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)).
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NIETCs, and grant transmission companies the power of eminent domain to
build them, if states failed to approve those lines.307
Not surprisingly, this transfer of regulatory authority from the states to
the federal government was strongly opposed by states. In the Ninth Circuit,
states quickly and successfully challenged DOE’s first efforts to designate
NIETCs.308 States also obtained a Fourth Circuit victory invalidating FERC’s
rulemaking regarding standards for approving transmission lines in an
NIETC.309
In 2021, Congress passed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act,310
which overturned the Fourth Circuit’s decision by expressly granting FERC
backstop siting authority for transmission lines in NIETCs even in cases where
a state had denied a permit. Notably, even prior to that legislation, experts had
argued that DOE and FERC could try to employ this authority again
elsewhere, given the procedural postures and somewhat narrow application of
these holdings.311 We are skeptical, however, of the viability of using
section 1221 to build new long-distance lines, even with the new Congressional
authorization to override state permit denials in NIETCs. Apart from the
federalism concerns associated with taking such actions, with FERC only
acting as a “backstop” siting authority, the process is a clunky one at best.312
Another provision of EPAct 2005—section 1222—provides an alternative
method for the federal government to facilitate electric-grid expansion, but in
a proprietary rather than a regulatory capacity. That section provides new
authority to two federal power-marketing authorities to “design, develop,
construct, operate, maintain, or own . . . an electric power transmission facility
and related facilities . . . needed to upgrade existing transmission facilities”
either in partnership with a private transmission line company or
307. Id.
308. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
309. Piedmont Env’t Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2009).
310. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021) (to be

codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
311. See AVI ZEVIN, SAM WALSH, JUSTIN GUNDLACH & ISABEL CAREY, BUILDING A NEW GRID

WITHOUT NEW LEGISLATION: A PATH TO REVITALIZING FEDERAL TRANSMISSION
AUTHORITIES 37-46 (2020) (recommending a pathway forward under section 1221
authority).
312. See, e.g., Benjamin Storrow, Power Lines are Infrastructure Bill’s Big Climate Win, E&E
NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 9, 2021, 6:31 AM EST), https://perma.cc/YSW8-5DQ5
(discussing provisions of the infrastructure law that overturned Fourth Circuit
decision but cautioning that barriers to new transmission remain); John Decker &
Andrew DeVore, President Biden Signs the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill into Law, Certain
to Fuel Long Standing Debates at FERC, VINSON & ELKINS: ENERGY UPDATE (Nov. 16,
2021), https://perma.cc/686J-UQNQ (discussing FERC’s new legislative authority over
transmission and the implementation difficulties FERC may encounter).
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independently.313 As federal actors, these entities need not obtain state siting
permits nor rely on state eminent domain authority.
During the Obama Administration, DOE developed regulations to
operationalize section 1222 and ultimately granted an application from Clean
Line Energy Partners to build the Plains and Eastern Clean Line project to
support wind energy. Arkansas had previously denied this line.314 During the
Trump Administration, DOE withdrew from the partnership and the project
was sold to NextEra.315 Nevertheless, authority under section 1222 still exists,
and could be used by DOE for projects in the future.316
A renewed focus on section 1222 and the federal power-marketing
administrations appears more promising than enhancing backstop siting
authority under section 1221, for several reasons. First, DOE has already gone
through that process once with the Plains and Eastern Clean Line.317 Second,
because it is a public–private partnership, the state law barriers are political,
but not legal. Any line built pursuant to section 1222 does not need any state
siting permits.318 Third, even though the power-marketing authorities
authorized to use section 1222 do not cover the entire United States, they cover
most of the areas in the western and central United States with access to the
strongest onshore wind and solar resources, and thus are in areas of the
country where long distance, multi-state HVDC and AC lines are most
feasible.319 By contrast, the integration of more renewable energy into the
regional grids further east may soon hinge on offshore wind resources, which
do not require multistate transmission lines.
Finally, DOE has indicated that it intends to play an enhanced role in
supporting the construction of new, regional transmission lines both through
313. 2 U.S.C. § 16421(a).
314. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (citing and discussing Arkansas legislation).
315. For a detailed discussion of the Plains & Eastern Clean Line and its demise, see RUSSELL

316.

317.
318.

319.

GOLD, SUPERPOWER 127-42 (2019); and Ros Davidson, Ambitious Clean Line Energy
“Wrapping Up,” WINDPOWER MONTHLY (Feb. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/MFJ7-NYUU.
See ZEVIN ET AL., supra note 311, at 47-50 (recommending a streamlined section 1222
process for public–private partnerships and more resources for federal powermarketing administrations to pursue transmission investments).
Id. at 46-49.
Id. (citing Downwind LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 16-cv-00207, 2017 WL 6542747,
at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2017), vacated as moot, No. 18-1399, 2018 WL 3648283 (8th Cir.
Apr. 18, 2018)).
ZEVIN ET AL., supra note 311, at 13, 24-25 (providing a map showing the strongest U.S.
wind- and solar-energy resources and a map showing the footprint of powermarketing authorities subject to section 1222 of EPAct 2005); Interconnection Seams
Study, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, https://perma.cc/SN4V-AZ9H (archived
Apr. 5, 2022) (to locate, select “View the live page”) (showing a map of regions of the
United States with the strongest wind and solar resources).
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its prior authority under EPAct 2005 and its new authority and funding under
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. As part of its Building a Better
Grid initiative announced in early 2022, the DOE expressed its intent to spend
approximately $20 billion in new funding for transmission through grants,
financing, and direct expenditures for new transmission to expand renewable
energy integration across the country; engage in enhanced coordination with
states, tribes, local governments, utilities, and RTOs to facilitate the
development of new transmission lines; support research and development for
new transmission technologies; and create new NIETCs in areas of the country
with transmission congestion.320 Thus, even if FERC does not play a major
role in direct permitting of interstate lines, the DOE has the opportunity to do
so through its own authority and funding, and can partner with FERC, states,
RTOs, and utilities in doing so.321
2.

Permitting and eminent domain reforms that can build a reliable,
decarbonized grid

A full build-out of the necessary macrogrid is also likely to require
enhanced federal or regional permitting authority. Experts have long proposed
siting and permitting reforms to address the mismatch between state authority
over transmission line siting and the regional and national scope of the nation’s
electric grid.322 Proposals include (1) Congress granting additional siting
authority to FERC, as was done in the early part of the twentieth century for
interstate natural gas pipelines323; (2) Congress granting greater authority to
RTOs to approve transmission lines that focus on more regional permitting
while matching existing regional grid planning324; and (3) Congress creating
federal standards regarding process and timing for states to implement—
similar to what Congress did through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
ease local siting barriers for telecommunication towers.325
320. See Fact Sheet: Biden–Harris Administration Races to Deploy Clean Energy That Creates Jobs

321.
322.

323.
324.
325.

and Lowers Costs, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 12, 2022), https://perma.cc/DHM3-6UG2; Peter
Behr & Miranda Willson, Details Emerge About DOE, FERC Grid Plans for Clean Energy,
E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 13, 2022, 7:22 AM EST), https://perma.cc/DN59-XTF9
(to locate, select “View the live page”).
See, e.g., Behr & Willson, supra note 320 (considering this potential outcome and
discussing state opposition to federal agency encroachment on state siting authority).
Joshua C. Macey, Zombie Energy Laws, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1122-25 (2020); Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A
Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1858-69 (2012).
See Klass & Wilson, supra note 322, at 1858-65; Klass, supra note 224, at 540-42.
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to
Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1948-51 (2015).
See id. at 1951-52 (discussing federal siting provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996).
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We believe that all of these reforms would be a significant improvement
over the status quo. They would realign transmission-line-siting authority
with both transmission-planning reforms and the need for a national
macrogrid to maintain grid reliability. Since many of these reforms require
congressional action, we recommend that Congress and the Biden
Administration seriously consider such proposals—going beyond what
Congress enacted in the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act—despite
the potential backlash from states. For reforms to be feasible, the federal
government will have to reach across the current silos and work with the
willing states while developing strategies to overcome other states’
intransigence.
FERC has indicated an interest in doing just that. In June 2021, it
announced a joint federal–state task force on electric transmission.326 We are
hopeful that this will realize the Commission’s goal of “secur[ing] the benefits
that transmission can provide . . . in the public interest.”327 Given states’
historical reluctance to build transmission, however, we are also skeptical that
it will achieve the necessary large-scale reform.
For this reason, we continue to support shifting some siting authority
from the states to either RTOs or FERC along the lines described above.
Commissioner Christie recently pointed out that there has been “an increasing
divergence of public policies in states that are members of multi-state
RTOs/ISOs, over such fundamental issues as mandated resource mixes,
compensation in capacity markets, transmission-planning criteria and cost
allocation, and carbon taxes.”328 States that control siting decisions are able to
effectively veto the type of large-scale transmission projects needed to connect
renewables to large load areas. This is one area where siloing is fatal to a clean
and reliable power grid, and where some centralization of the permitting
process is needed to break the states’ authority to veto developments that are
critical to grid reliability.
V. Reliability Regulation: NERC Reforms
A final key area of U.S. energy policy and governance that requires
transformation is, predictably, the direct regulation of reliability—a serious

326. See Joint Fed.–State Task Force on Elec. Transmission, 175 FERC ¶ 61,224, at 1 (June 17,

2021).
327. Id. at 1-2.
328. State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities, 175 FERC

¶ 61,225, at 2-3 (June 17, 2021) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring).
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task shouldered by NERC (the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation).329
The reliability of the electric grid centrally depends on a complex set of
policies pertaining to markets for energy capacity and generation, as well as
transmission planning, financing, and construction, as explored above.
Another central piece of the reliability puzzle is the direct regulation of the
reliability of all the grid components introduced above and more. NERC writes
and administers standards with extensive assistance from regional subsets of
NERC called regional entities, and with oversight from FERC.330 Owners and
operators of power plants, transmission lines, transformers, and other grid
components, which collectively form the “bulk electric system,” are required
by reliability regulations to comply with these standards.
Reliability regulations, which are called “reliability standards,” cover most
facets of the grid. They address everything from properly training workers
who install and maintain bulk electric system components to requiring tree
trimming around transmission lines to ensuring adequate capacity.331 Indeed,
the approaches to securing capacity that we discussed in Part III above—
capacity markets, minimum capacity thresholds, and price-based systems such
as those in Texas—are partially designed to meet federal reliability standards
for capacity.332
In covering nearly all grid components and operations, reliability
standards implicate the three sets of silos introduced above. First, they
centrally affect both the reliability and the amount of clean energy installed on
329. See About NERC, supra note 26 (explaining that “NERC is the [ERO] for North

America”).
330. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a), (d).
331. See United States Mandatory Standards Subject to Enforcement, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY

CORP., https://perma.cc/RH65-6DWR (archived Apr. 5, 2022).
332. NERC itself does not prescribe minimum generation capacity that must be maintained

by grid operators. However, NERC publishes criteria that must be included in capacity
planning and regularly compares capacity (planning reserves) with NERC’s ideal levels
of reserves. NERC’s regular assessments of planning-reserve margins, which analyze
the adequacy of capacity, aim to influence grid-operator decisions and policymakers
who control generators and grid operators. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2020
LONG-TERM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 8 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 LONG-TERM
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT], https://perma.cc/3MXQ-K3VU (assessing the adequacy of
capacity in all regions governed by NERC and noting that “[w]hile NERC does not
have authority to set Reliability Standards for resource adequacy . . . NERC
independently evaluates where reliability issues may arise”); N. Am. Elec. Reliability
Corp., Standard BAL-502-RF-03, at 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter Standard BAL-502-RF-03],
https://perma.cc/UJL6-LKMZ (requiring regulated NERC entities to conduct annual
resource-adequacy analyses with specific requirements, including a planning-reserve
margin, to address NERC’s reliability standard, but not setting a specific numerical
requirement for resource adequacy or planning-reserve margin).
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the grid. For example, NERC’s requirement that grid operators plan for and
report adequate generation capacity—an assurance that there will be enough
operable generation infrastructure to meet all demand—aims to limit a major
electrical outage to only one day every ten years.333 This standard requires the
entity responsible for regulating capacity—an RTO or balancing authority—to
model the adequacy of capacity and to describe the model’s assumptions
regarding intermittent generation resources, such as wind.334 Capacity models
that overestimate the risk that renewable energy capacity poses to reliability
undervalue this capacity and could discourage its construction. And as
explored here, current reliability standards do not adequately account for the
reliability attributes of sources that can operate on clean energy, such as
microgrids.
Second, reliability standards cross jurisdictional silos because of their
universal nature. For example, utilities must obtain permission from a state
regulatory commission or municipal officials to recover the costs of complying
with a variety of NERC mandates.335 Reliability standards also apply at the
regional level and affect regional decisionmaking. RTOs regularly request
permission to recover costs associated with NERC compliance through the
rates for transmission line service charged by RTOs.336 At the federal level,
FERC reviews all NERC reliability standards and the enforcement of those
standards. FERC and NERC sometimes work together to address the cause of
reliability problems and to draft new standards in response.
333. Standard BAL-502-RF-03, supra note 332, at 1 (describing the required resource-

adequacy analysis for the “ ‘one day in ten year’ loss of load expectation principles”
(capitalization altered)).
334. Id. at 1-2.
335. See PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45135, NERC STANDARDS FOR BULK
POWER PHYSICAL SECURITY: IS THE GRID MORE SECURE? 18 (2018) (discussing “state
public utility commissions which regulate the rates grid owners may charge for
electric transmission and distribution service” and noting that these commissions
“must be convinced that any new grid security capital costs and expenses are necessary
and prudent before they will allow them to be passedthrough to ratepayers”); id. at 13
(noting that for changes in utility capital and operational spending, including spending
on efforts to comply with NERC requirements, “[p]ublicly owned utilities may need
approval from cooperative boards, or municipal or federal officials”).
336. See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 135 FERC ¶ 61,118, at 1-2
(May 6, 2011) (approving MISO’s recovery of NERC compliance penalties through
rates); Letter from Monica Gonzalez, Couns., ISO New England, Inc., to Kimberly D.
Bose, Sec’y, FERC (Jan. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/7CB9-UJT7 (including a filing that
requests cost recovery for compliance with NERC standards); cf. Rules Concerning
Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, 71 Fed.
Reg. 8662, 8686 (Feb. 17, 2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 39) (noting that FERC “will
allow recovery of all costs prudently incurred to comply with the Reliability
Standards”).
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Reliability standards also centrally involve public and private silos. NERC
itself is a 501(c)(6) nonprofit corporation, and the regional entities that propose
reliability standards to NERC and enforce these standards are 501(c)(3)
organizations. Indeed, the regulation of the reliability of the U.S. grid was
entirely in private hands until 2005. As noted in Part I above, from the 1960s
through 2005, the North American Electric Reliability Council—NERC’s
predecessor, which was an association of electric utilities—was solely
responsible for assuring grid reliability through privately administered
standards.337 NERC, with input from its regional entities, now writes
reliability standards for approval by FERC and, with the help of regional
entities, enforces these standards—also with FERC approval. Regional entities,
in turn, write and enforce regional reliability standards that only apply within
their territories.338
The clean energy–reliability, jurisdictional, and public–private silos
present both challenges and opportunities for regulating the reliability of the
U.S. grid while expanding clean-energy generation. Specifically, the silos
impede or enhance two specific challenges of reliability regulation. First, as
highlighted by the events in the U.S. South in 2021, all types of power plants,
both conventional and clean, and their fuel supplies, require better reliability
standards that address weather extremes and other emergencies, many of
which are at least partially caused by climate change. Second, in improving
reliability standards, NERC and FERC must better recognize and leverage the
value that clean-energy resources can offer in terms of enhancing reliability.
Siloed reliability regulation makes these two efforts challenging, but it can also
pose opportunities for incorporating clean-energy resources solidly within
clean-energy standards. This Part uses Winter Storm Uri and historical
approaches to regulating reliability for extreme cold-weather events to
illustrate the broader challenges associated with updating reliability
regulations and incorporating clean energy into these standards. It explores the
weaknesses of some modern reliability regulations and then analyzes the
challenges and opportunities posed by silos when it comes to updating these
regulations to address modern extremes and clean-energy values.

337. NEVIUS, supra note 140, at 5-9, 85.
338. See, e.g., Standards, RELIABILITYFIRST, https://perma.cc/7KF4-ZM6F (archived Apr. 5,

2022) (“ReliabilityFirst also maintains Regional Reliability Standards as needed to
provide for the reliable regional and sub-regional planning and operation of the Bulk
Power System.”).
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A. Weaknesses of Current Reliability Regulation: The Case of Cold
Weather
The U.S. electricity grid faces a growing number of threats.339 One such
threat, which regulators have repeatedly studied yet failed to fully address, is
the loss of generation capacity from extreme weather, such as extreme cold. 340
This does not always result in the loss of power to customers. Grid operators
often manage to cobble together adequate backup reserves—particularly when
they can draw from generation capacity in regions that are not experiencing
the extreme weather. But Winter Storm Uri in 2021 involved major capacity
losses and outages in Texas and neighboring states.
The winter events of 2021 that caused these outages were not entirely an
anomaly. Indeed, similar cold-weather events in 2018, 2014, 2011, and earlier
years had caused NERC, FERC, RTOs, and regional entities to investigate the
events and associated outages and propose changes. In 2011, following
“unusually cold and windy weather” and associated outages in the Southwest,
NERC, FERC, and the regional entities affected by the cold—including the
Texas Reliability Entity—analyzed the causes of capacity outages during the
cold snap.341 In the individual states affected by the cold, utility regulatory
commissions and legislatures also initiated investigations and inquiries.342
The joint NERC–FERC 2011 report examined past winter events and
individual state responses to those events as well, examining similar “cold
weather events in 1983, 1989, 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2010” in the Southwest,
including two events that involved colder weather than that experienced in
2011.343 After exploring the causes and consequences of power outages in 2011
and previous years, FERC and NERC identified needed changes, including, for
example, (1) avoiding scheduled power-plant outages for maintenance and
other reasons during projected cold-weather events; (2) designating natural gas
facilities that supply power plants as “critical and essential loads” that should
continue to receive electricity even during events causing shortages; and

339. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2021 ERO RELIABILITY RISK PRIORITIES REPORT

340.
341.

342.
343.

17, 22-34 (2021), https://perma.cc/KBY9-SG9M (identifying “grid transformation,”
“extreme events” such as wildfires, pandemics, flooding, and drought, “security risks,”
and “critical infrastructure dependencies” as the greatest reliability threats in 2021).
See id. at 26-28.
FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS
DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1-5, 2011: CAUSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (2011).
Id. at 2.
See id. at 169-87.
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(3) requiring “generators to perform winterization.”344 Regional entities and
states did not consistently implement these recommendations, however, as
evidenced by the fact that the same shortcomings were some of the primary
causes of the extensive outages in Texas in 2021.345
Similarly, after extreme cold in the form of a “polar vortex” enveloped the
“Midwest, South Central, and East Coast regions of North America” in 2014,
regional entities such as ReliabilityFirst, with the assistance of the two RTOs
in which it operates—MISO and PJM—investigated the causes of capacity losses
and suggested “areas for improvement.”346 These suggestions included a
recommendation that the entities subject to reliability standards, such as
operators of power plants and transmission lines, “review their power plant
weatherization programs.”347 NERC also conducted a “Polar Vortex Review”
in 2014, recommending that power plants review their ability to maintain
natural gas supply and transport through pipelines even in the face of cold
weather and “[r]eview and update power plant weatherization programs.”348
Also in 2014, FERC—citing to the 2011 and 2014 cold-weather events—required
all RTOs affected by the polar vortex to provide data on the causes of frozen
equipment and “policy and procedural changes” to address RTOs’ awareness of
“generators’ ability to run at extreme ambient temperatures,” among other
data.349 Yet again in 2019, FERC and NERC issued a report on outages in the
South Central United States after a 2018 cold-weather event, noting that

344. See id. at 195-96; see also id. at 90-91 (defining critical-load customers as those that are

345.

346.
347.
348.
349.

“either exempt from rolling outages or are given a higher priority for preservation of
service”).
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INST., supra note 8, at 8-9 (“Some power generators
were inadequately weatherized; they reported a level of winter preparedness that
turned out to be inadequate to the actual conditions experienced.”); id. at 9 (noting that
some critical power plants supplying natural gas infrastructure were not identified as
critical load and had even been identified as the opposite—infrastructure that could be
shut down during periods of peak demand); see also FERC ET AL., supra note 13, at 17
(“Despite multiple prior recommendations by FERC and NERC, as well as annual
reminders via Regional Entity workshops, that generating units take action to prepare
for the winter (and providing detailed suggestions for winterization), 49 generating
units in SPP (15 percent, 1,944 MW of nameplate capacity), 26 in ERCOT (7 percent,
3,675 MW), and three units in MISO South (four percent, 854 MW), still did not have
any winterization plans.”).
RELIABILITYFIRST, RELIABILITYFIRST’S REVIEW OF WINTER PREPAREDNESS FOLLOWING
THE POLAR VORTEX, at iii, 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/3G4M-T8V6.
Id. at 7.
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POLAR VORTEX REVIEW, at iii (2014), https://perma.cc/
WB55-KLNJ.
Letter from Michael Bardee, Dir., FERC Off. of Energy Reliability, to Ne. Power
Coordinating Council, Inc. et al. 2-4 (Sept. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/3MWK-886B.
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“[m]ore than one-third” of the generators that stopped generating electricity
during the cold weather “did not have a winterization plan.”350
In short, the panoply of actors responsible for writing and implementing
reliability standards repeatedly identified the causes of power outages during
extreme cold and proposed solutions. Yet many of these solutions—
particularly mandatory winterization—were not consistently implemented.351
And repeatedly, regional entities, FERC, and NERC only recommended
solutions such as winterization of power plants, despite having the power to
mandate winterization.352 After the 2014 polar-vortex event, ReliabilityFirst
emphasized that its recommendations “are not, and should in no way be
construed as, directives to industry to undertake any actions.”353 Likewise,
NERC recommended that entities “continue or consider implementing a
program of periodic site reviews of generation facilities’ winter
preparation.”354 NERC did not formally consider mandatory weatherreadiness standards until 2019, when it published proposed standards for
comment. Following Winter Storm Uri in 2021, the NERC Board of Trustees
voted to “direct the completion” of cold-weather reliability standards first
proposed in 2019 by June 2021.355
Equally important, it appears that none of the many reports addressing the
semi-regular occurrences of “unusually” cold weather in the South have
assessed the substantial costs of continuing to rely on winterization of utilityscale power plants—and particularly fossil fuel–fired power plants—as
compared to expanding microgrids. Nor have they compared these costs to the
benefits and costs of expanding microgrids and other distributed (small-scale)
resources such as home batteries paired with rooftop solar.356 Indeed, one
350. FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES COLD

351.
352.

353.
354.
355.
356.

WEATHER BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEM EVENT OF JANUARY 17, 2018, at 10 (2019),
https://perma.cc/SP6V-U8GS.
See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 341, at 203-04; N. AM. ELEC.
RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 348, at 19-20. NERC presumably has this authority (at
least in its own view) because its staff, along with the staff of FERC and regional
entities, have now recommended federal reliability standards that mandate
winterization plans and actions. See FERC ET AL., supra note 13, at 18.
RELIABILITYFIRST, supra note 346, at iii.
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 348, at 20 (emphasis added).
Project 2019-06 Cold Weather, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., https://perma.cc/F9Z458ZR (archived Apr. 6, 2022).
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 348, at 19-20 (recommending improved
weatherization programs but not discussing distributed solar or microgrids); FERC &
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 341, app. at 34 (discussing the costs of
weatherization but not comparing these with the costs of microgrids or distributed
solar); FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 350, at 166-67
footnote continued on next page
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report noted the expense of using a distributed solar-powered unit at a natural
gas–well site to ensure continued production of natural gas for power plants
even during cold weather—ignoring the value that such generation could
provide elsewhere.357 Distributed solar, batteries, and microgrids could
provide substantial reliability benefits without locking in fossil fuel–fired
infrastructure that will continue exacerbating the very climatic conditions
that are contributing to weather extremes.358
Cold-weather events, of course, are not the only causes of reliability
failures. In part due to climate change, other extreme events such as wildfires
and droughts have also caused electricity outages.359 But they provide an
example of the challenges that reliability regulators have faced in ensuring that
reliability standards keep pace with modern events. As catastrophes at least
partially induced by climate change continue to wreak havoc on the grid, and
as we move toward more clean-energy infrastructure, it is important to
examine the challenges of updating reliability standards for both clean and
conventional infrastructure. Given the expansion of clean energy and its
potential to enhance reliability, reliability regulators must better incorporate
the reliability attributes of clean energy into standards rather than focusing so
heavily on the risks. The three planes of siloed energy regulation can impede
or enhance these efforts, as explored below.
B. Crossing Substantive Silos
In the sphere of substantive silos between clean energy and reliability, all
actors responsible for writing and implementing reliability standards need to
better integrate the current divide between the mission of reliability regulation
and clean-energy mandates. For example, most of the reports following the
outages associated with the cold-weather events in the U.S. South tend to focus
on the direct causes of those outages, such as frozen electricity-generation
infrastructure and frozen fuel-supply components.360 This is important, but
additional reports should examine how to replace some parts of the existing
system rather than simply weatherizing it. For example, in some cases,

357.
358.

359.
360.

(recommending winterization but not assessing the value of microgrids or distributed
solar).
FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 341, app. at 36 (describing
winterization expenses for a solar-powered pump under a gas well).
See, e.g., I. Waseem, M. Pipattanasomporn & S. Rahman, Reliability Benefits of
Distributed Generation as a Backup Source 7 (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/L2JH-MQKA (noting that when distributed generation resources are
located on portions of the grid that can be disconnected from the larger grid, they “can
supply the loads cut off from the substation” in the event of certain grid failures).
See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 339, at 27.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 344, 347-50.
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expanding the amount of solar and wind energy on the grid could address the
fuel-supply issues that arise for sources like natural gas during cold weather,
when wells and pipeline components freeze. Wind and sun are also sometimes
scarce during and immediately following a cold-weather event, but they could
help to fill in some fuel-supply gaps given that fuel in the form of sunlight and
wind does not freeze—provided the wind- and solar-generation infrastructure
is also adequately winterized. Furthermore, recommendations following cold
weather and other extreme events should focus more heavily on the value of
geographic diversity in grid operations. When one part of the country is
enveloped in cold or heat, for example, a well-connected grid would allow the
importation of electricity—from either clean or conventional sources—from
regions experiencing different conditions.361
Additionally, very local generation supply can be key during widespread
outages, whether these are caused by drought (and associated unavailability of
water for conventional power plants or hydroelectricity), wildfires, extreme
temperatures, or severe storms. NERC, FERC, and regional entities should
more consistently recognize the value of small energy resources such as
rooftop solar coupled with storage, and microgrids—including microgrids that
can run on green hydrogen—in helping to fill supply gaps during reliability
incidents. Some states have begun to do this, requiring the consideration of
non-wires (non-transmission) alternatives in transmission planning.362
FERC, too, has taken several initiatives to incorporate renewable energy
and other alternatives to conventional generation into wholesale markets,
despite grid operators’ concerns about the intermittency of renewable energy.
For example, FERC developed uniform standards for the interconnection of
renewable energy to the grid, thus preventing grid operators from using
arbitrary or inconsistent data and excuses for refusing interconnection.363
FERC also required RTO wholesale markets to allow energy nonuse in lieu of
generation to maintain a balance of supply and demand during periods of peak

361. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., TOM STANTON, NAT’L REGUL. RSCH. INST., GETTING THE SIGNALS STRAIGHT:

MODELING, PLANNING, AND IMPLEMENTING NON-TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVES STUDY 913 (2015) (describing state guidelines, policies, and regulations for non-transmission
alternatives).
363. Interconnection for Wind Energy, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,993, 34,995-96 (June 16, 2005)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 49,974, 49,974-75 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,190, 34,190-92 (June 13, 2005) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements, 83
Fed. Reg. 21,342, 21,343 (May 9, 2018) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).
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demand.364 Further, FERC required that distributed resources, such as rooftop
solar, have the opportunity to participate in RTO and ISO markets.365 In so
doing, it emphasized the reliability benefits of these resources. For example,
FERC noted the small lead time needed to build distributed energy resources,
thus allowing these resources to “respond rapidly to near-term generation or
transmission reliability-related requirements” and to enhance reliability.366 But
these policies do not directly regulate reliability, and NERC has been slow to
incorporate clean energy into reliability standards.
NERC has made some progress toward including clean-energy
considerations into its regular reviews of grid reliability. For example, in 2017,
NERC wrote a report on distributed energy resources that focused on how
modeling and projections for the reliability of the grid needed to change in
order to address the growing use of these resources.367 But this report
primarily addressed the reliability risks posed by distributed energy resources,
leaving for another day the agency’s observation that some of these resources
“have the capability to ride through [grid] disturbances” and “contribute
reliability services.”368 In the report, NERC also listed the existing reliability
standards that addressed the extent to which transmission operators could
obtain information from distributed resources so as to accurately predict their
impact on reliability.369 But again, it did not suggest how standards could be
modified or added to capture the reliability benefits of distributed energy.
Further, NERC has only addressed renewables in fits and starts within other
364. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg.

365.

366.
367.

368.

369.

64,100, 64,101-02 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Demand Response
Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,658-59
(Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 85 Fed. Reg.
67,094, 67,095-96 (Oct. 21, 2020) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Id. at 67,096.
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: CONNECTION,
MODELING, & RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS, at iv-v (2017), https://perma.cc/R63JH2LV.
Id. (omitting from discussion the dispatch of distributed energy resources to provide
these sorts of benefits to the power system); id. at iv (specifying that the “report
discusses the potential reliability risks and mitigation approaches for increased levels
of ” distributed energy resources on the bulk power system (emphasis added)). NERC
also wrote a report on renewable energy and distributed resources in 2015, which
similarly focused on reliability risks. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., ESSENTIAL
RELIABILITY SERVICES TASK FORCE MEASURES FRAMEWORK REPORT, at iv-v (2015),
https://perma.cc/UC7X-N8CP (noting that variable generation (the retirement of
coal-fired power plants and the increase in renewables), as well as distributed
generation and demand response (the reduction of energy use during peak demand),
“will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability”).
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 367, at 25-26, 37-38.
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reliability reviews. For example, in its assessment of reliability and reliability
challenges for summer 2021—when heat waves taxed the electric grid—NERC
noted that in Texas, “generator performance . . . is optimized for summer
conditions” even though there is not a great deal of generation capacity in
excess of demand.370 This optimization is due to the “diverse mix of fuel types,
including natural gas, nuclear, on-shore and coastal wind, solar, and a small
amount of coal-fired generation.”371 Given U.S. clean-energy and reliability
imperatives, NERC should comprehensively identify the potential for cleanenergy resources to enhance reliability and incorporate this knowledge into
standards and guidelines, through a newly established technical committee or
task force.
The jurisdictional silos in the area of reliability regulation could both
enhance and impede this effort to meld reliability and clean-energy values
while strengthening reliability standards, as explored below.
C. Leveraging Jurisdictional Silos
The complex web of actors involved in reliability regulations poses both
opportunities and hurdles with respect to enhancing reliability standards to
address modern problems, such as more extreme weather, and incorporating
clean-energy benefits into these standards. On the upside, the fact that
reliability regulation involves regional actors that cross state and other
regional lines, in addition to a federal agency and national organization, means
that innovations in regulation that embrace the reliability attributes of clean
energy could trickle up to the federal level.
Take the example of ReliabilityFirst—one of NERC’s six regional entities.
This corporation is responsible for implementing NERC standards in all or
parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia,372 and its territory covers
parts of two RTOs—PJM and MISO.373 ReliabilityFirst and the five other
regional entities can and sometimes do bring important reliability issues to the
attention of NERC or make direct recommendations to the grid operators and
owners that they regulate. For example, as noted above, following the 2014
polar vortex, ReliabilityFirst recommended several best practices that would
have prevented some of the problems experienced in Texas in 2021, including,
for example, limiting planned outages of generation when cold weather was
forecasted, securing natural gas and alternative fuel supplies even in the face of
370. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2021 SUMMER RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 9 (2021),

https://perma.cc/4P2A-6UX4.
371. Id.
372. About Us, RELIABILITYFIRST, https://perma.cc/KK4B-X2PX (archived Apr. 7, 2022).
373. ReliabilityFirst, ReliabilityFirst Newsletter 10 (Nov./Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/

B4R3-KJRM.
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cold weather, and winterizing equipment.374 Texas’s regional entity took
similar action, recommending improvements and conducting “spot checks” of
utilities; this resulted in several power plants implementing weatherization
recommendations, such as replacing thermostats and other equipment that
measured ambient air temperature at power plants.375 But as shown by the
events in Texas, especially, in 2021, these measures were not enough. Not all
plants had winterized, and fuel-supply issues caused major capacity outages.
These challenges highlight the downside of jurisdictional silos in the reliability
regulation space.
Although regional subunits of NERC have the potential to recommend
innovative or more effective reliability approaches, the presence of regional
entities, NERC, and FERC in the reliability space poses several silo-based
problems. First, FERC, NERC, and regional entities lack jurisdiction over
many facets of fuel supply—one of the main problems that contributed to the
2021 blackout in Texas.376 States primarily regulate natural gas wells,
gathering lines that collect gas from those wells, intrastate natural gas
pipelines, and natural gas distribution lines. Therefore, although NERC can
(and has) recommended mandatory winterization of power plants, it lacks the
authority to mandate winterization of these state-regulated fuel-supply
components for power plants. This leaves NERC in the relatively weak
position of recommending that “Congress, state legislators, and regulators with
jurisdiction over [these] facilities . . . should require those gas facilities to have
cold weather preparedness plans” and that these facilities “should consider
implementing measures to protect against freezing and other cold-related
limitations.”377
A second limitation posed by jurisdictional silos in the area of reliability
regulation is the free-riding threat. As noted above, several regional entities—
including the Texas regional entity—had recommended winterization of
plants prior to the 2021 crisis, as had NERC and FERC.378 But the numerous
actors operating in the reliability space, at different jurisdictional levels, might
374. RELIABILITYFIRST, supra note 346, at 5-7.
375. See, e.g., ReliabilityFirst, RF 2020-2021 Outreach Approach, Lessons Learned, Best

Practices & Cold Weather SAR Update 6-11 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/79ZP-CF96 (noting
winterization responses by utilities such as replacing plant equipment that measures
ambient temperature and thermometers on transmitter boxes).
376. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 236, at 5 (noting that “[d]uring the
Event, [well] shut-ins,” or closures to make wells nonproducing, “and unplanned
outages of natural gas wellheads, as well as unplanned outages of gathering and
processing facilities, resulted in a decline of natural gas available for supply and
transportation to many natural gas–fired generating units in the south-central U.S.”).
377. Id. at 24.
378. See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
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have created a false sense of complacency, with NERC and FERC potentially
assuming that regional entities and RTOs were doing enough, or vice versa.
This is similar to the regulatory gaps that emerge in a regulatory commons as
discussed in Part II above, in which numerous actors have partial regulatory
authority and may assume that the other actors have addressed a problem.
Indeed, the remarks of American Electric Power (AEP)—a large utility—on
proposed mandatory winter reliability standards are illustrative. AEP argued
against mandatory standards in part because it believed that numerous
organizations had already adequately addressed the risks. It pointed to NERC’s
guidelines and guidance documents from RTOs and regional entities and
argued that “ERCOT already has a suitable mechanism in place, which has
proven itself in practice.”379 Here, FERC—as the umbrella organization
overseeing all reliability standards and thus benefitting from a bird’s-eye
view—could have done more to identify and recognize regulatory gaps that
remain despite (and in part due to) multiple actors operating in the reliability
space.
The weaknesses of some reliability standards and NERC’s failure to
adequately incorporate the reliability benefits of clean energy into reliability
standards might also arise from public–private silos in the reliability
regulation space. Here again, however, there are some benefits to these silos,
which could enhance reliability standards for clean energy and protect against
overly weak standards.
D. Bridging Public–Private Values in Public–Private Energy Silos
The status of NERC as an organization that relies centrally on private
entities to draft and enforce standards (with government oversight) is
beneficial in part. Utilities are keenly aware of the nuanced and technical
requirements for maintaining a reliable grid—more so, perhaps, than anyone
else. Additionally, the structure of NERC and its regional entities may protect
against undue political influence of the relatively wealthy, well-resourced
utilities subject to reliability standards. This potentially helps to support
adequately protective standards and innovative standards that recognize the
value of relatively new entrants to the market, including, for example, smallscale renewables. In drawing together public and private members from a
variety of geographies, from areas governed by RTOs and not governed by
RTOs, and from areas with competitive and noncompetitive state markets,
NERC’s regional entities may serve as entities that the political-science
literature describes as “boundary organizations.” These are organizations that
can transcend typical political (and other) divisions by shaking up traditional
379. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., COMMENT REPORT ON 2019-06 COLD WEATHER

STANDARD AUTHORIZATION REQUEST (2019), https://perma.cc/Z4MF-VDZ9.
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authority structures.380 Indeed, ReliabilityFirst provides a good example of
this, with its leadership team alternating between members from different
RTOs and explicitly including representatives from different geographies and
markets.381 Boundary organizations can create innovative, effective policies by
overcoming traditional divisions and assumed limitations to policy reform.
But NERC and its regional entities have not yet realized the full potential of
boundary organizations, as evidenced by recent reliability crises and the
overall failure of reliability standards to capitalize on the reliability benefits
offered by clean energy.
These weaknesses of reliability standards suggest that the opportunity to
shake up traditional political power within regional entities and NERC has not
been realized. Utilities, like any rational economic actor, understandably tend
to resist mandates that constrain their operations and add costs. And these
utilities have a powerful voice, particularly within private organizations such
as regional entities and NERC governed by individuals who were previously
or currently are in the utility industry. For example, the board of directors of
ReliabilityFirst is chaired by the vice president of the largest transmission-only
company in the United States.382 The vice chair is the Senior Vice President of
Transmission Ventures, Strategy, and Policy at AEP—one of the nation’s
largest utilities, and most of the other members also represent large utilities
and transmission companies.383 NERC’s governing body, its board of trustees,
includes former or current utility CEOs and members of utility boards of
directors, utility consultants, vice presidents of commercial energy users, and a
former president and CEO of the American Public Power Association—an
association of government-owned and -operated utilities—among other
trustees.384 So membership is diverse, but utilities are well represented on the
board.
Large utilities are in some cases incentivized to argue against national
mandatory standards, such as power-plant winterization, that will increase
their expense. As AEP commented on NERC’s proposed 2019 standards for cold
weather, “[W]e believe entities need the flexibility of engineering judgement to
380. Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Solan,

381.
382.

383.
384.

Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market in the United States: The
Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 2016, at 94,
95.
Governance, RELIABILITYFIRST, https://perma.cc/HHN4-G85S (archived Apr. 7, 2022).
Board of Directors, RELIABILITYFIRST, https://perma.cc/LM6T-YPTB (archived May 20,
2022); About Us, ITC HOLDINGS CORP., https://perma.cc/6RT3-89BT (archived Apr. 7,
2022).
Board of Directors, supra note 382.
Board of Trustees, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., https://perma.cc/YF84-UTAX
(archived Apr. 7, 2022).
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design and implement their own procedures to prepare for cold weather
outside of prescriptive obligations.”385 Additionally, some utilities have resisted
recognizing the value of resources such as distributed solar. For example, when
FERC issued a rule requiring that distributed energy resources (including
collections of these resources bundled together, or “aggregated”) be able to
participate in wholesale markets, some utilities voiced “concerns about the
cost, and operational and reliability impacts, of distributed energy resource
aggregations on distribution utilities and the distribution system.”386 This is in
part because utilities do sometimes have to shoulder the costs of enhancing the
distribution grid to accommodate more solar energy—albeit typically with
ratepayer support. But some large utilities also oppose distributed solar because
they view it a problematic competition.387 Ultimately, the challenges of
updating reliability standards and incorporating clean-energy benefits into
these standards might not arise directly from the silos themselves, but partially
from powerful players who are able to leverage these silos to their advantage.
The relatively strong utility presence within private regional entities and
NERC could potentially push back against values that the broader public
increasing demands, including a more reliable and cleaner grid. FERC, a public
agency with review authority over NERC, should do more in reviewing
NERC’s proposed reliability standards to require incorporation of cleanenergy benefits. More public participation within NERC and NERC’s regional
entities could also potentially help to incorporate public values into reliability
regulation. Including at least two members on regional entity boards of
directors from nonprofit groups that advocate for reliability and low-carbon
generation would go a long way toward helping to balance private and public
values within the standard setting and enforcement process.
VI. Public–Private Regional Governance: Improving RTOs
As FERC and the states have sought means to improve market design,
transmission planning and financing, and reliability services, they have
consistently converged on the regional level as a preferred scale of

385. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 379.
386. Participation of Distributed Energy Res. Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l

Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247, at 39-51 (Sept. 17,
2020).
387. See, e.g., Joby Warrick, Utilities Wage Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, WASH. POST
(Mar. 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/6R8Q-MEWC (noting utilities’ concerns, voiced in a
private meeting, ranging from “ ‘declining retail sales’ and a ‘loss of customers’ to
‘potential obsolescence’ ” (quoting DAVID K. OWENS, EDISON ELEC. INST., FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 3, 7 (2012))).
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coordination.388 Regional-governance structures—in particular RTOs—
dominate each of the critical energy-policy areas that we have discussed. RTOs
design capacity markets, plan for transmission (often across state lines), and
establish structures for financing new transmission needed for renewable
energy and reliability, all under FERC oversight.
The appeal of regional governing entities stems from their ability to
mediate among energy governance’s jurisdictional silos. RTOs, at their best, are
technically skilled grid managers that advance the objectives of both FERC and
the states in their region. They can reduce policy conflicts among private
utilities and transmission owners, states, the federal government, and other
stakeholders by providing a forum in which constituents hash out state and
federal and public and private values to reach a compromise. Regional
governing entities can also fill gaps that occur when neither federal nor state
entities fully address an issue—as, for example, RTOs with capacity markets
have attempted to do with respect to resource adequacy.389
But the potential for regional organizations to effectively serve as these
kind of mediating institutions hinges on their design. The regional format can
only succeed only if utilities, states, public federal regulators, and public
stakeholders view these organizations’ systems of governance as appropriately
balancing federal authority with state authority and private expertise with
public values. Recent challenges in RTOs’ management of clean energy and
reliability suggest that this balance is presently off, throwing into question the
choice to silo predominant control of regional grids and electricity markets
within private membership organizations.
This Part discusses why RTOs, the privatized, regional institutions we
have charged with managing the grid, too often fail to facilitate the transition
to a clean, reliable grid. As this analysis shows, before we can champion
regionalization as a mode of achieving a clean, reliable grid, we will need to
also reform the oversight or structure of the regional institutions in charge of
this project.
A. RTOs in Depth
As discussed in Parts I and II above, RTOs and ISOs manage the grid and
electricity markets in most areas in the United States. From a governance
perspective, these RTOs are unique institutional constructs: They are
membership organizations, comprised primarily of industry insiders along
with others with sufficient stake in industry outcomes to register as members
388. See Wiseman, supra note 144, at 151-52, 166-167; see also supra Part III (discussing

capacity markets); supra Part IV (discussing transmission-planning reforms); supra
Part V (discussing NERC regions).
389. See supra Part III.
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and pay annual membership dues.390 States and consumer advocates have
limited voting authority in most RTOs and ISOs.391 To ensure efficient
regional dispatch of electricity, transmission-owning members of RTOs agree
to give the RTO operational control over their transmission assets.392
Individual transmission owners, however, retain ownership, which gives them
a distinct interest in what gets built where and how the grid is run.393 In most
RTOs, membership voting processes—in collaboration with RTO Boards—
establish the rules for how transmission owners are compensated, how utilities
share the costs of regional transmission upgrades, and what resources are
eligible to participate in energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets.394
FERC reviews these proposed rules under a deferential standard, rejecting
them only if they will clearly produce unjust or unreasonable rates.395
This governance structure creates a range of competing—and often
perverse—incentives when it comes to achieving a clean, reliable grid.396 RTOs
390. Each RTO has internally established membership and participation rules. See, e.g.,

391.

392.
393.

394.

395.

396.

RTOGov Researchers, Comment Letter on the Office of Public Participation 11-12
(May 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/N927-89BB; Membership Enrollment, PJM
https://perma.cc/PJL3-Z6MS (archived Apr. 7, 2022) (listing membership fees to join
largest RTO).
See JENNIFER CHEN & GABRIELLE MURNAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN RESOURCE
ADEQUACY DECISIONS IN MULTISTATE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 7-15
(2019) (documenting the role of states across various RTOs); CHRISTOPHER A. PARENT,
KATHERINE S. FISHER, WILLIAM R. COTTON & CALI C. CLARK, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
AND PRACTICES IN THE FERC-JURISDICTIONAL ISOS/RTOS, at ES-2 to ES-3 (2021),
https://perma.cc/XP58-K8N2 (comparing state and stakeholder roles across RTOs).
See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28
ENERGY L.J. 543, 552-53, 552 n.43 (2007).
See Welton, supra note 142, at 237-52 (describing RTOs’ roles in market rulemaking);
Klass & Wilson, supra note 322, at 1869-72 (describing RTOs’ role in cost allocation).
There is considerable complexity to how various RTOs structure membership voting,
and regions also differ in the issues that are determined through membership voting, as
compared to direct board control. For details on RTO-governance processes, see, for
example, Stephanie Lenhart & Dalten Fox, Participatory Democracy in Dynamic Contexts:
A Review of Regional Transmission Organization Governance in the United States, ENERGY
RSCH. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2022, at 1, 2.
See Welton, supra note 142, at 221-22; Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1,
554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008); NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (observing that “[s]ection 205 puts FERC in a ‘passive and reactive role’ ” (quoting
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2017))).
See MARK JAMES, KEVIN B. JONES, ASHLEIGH H. KRICK & RIKAELA R. GREANE, HOW THE
RTO STAKEHOLDER PROCESS AFFECTS MARKET EFFICIENCY 15 (2017) (observing
incumbency power and bias); Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, The Political Complexity
of Regional Electricity Policy Formation, COMPLEXITY, Dec. 2018, at 1, 2 (modeling political
power structures within RTOs); Blumsack & Yoo, supra note 139, at 3087; Welton,
footnote continued on next page
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are deeply invested in grid reliability. First, they are typically charged to act as
the Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators for their respective
territories to ensure a steady match between electricity supply and demand.397
Second, they oversee transmission planning to ensure necessary expansions to
guard the reliability of the grid.398 Third, in several regions, they also run
markets to ensure resource adequacy.399 Politically and practically, RTO
members and boards have every incentive to avoid major blackouts or other
reliability events—if the lights go out in their region, they are likely to
shoulder much of the blame.400
In contrast, RTOs have no clear mandate to promote renewable energy,
given that the primary legal authority under which they operate is the
assurance of “just and reasonable rates.”401 Instead, RTOs proclaim themselves
to be resource-neutral organizations, in charge of making the grid function
reliably and cost-effectively in light of whatever resource priorities state and
federal regulators establish for their respective jurisdictions.402
But in application, RTO rules and policies often veer far from neutrality in
ways that favor incumbent members and punish new-entrant technologies

397.

398.

399.
400.
401.

402.

supra note 142, at 213-14, 241-43, 245-47, 252-53; Christina E. Simeone, Reforming
FERC’s RTO/ISO Stakeholder Governance Principles, ELEC. J., June 2021, at 1, 1 (“The
RTO/ISO governance system has the potential to influence almost every aspect of the
organization’s functioning.”).
ASHLEY J. LAWSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45764, MAINTAINING ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
WITH WIND AND SOLAR RESOURCES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2019)
(noting that RTOs act as balancing authorities in their regions); FERC, RELIABILITY
PRIMER 27 (2020), https://perma.cc/6BLR-E646 (describing how reliability coordinators
have broader regional authority over reliability).
LIEBERMAN, supra note 265, at 3 (describing how regional transmission-planning
processes “begin with a reliability model designed to identify and determine a means to
resolve any violations of . . . reliability requirements or applicable regional or local
reliability requirements”).
See supra Part III.
See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 393, at 562.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e. Some argue that this language provides a mandate to pursue
clean energy, but regulators have not yet agreed. Compare Christopher J. Bateman &
James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENV’T
L. REV. 275, 278 (2014) (urging FERC to incorporate environmental considerations into
market design), with Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40
ENERGY L.J. 1, 5, 32-33 (2019) (explaining FERC’s role as a fuel-neutral regulator).
See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems:
Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations,
ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., Nov. 2016, at 222, 229 (“We are a taker of policy not a maker
of policy . . . . We don’t create policy. We attempt to interpret policy as handed to us.”
(quoting an RTO employee)); MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, MISO’S RESPONSE
TO THE RELIABILITY IMPERATIVE 2 (2021) (describing the organization as “policyneutral” on renewable energy’s growth and thus interested only in the challenges
rising levels of renewables pose for grid management).
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that are critical for decarbonization. Consider a few examples. When it comes
to interconnection queues, most resources now wanting to connect to the grid
are renewables and battery-storage projects that can support renewables.403
But interconnecting resources face high transmission-related costs, including
the full cost of network upgrades associated with interconnection (such as
expanded transmission capacity to support the new interconnecting
generation), even though these upgrades typically offer reliability and
economic benefits to load across the region.404 In application, these rules mean
that incumbent utilities reap free grid-reliability improvements financed by
renewable energy generators, while competition from new entrants is tamped
down through the imposition of often unaffordable network-upgrade costs.405
Another example of RTOs acting in a resource-biased manner when
confronting the twin aims of reliability and clean energy comes from
transmission planning. As discussed in Part IV.B above, Order No. 1000
requires regions to take into account “public policy requirements” when
planning for future regional transmission expansion, including, for example,
state requirements for renewable energy generation.406 But RTO transmission
planners, under pressure from transmission owners, employ renewable
forecast scenarios, or “Futures,” that vastly underestimate the amount of
renewable energy that both changing economics and policies cause to enter the
grid.407 This, in turn, causes planners not to solicit or select regional
transmission projects that facilitate renewable energy development, with rare
yet notable exceptions.408

403. See Miranda Wilson, FERC Complaint Highlights “Structural Problem” for Renewables,

404.

405.
406.

407.

408.

POLITICO PRO: ENERGYWIRE (May 25, 2021, 7:13 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/D5M4B4UF (to locate, select “View the live page”); Berkeley Lab Data Products Summarise
Proposed US Projects in Interconnection Queue, RENEWABLES NOW (May 25, 2021, 8:56 AM
CEST), https://perma.cc/MG6V-R5TX (showing graphs of queues dominated by wind
and solar projects).
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 265, at xii (“Currently, in each RTO the generator is charged
for all or nearly all of the upgrade even though the upgrade will have benefits to other
generators or load.”).
See id. at vi, xii (reporting that these costs are “sometimes in the hundreds of millions of
dollars”).
See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,855 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35) (capitalization altered).
LIEBERMAN, supra note 265, at vii, x, 10 (noting transmission owners’ “significant
influence[]” in these planning processes and the problematic use of signed
interconnection agreements as a forecast for renewables’ growth); GRAMLICH &
CASPARY, supra note 222, at 10-11.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 265, at 19. For discussion of exceptions, see notes 415-18 and the
accompanying text below.
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A similar dynamic is at work in the energy-market design challenges
discussed in Part II, where incumbent nonrenewable generators pushed market
changes that penalized renewable energy competitors. And this dynamic also
emerges in the self-scheduling practices discussed in Part II.409 What do these
examples have in common? They all highlight instances in which RTOs fail to
embrace the potential of new resources that could contribute to a clean,
reliable energy future but threaten the bottom line of incumbents.410
The key problem here is that RTO governance, focused as it is on
amalgamating member preferences, often fails to facilitate forward-looking
reforms that would ensure the reliability of a transformed, clean energy grid.
Experts widely agree that the key to integrating high levels of variable
renewable energy generation into the grid while maintaining reliability is to
seek out complementary resources that offer flexibility to balance out temporal
variations in renewables’ output.411 To date, most RTOs have proven resistant
to updating their conceptions of reliability to embrace flexibility as a key grid
characteristic that regions should be procuring.412 Indeed, many RTOs have
actively resisted incorporating a host of more flexible resources into their
energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets.413
Thus, behind many of the current laws, tariffs, and practices that impede a
clean, reliable energy future lies an RTO-governance model where incumbents
hold outsized sway and, at times, have structural interests against the build-out

409. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
410. For a longer discussion, see Welton, supra note 142, at 241-46. See also SONIA AGGARWAL

& MIKE O’BOYLE, ENERGY INNOVATION LLC, REWIRING THE U.S. FOR ECONOMIC
RECOVERY 22 (2020) (“As new technologies emerge and request to participate in the
market, RTOs/ISOs have often reacted by imposing restrictions on the types of
connections and services those technologies can offer.”).
411. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2020 STATE OF RELIABILITY: AN ASSESSMENT OF
2019 BULK POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, at x, 49-51 (2020); Amory B. Lovins, Reliably
Integrating Variable Renewables: Moving Grid Flexibility Resources from Models to Results,
ELEC. J., Dec. 2017, at 58, 58 (“Careful analyses consistently find that largely or wholly
renewable power supply can be delivered with little or no bulk storage and at
reasonable cost by integrating at least seven kinds of ‘grid flexibility resources.’ ”); 2020
LONG-TERM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 332, at 37; NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB’Y, supra note 32, at 3 (“Electric sector modeling shows that a more flexible system is
needed to accommodate increasing levels of renewable generation.”).
412. See ERIC GIMON, ENERGY INNOVATION, WHY THE CLEAN ENERGY INDUSTRY SHOULD BE
INTERESTED IN RESOURCE ADEQUACY 1 (2020) (describing how incumbent generators,
“having failed to make the argument that clean power is too expensive . . . are now
falling back on resource adequacy as a last bastion to defend their market share and
slow the power grid’s decarbonization”).
413. See Welton, supra note 142, at 241-45; see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760, 774 (2016) (upholding a FERC order forcing RTOs to compensate demand
response and generation equally).
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of clean energy.414 Transmission companies resist having their customers pay
for their fair share of transmission upgrades, instead pushing these costs onto
renewable entrants and overbuilding local transmission lines to the detriment
of regional and interregional development. Incumbent fossil fuel generators
resist market reforms that increase the entry of new flexible resources into
competitive energy markets, while pushing market reforms that are punitive
to renewable energy.
There are, to be sure, counterexamples to the ones discussed above, where
RTOs have pursued policies to support renewable energy integration. The
most cited of these is the multi-value projects (MVP) planning initiative in
MISO. MISO undertook the MVP initiative to help build the transmission
necessary for states in the region to meet their renewable energy targets.415
Through the MVP process, MISO identified projects that were regional in
nature, provided economic value to the region, and allowed for compliance
with state public policy requirements such as renewable energy mandates. The
costs of these projects, which were effective in connecting new wind energy
resources to the regional grid, were distributed across load on a regional rather
than a local basis.416 SPP has undertaken similar initiatives.417 MISO and SPP
have also proven proactive in integrating new wind resources into energy
markets through improved forecasting and bid flexibility.418
414. See AGGARWAL & O’BOYLE, supra note 410, at 20 (“RTO/ISO proposals [for market rules]

415.
416.

417.
418.

tend to favor incumbents, stifle innovation, and lack upfront input from state,
consumer, and environmental interests that have to then battle bad proposals in
FERC-regulated dockets.”); see also Ethan Howland, SOO Green Transmission Project
Faces PJM Obstacles: Are Grid Operators Hindering the Energy Transition?, UTIL. DIVE
(Jan. 13, 2022), https://perma.cc/ST6M-YE4G (discussing how outdated PJM rules that
favor incumbent utilities are creating unnecessary roadblocks to innovative
interregional HVDC transmission projects designed to bring wind energy from MISO
to PJM).
Wiseman, supra note 144, at 181-82.
See Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC (ICC II), 721 F.3d 764, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing
the MISO MVP process); LIEBERMAN, supra note 265, at 14, 24. MISO has begun
planning a second round of regional projects, but disagreements over regional cost
sharing between the north and south subregions of MISO has slowed progress. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Tomich, MISO Urges Splitting South, Midwest Grid for Transmission Build-Out,
POLITICO PRO: ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 15, 2021, 7:19 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/Z4HQDBKY (to locate, select “View the live page”) (discussing success of MVP lines and
MISO efforts to build on that success); Ballard, supra note 242 (discussing the
opposition of Louisiana and utilities in the southern region of MISO to paying for
Midwest transmission lines).
Wiseman, supra note 144, at 185; Priority Projects, SW. POWER POOL, https://perma.cc/
J5KX-VX47 (archived Apr. 9, 2022).
See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 402, at 225; SW. POWER POOL, 2016 WIND
INTEGRATION STUDY 5 (2016), https://perma.cc/CY7X-2PNV (describing how the RTO
proactively undertook a study “to identify challenges for integrating higher levels of
wind penetration into the SPP transmission system”).
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Notably, these proactive, pro-renewables stances have taken place in
RTOs where (1) states retain substantial decisionmaking authority within
RTO-governance structures; and (2) utilities remain vertically integrated,
recovering their generation costs under cost-of-service ratemaking.419 This
first factor is important because it allows states in SPP and MISO to have more
institutional power in advancing pro-renewables stances in both regions.420
The second factor is important because it makes incumbent generators in a
region less likely to object to renewable energy growth, as they are more likely
to recover their sunk generation costs under state public-utility law.421
The two examples discussed above, both of RTOs stymieing new cleanenergy technologies and at times accepting them, highlight the importance of
governance structures to substantive outcomes. RTOs’ mixed performance
drives home the risks of public–private siloing, as well as the importance of
public oversight in policing the potential skewed incentives of private
providers of critical public services. These dynamics suggest that it may not be
enough to substantively fix each discrete RTO rule or practice that discriminates
against renewable energy and complementary reliability-enhancing resources.
It might, instead, be wise to engage in more structural reforms that carve away
at the ways in which RTO-governance models enable anti-renewable
incumbent power. Subpart C below offers several suggestions for reforms in
this regard, drawing on examples of RTO pro-renewables policies for
inspiration. First, though, we turn to discuss governance challenges in those
regions outside of RTOs and ISOs.
B. Non-organized Regions
RTO and ISO regions serve two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load,
which means that millions of Americans live in areas of the country without
this regional-governance construct. These areas are underdiscussed in the
academic and policy literature, likely because their diffuse governance
419. In MISO, state regulatory authorities maintain 16% of the membership voting rights.

MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE GUIDE 9 (2021). In
SPP, a regional state committee maintains oversight of transmission planning and
pricing and resource adequacy. SW. POWER POOL, GOVERNING DOCUMENTS TARIFF:
MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT § 3.10 (2021); SW. POWER POOL, GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
TARIFF: BYLAWS § 7.2 (2010); FISHER ET AL., supra note 192, at 8 (“[T]he majority of the
generators in the market regions of [MISO] and [SPP] are owned by regulated
utilities.”).
420. See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 402, at 228 (describing state and wind industry
pressure on MISO to “better integrate” renewable resources); GRAMLICH & CASPARY,
supra note 222, at 79 (“State involvement was critical to the successful regional
transmission plans that have occurred.”).
421. These same dynamics, however, are involved in the self-scheduling challenges
discussed in notes 192-94 and the accompanying text above.
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structures and regional specificity make them less easy to analyze as a bloc.422
But although RTOs deserve critique, unorganized regions pose perhaps even
greater institutional risks to the project of constructing a reliable, clean energy
grid.
Outside RTOs, reliability remains much more tightly managed by state
public-utility-commission oversight of individual utilities.423 Many of these
commissions—especially in southern states—oversee politically powerful
utilities that frequently dominate legislative and regulatory initiatives at the
state level.424 As highlighted by the recent debates in Texas, utilities often
resist energy-system change at their commissions and statehouses, deploying
reliability as an argument against clean-energy integration.425
In non-RTO regions, there is limited regional coordination of
transmission planning or electricity dispatch, each of which hinders cleanenergy integration. Although Order No. 1000 applies to these regions,426 in
practice utilities outside RTOs have resisted any dramatic transformations to
their bottom-up transmission-planning processes and rarely cooperate as well
as RTO regions.427 When it comes to dispatch, most non-RTO utilities run
their own systems that have only limited integration with neighboring
utilities.428 This siloed approach frequently causes these utilities to overbuild
fossil fuel generation as a means of ensuring reliability—all while impeding
competition from cost-effective renewable energy generators who have
limited ability to interconnect into these systems.
Some states outside RTOs have, however, begun to reconsider this go-italone governance model for their utilities, particularly given the challenges
presented by the clean-energy transition. In 2014, several non-RTO western
422. See Harrison & Welton, supra note 24, at 2-3 & 2 n.1; Wiseman, supra note 144, at 159,

173-74.
423. See LAWSON, supra note 397, at 4.
424. See Harrison & Welton, supra note 24, at 8.
425. See supra notes 11-14. For an example of this same phenomenon outside Texas, see

RACHEL WILSON, NINA PELUSO & AVI ALLISON, NORTH CAROLINA’S CLEAN ENERGY
FUTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO DUKE’S INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 1 (2019)
(highlighting the perversity of Duke’s proposed strategy of adding 9,000 MW of new
natural gas generation, given reliable and cost-comparable renewable energy options);
and Travis Fain, State Regulators: More Info Needed to Approve Duke Energy’s Natural Gas,
Other Construction Plans, WRAL.COM (updated June 30, 2021, 11:42 AM EDT),
https://perma.cc/VG3C-UR5F (“Duke has argued that it needs the reliability of natural
gas in the near and medium term.”).
426. See supra Part IV.B.
427. See Wiseman, supra note 144, at 173-74, 185.
428. See, e.g., SE. ENERGY MKT. SERVS., SOUTHEAST ENERGY EXCHANGE MARKET AGREEMENT
5-7 (2020), https://perma.cc/Z2AV-JR54 (describing the traditional southeastern
marketplace).
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states collaborated with California to form a regional energy imbalance market
(EIM).429 The EIM operates as an extension of CAISO’s preexisting EIM and
allows utilities across the region to share energy resources more efficiently in
real time.430 A 2020 analysis suggests that the EIM has created $1.1 billion in
total economic benefits in its first six years, through cost savings and better
integration of renewable energy in the region.431 Whether the EIM goes far
enough is a continued point of debate: Many suggest that a full Western RTO
would create even greater regional benefits—if participants were able to agree
on a suitable governance model that would not threaten California’s climate
leadership.432
In light of the EIM’s success, the long-market-resistant South is also
beginning to explore the possibility of more regional cooperation. One 2020
analysis of the southeastern energy grid found that if the region were to form a
competitive RTO, it could reap cost savings of $384 billion by 2040, while
lowering retail costs by 23% and carbon emissions by 37% (relative to 2018
levels).433 Utilities in the southeast have since cited this study in support of
their petition to form what they call the Southeast Energy Exchange Market.
This market—scheduled to go into operation as a result of FERC deadlock and
currently facing litigation in the D.C. Circuit—will facilitate more bilateral
sales among utilities in the region, but will not result in centrally dispatched
electricity nor full market competition.434 Many have expressed concerns that
this multi-utility agreement or “RTO-lite” arrangement might be a poor model
for facilitating a clean-energy transition in the Southeast.435 Again, it appears
that the devil is the details of these new regional-governance arrangements.
429. See Lenhart et al., supra note 380, at 94-95, 103.
430. Id. at 95.
431. See MKT. ANALYSIS & FORECASTING, CAL. ISO, WESTERN EIM BENEFITS REPORT: THIRD

432.
433.

434.

435.

QUARTER 2020 5, 17 (2020); SADIE COX & KAIFENG XU, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB’Y, INTEGRATION OF LARGE-SCALE RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE BULK POWER SYSTEM:
GOOD PRACTICES FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 7 (2020) (“A significant potential
benefit of BA coordination and expansion is that it reduces renewable curtailment. By
the end of 2018, the Western EIM market had avoided more than 700 cumulative
gigawatt-hours of curtailments.”).
See BENTHAM PAULOS, PAULOSANALYSIS, A REGIONAL POWER MARKET FOR THE WEST:
RISKS AND BENEFITS 5-7 (2018).
ERIC GIMON, MIKE O’BOYLE, TAYLOR MCNAIR, CHRISTOPHER T.M. CLACK, ADITYA
CHOUKULKAR, BRIANNA COTE & SARAH MCKEE, SUMMARY REPORT: ECONOMIC AND
CLEAN ENERGY BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A SOUTHEAST U.S. COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY MARKET 1-2 (2020).
See SE. ENERGY MKT. SERVS., supra note 428, at 1; Ethan Howland, Clean Energy,
Environmental Groups Sue FERC Over Approval of Southeast Energy Market, UTIL. DIVE
(updated Feb. 9, 2022), https://perma.cc/H9K8-P94X.
See, e.g., Protest of Public Interest Organizations at 1, 9, Ala. Power Co., Docket Nos. ER21-1111-0000 et al. (FERC June 28, 2021).
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Regional collaborations can only counteract energy silos when their
governance is calibrated to appropriately mediate public and private, and state
and federal, objectives for energy policy.
C. Regional-Governance Reforms to Support Reliability Through
Renewables
Regional-governance arrangements must shift if regions are to fulfill their
potential as integrationists of clean and reliable energy, state and federal aims,
and public and private entities. But reforming RTOs and non-RTO regional
governance will be complex. One way to conceptualize potential approaches to
creating more effective regional organizations is to identify them on a
spectrum from minor, useful adjustments to transformative systemic overhaul.
We begin with more pragmatic adjustments, which would not require
congressional action to implement. One of the central challenges with RTO
governance outlined above is its overly privatized nature. States, new entrants,
and organizations representing the public interest have little sway within
current regional-governance constructs. There are several solutions internal to
RTOs that might remediate this challenge. Perhaps the most basic would be to
enhance the transparency of RTOs, which too often operate like secret cabals.
For example, reformers in New England are pushing for their RTO’s
stakeholder processes to allow public representatives at its meetings,436 while
reformers in PJM have expressed outrage at the continued secretive nature of
transmission-rate development.437
There is a relatively simple fix available for these transparency-related
concerns: As suggested by several congressional representatives during a 2019
hearing, FERC could initiate a notice of inquiry into whether RTOs continue
to meet required governance characteristics.438 In 2007, in Order No. 719,
FERC established governance objectives that regional entities had to achieve to
maintain RTO status, emphasizing the need for RTO boards’ “responsiveness,”
defined as their “willingness, as evidenced in its practices and procedures, to
directly receive concerns and recommendations from customers and other
stakeholders, and to fully consider and take actions in response to the issues
436. FERC rejected a petition forcing such openness in 2019. RTO Insider LLC, 167 FERC

¶ 61,021, at 17-18 (Apr. 10, 2019). States, however, continue to pursue other avenues of
reform. See Mark Pazniokas, Governors Want Sunlight on the Secretive ISO New England,
CT MIRROR (Oct. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/UJT9-PWLA; NEW ENG. STATES COMM.
ON ELEC., NEW ENGLAND STATES’ VISION FOR A CLEAN, AFFORDABLE, AND RELIABLE 21ST
CENTURY REGIONAL ELECTRIC GRID 6-8 (2020), https://perma.cc/77FQ-J8SY.
437. Peskoe, supra note 149, at 52-53 (describing PJM’s “secretive” transmission-planning
process and FERC’s investigation into these practices).
438. Paul Ciampoli, Lawmakers Seek Details from FERC on RTO Governance, AM. PUB. POWER
ASS’N (June 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/MHL2-C4LA.
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that are raised.”439 In light of mounting evidence of secrecy and skewed
representation within RTOs, FERC can and should revisit whether or not
RTOs are living up to these preexisting expectations perhaps through
reopening Order No. 2000 or by requiring that RTOs have new characteristics
or functions. Similarly, such a proceeding might provide a forum for
considering whether RTOs’ current membership rules, including sectoral
designations and weighted voting procedures, prove adequately representative
of all members in light of the shifting nature of energy generation.
These reforms to internal RTO-governance arrangements would be a
useful first step, but they likely would not go far enough to create regional
entities trusted by states and public actors. Instead, FERC may need to
reconsider the role it has carved out for states within privatized regional
processes. As states have argued, they are “not just stakeholders . . . . States are
sovereign entities with their own laws that the regulators are tasked with
implementing.”440 To date, FERC has allowed RTOs to differ on the extent to
which states reserve authority over certain issues, including resource
adequacy.441 Going forward, FERC might consider rebalancing the nature of
public, state-level input and control in RTOs. Fortunately, the agency has
several tools at its disposal to do so. It might inquire as to whether RTO rules
that do not accommodate state resource preferences are “just and reasonable,”
and thereby force accommodative changes to RTO governance.442 Or, it might
explore using its section 209 authority in more muscular ways. Section 209
allows FERC to delegate its full authority over particular matters to a
committee of affected states.443 More experimental use of this section 209
authority could prove important in addressing a range of roadblocks that exist
at the clean energy–reliability nexus, including innovative approaches to
regional resource adequacy and regional carbon pricing.
Finally, and particularly if FERC initiatives prove unsuccessful, Congress
might consider more thorough set of reforms to RTO governance. A series of
court decisions has bounded FERC’s oversight of RTO-governance
439. See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity Markets, 73 Fed.

Reg. 64,100, 64,154 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
440. Catherine Morehouse, New England States Push for Governance Changes in ISO-NE, Ahead

of Anticipated MOPR Reform, UTIL. DIVE (June 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/FG7A-7ZEM.
441. See CHEN & MURNAN, supra note 391, at 2.
442. See, e.g., TRAVIS KAVULLA, NRG ENERGY, MOVING FORWARD: APPROACHES FOR STATE–

FEDERAL COOPERATION IN A DECARBONIZING ELECTRICITY SECTOR 12 (2021) (describing
how such arrangements might be modeled off of SPP, where the “Regional State
Committee” exercises the rights to “determine what the regional market will file as a
tariff at FERC with respect to certain topics that traditionally implicate states’
regulatory prerogatives”).
443. 16 U.S.C. § 824h(a)-(b).
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arrangements and their outputs under its current FPA (Federal Power Act)
authority. In particular, two D.C. Circuit cases have held that FERC cannot
dictate RTO board composition or require RTOs to make amendments to their
filings to gain FERC approval.444 If Congress is concerned that such decisions
cabin FERC too greatly, it could pass legislation overriding these precedents
and thereby give FERC greater ability to dictate the shape of RTO-governance
arrangements and their substantive outcomes. Or it could even go so far as to
consider whether to restructure RTOs more thoroughly, making them
publicly governed and accountable through more classic channels of
administrative law.445
Of course, there is a glaring challenge to tinkering too greatly with RTOs,
either at FERC or through Congress: They remain voluntary membership
organizations. If utilities do not like changes made in the degree of public
oversight of RTOs, they retain the right to exit. Because of this exit threat, and
because the regions not currently participating in RTOs are even worse than
their organized counterparts, many respected voices within the energy policy
community have begun to call for FERC to revisit the idea of making RTO
membership mandatory.446
If FERC were to heed this call, it would be entering uncharted legal
terrain. It has never been determined whether the agency has the legal
authority to require RTO membership.447 Given the increasing number of
studies that show clear economic gains to RTO membership,448 however, we
believe FERC at least has a strong argument that mandating RTO participation
is within its authority to ensure “just and reasonable” rates. The
counterargument is that section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act specifically
authorizes FERC to “promote and encourage” voluntary interconnection
within regional districts—perhaps although not definitively foreclosing more
muscular action on the part of the agency.

444. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

445.
446.

447.
448.

(addressing FERC’s authority over board composition); NRG Power Mktg. v. FERC,
862 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addressing FERC’s authority to require amendments
to tariff filings).
California’s ISO is already structured in this public manner. See Welton, supra note 142,
at 229-30.
See Letter from Former FERC Commissioners to Richard Glick, Chairman, FERC, et
al. 1-2 (June 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/9DP2-9LU6. But see Jasmin Melvin, Ex-state
Utility Regulators Caution FERC Against Upending Voluntary RTO Regime, S&P GLOB.
(June 25, 2021, 3:25 PM UTC), https://perma.cc/P6TA-5DSN (reporting on a response
letter urging FERC to do the opposite).
FERC abandoned efforts in the early 2000s to mandate RTOs for political reasons as
well as legal uncertainty. See Harrison & Welton, supra note 24, at 2.
See GIMON ET AL., supra note 433, at 9.
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Legal authority aside, there are careful political considerations that must
enter any decision about whether FERC or Congress should mandate RTOs. As
we have catalogued above, current RTOs are far from perfect. If not coupled
with governance reforms, a requirement that all states join RTOs could end up
setting some states back on their clean-energy goals, should their newly
formed RTO prove resistant to integrating renewable energy thoroughly into
its markets. Therefore, we think it imperative that FERC and Congress focus
first on reforming existing RTOs to allow them to live up to their potential as
mediators among the energy-governance silos. Only then should reformers
consider whether mandatory membership would be an advisable or necessary
accompanying shift.
Conclusion
Building a cleaner, more reliable grid is central to the fight against climate
change. The grid cannot remain reliable under conditions of climate change
without a commitment to decarbonization through clean energy. Thus,
politicians’ resort to the fear of blackouts as an objection to ambitious climate
action is a dangerous stunt.
As this Article demonstrates, however, current institutional arrangements
in U.S. energy law exacerbate this misperceived tension between clean energy
and reliability by disaggregating responsibility across actors and scales. We
have argued that policy and governance reforms are available to remediate
these tensions without dramatically upending the central features of our
disaggregated energy governance regime. These reforms should be priorities
for those seeking to advance climate policy in the United States, given the
central importance of the electricity grid to climate stabilization.
As we close, it is worth reemphasizing that a clean, reliable grid is crucial
not only as a matter of sound economic policy and climate politics, but also
from an equity perspective. The technical nature of conversations about grid
reform often serves to obscure its social stakes. But make no mistake: The
transition to a clean, reliable grid is fundamentally a matter of justice. The
fossil fuel–based grid has too long disproportionately harmed low-income
communities and communities of color.449 Going forward, wealthy Americans
might be able to insulate themselves from the risks of climate change and grid
failure, but the vast majority of Americans will be rendered increasingly
vulnerable to both challenges over time. Thus, although the clean-energy
transition presents justice-related challenges of its own,450 decarbonization—
449. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
450. Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43

HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 307, 310-11 (2019) (charting the justice challenges presented by the
clean-energy transition).
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designed and implemented in a matter that protects low-income ratepayers
from major rate increases—remains a critical foundation of a more just future.
The reforms we have proposed to energy markets, energy governance, and
transmission planning and siting will not remediate all of these inequities—but
they are a vital step in the right direction. A nationally reliable, clean,
interconnected grid would bring less expensive renewable energy to
communities disproportionately facing energy poverty and the health impacts
of fossil fuels. And a legal regime that appropriately values the contributions of
clean energy to reliability will empower communities to pursue cleaner, more
reliable energy sources, including microgrids, distributed energy resources, and
energy storage. If our institutions can deliver it, such a grid will ultimately
help ensure that all communities—not just privileged ones—maintain
electricity services in the face of the weather extremes that climate change is
already delivering to our doors.
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